What can Norway learn from other states’ approach to hybrid threats? – A report to the Norwegian Defence Commission

FFI-Report 2022
This publication is only available in Norwegian

About the publication

Report number

22/02310

ISBN

978-82-464-3438-4

Format

PDF-document

Size

1.7 MB

Language

Norwegian

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Julie Celine Bergaust Frida Skjei Stig Rune Sellevåg
The Norwegian Defence Commission of 2021−2023 shall assess security and defence choices and priorities for Norway in a 10−20 year perspective. As part of this assessment, the Norwe-gian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has been commissioned to consider what Norway can learn from Finland, Sweden, Estonia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia regarding how they work to deter, detect and respond to hybrid threats. The report sheds light on suggested best practices in Nato and the EU, and how the different states have approached the topic of hybrid threats. A non-exhaustive list of relevant measures is presented. We have not undertaken examinations on the effectiveness of the measures. Based on the suggested best practices and the states’ approaches, recommendations regard-ing what Norway can learn to strengthen the ability to counter hybrid threats is given. Based on this study FFI gives the following recommendations to the Defence Commission: (i) Clarification of concepts and terms is decisive for situational awareness. The Defence Com-mission should use the Ministry of Defence’s definition for the purpose of their mandate, but the conceptual understanding of hybrid threats should be advanced to develop policies that differ-entiate between different activities, level of intensity, and degree of severity. (ii) Suggested best practices and other states’ approaches highlights that national handling must be syncronised, systematic and customized. The Defence Commission should look further into how a proactive and whole-of-society approach – with the ability to act syncronised, sys-tematic and customized – can be organised. As part of this, the Defence Commission should consider a comprehensive national security and defence concept. (iii) The Defence Commission should consider how a strategic function to strengthen the Norwe-gian government’s situational awareness could be organised, how the Norwegian intelligence and security services can be strengthened, and whether today’s structure for domestic and for-eign intelligence should be modified. (iv) The largest room for development in Norway as a liberal democracy is to strengthen resili-ence in our democracy, in critical infrastructure and in the population. The Defence Commission should consider how a modern psychological defence could be organised in Norway. (v) Legal changes ought to be considered to be narrow, in order to take care of rule of law, de-mocracy and human rights, and ensure that the measures initiated to protect our values are not at the expense of the same values we seek to protect. (vi) Caution should be exercised regarding possible expansions of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ responsibility related to countering hybrid threats. The Armed Forces’ most important task is to maintain military capacity for deterrence, contribute to situational awareness and as-sist civilian authorities with maintaining societal security.

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