Boko Haram – an overview

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Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

31 May 2013
Keywords

Boko Haram
Z
Vest-Afrika
Islamisme
Terrorisme
Opprørsbevegelser

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English Summary

This report is a study of the militant Islamist group Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram. The report provides an overview of the emergence, ideology, and organization of Boko Haram, its key members and major attacks, as well as relevant literature on the group.

Boko Haram has been operating in Nigeria since the late 1990s or early 2000s, becoming increasingly active and violent since 2010. The group’s main declared goals are to overthrow the Nigerian government and institute Islamic law (Sharia). Boko Haram also wants to free imprisoned members and avenge the death of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by Nigerian police in 2009. The majority of Boko Haram’s attacks target official figures and symbols, especially the police and security forces. Since mid-2011 there has also been an increase in attacks on Christian targets.

There have been speculations concerning Boko Haram forging alliances with foreign militant movements, including al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar Dine in Mali. There are many indications that such alliances exist, including statements from local and international security officials. However, the exact nature and extent of the connections are difficult to determine. So far, Boko Haram has focused mainly on national grievances and targets. It has only conducted one attack outside Nigeria: the kidnapping of seven Frenchmen in Cameroon in February 2013. This report warns against exaggerating Boko Haram’s connections with foreign militants and considers the likelihood of Boko Haram becoming a major international terrorist threat in the near future to be relatively low. Still, the possibility of Boko Haram or one of its factions/splinter groups becoming more internationally oriented and mounting further attacks outside Nigeria cannot be ruled out. For instance, the splinter group Ansaru has conducted several attacks against Westerners and targeted soldiers going to Mali, and appears more globally oriented than the “core” Boko Haram movement led by Abukakar Shekau.
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Preface

This report was written within the framework of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s (FFI’s) Terrorism Research Group (TERRA) and its Master’s fellowship program. Since 1999 TERRA has produced academic research for the Norwegian Government regarding insurgent and terrorist groups that pursue transnational militancy. The research focuses mainly on militant Islamist actors, but also includes right-wing extremism and militancy in Europe and Russia. TERRA is funded primarily by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and uses unclassified primary sources to study the history, structure, ideology, and behavior of terrorists. TERRA staff includes historians, political scientists and linguists possessing area knowledge and language skills. FFI is recognized as one of the world’s leading centers for the academic study of militant Islamism.

FFI terrorism research continuously looks into new, emerging armed conflicts and terrorist threat actors. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa in wake of the Arab Spring, the Tuareg insurgency in Mali, and regional activities by al-Qaida’s Algeria branch (AQIM) have raised concerns that West Africa could turn into an important sanctuary and conflict theater for transnational jihadists. Boko Haram in Nigeria is an understudied actor that could come to play a significant role in such a scenario. This report describes the background, emergence and evolution of Boko Haram with a view to provide a foundation for understanding its local, regional and international aspects, as well as the potential for cooperation with al-Qaeda and likeminded groups.
1 Introduction

This report is a study of the militant Islamist group Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram.\(^1\) Boko Haram has been operating in Nigeria since the late 1990s or early 2000s, becoming increasingly active and violent since 2010. Its main declared goals are to overthrow the Nigerian government and institute Islamic Law (Sharia). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Boko Haram is among the world’s most active terrorist groups, but there are few academic studies of the group.\(^2\) This report aims to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive overview of the emergence, ideology, and organization of Boko Haram, its key members and major attacks, as well as relevant literature on the group. The report is written for researchers, policymakers and others who are interested in learning more about Boko Haram. It is mainly descriptive, but it also raises some analytical questions. Among the main questions discussed are: How and why did Boko Haram emerge? How is it organized? How has Boko Haram evolved with time? Will Boko Haram become an international terrorist threat? Does Boko Haram have ties to other terrorist groups in the region, such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab? The report does not provide policy prescriptions or enter into political debates about how to counter Boko Haram, such as the question of offering amnesty for group members.

The report consists of eight parts. Following this introduction, the second chapter briefly discusses the main methods and sources of information used in the report. The third chapter provides a short overview of Islamism in Nigeria, thus placing Boko Haram in context. The fourth chapter contains general background information on Boko Haram, giving an account of the origin of the group’s name, its emergence, evolution and ideology, as well as a discussion of some of the main explanations for the rise of Boko Haram. The fifth chapter addresses the organization of Boko Haram: its size and members, its organizational structure, the biographies of key members, its ties to other terrorist networks and its sources of funding. The sixth chapter provides an overview of Boko Haram’s operations and discusses how its tactics and targets have changed over time. The report concludes with a summary of the main findings and a bibliography of literature concerning (radical) Islam in Nigeria in general, and Boko Haram in particular. The appendices contain a map of Nigeria (Appendix A), a list of abbreviations (Appendix B), a glossary of key terms (Appendix C), and a timeline of incidents related to Boko Haram (Appendix D).

\(^1\) There are many different transliterations of Boko Haram’s Arabic name. This report adopts the transliteration used by Jacob Zenn in all his publications, and employs it consistently whenever there is a need to refer to the Arabic name of the group. However, the report generally uses the name Boko Haram to denote the group.

2 Methodology and Sources

This study provides an overview of the background, organization and operations of Boko Haram. It gathers the existing information on Boko Haram and critically discusses the main arguments outlined in the literature. The report is mainly descriptive and seeks to identify facts and various narratives on Boko Haram. When discussing the more analytical questions, such as why Boko Haram emerged (Section 4.5) and to what extent Boko Haram has ties with other terrorist groups (Section 5.4), the report also makes some independent assessments.

The main methods of data collection for the report are reviews of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include online video clips and written statements made by representatives of Boko Haram, while the secondary sources mainly consist of academic articles and news reports on the group. In addition, the author traveled to Nigeria for three weeks and conducted interviews with academics, diplomats and security officials with knowledge on Boko Haram and the security situation in the country.

Relevant literature has been identified through searches for “Boko Haram”, “terrorism + Nigeria” and “Islamism + Nigeria” in several academic search engines, as well as by studying the lists of references in articles about Boko Haram and (radical) Islam in Nigeria. The resulting bibliography can be found in Section 8. The literature consulted is in English and French, not in the local Hausa language. The study is based on open sources.

The literature review indicates that despite an increase in activity by Boko Haram since 2010, the group remains understudied. In general, the academic literature is limited and fragmented, and some of the information it provides is contradictory. Most of the articles that have been written are short and descriptive, focusing on one or a few empirical issues, such as a specific attack, Boko Haram’s emergence, its organizational structure or its modus operandi. The literature focuses mostly on Boko Haram in its national context, but recently, the possible transnational aspects of the group, including its relationship with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the conflict in Mali, have received much attention. At the time of writing, no comprehensive studies of Boko Haram’s many dimensions appear to exist. This report therefore compiles information from many different sources.

Due to the somewhat limited availability of academic research on Boko Haram, local and international newspapers are an important source of information for this study. News reports about various Boko Haram attacks constitute an important foundation for the discussion of the group’s operations (Chapter 6), and provide much of the material for the biographies of the

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3 The following websites have been used:
- [http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search/selectdb?sid=e4863d35-9955-4fcd-9680-6c496e0e29%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=106](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search/selectdb?sid=e4863d35-9955-4fcd-9680-6c496e0e29%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=106)
- [http://scholar.google.no/](http://scholar.google.no/)

leadership presented in Section 5.3. The author consulted major national Nigerian newspapers, such as Leadership, This Day, The Guardian Nigeria, Vanguard, Daily Trust, PM News, and The Nigerian Tribune, in addition to major international media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, Le Monde, Al-Jazeera, The New York Times, and The Washington Post.

In addition to academic articles and news reports, the author studied English transcripts of Boko Haram’s own statements. Boko Haram appears not to have issued any comprehensive ideological declaration stating its objectives and strategies. A manifesto exists signed Boko Haram, but most experts believe it is a falsification. However, the group has released several shorter statements in which they have claimed responsibility for attacks, issued threats or reacted to public criticisms from powerful Nigerian figures. Most of these statements have been communicated through phone calls or e-mails to local journalists. They have often been attributed to Boko Haram’s public spokesman “Abu Qaqa”, an alias which is probably used by more than one person. The group’s current leader, Abubakar Shekau, has released other statements in videos or audio-clips on YouTube. In addition, local and international media have been able to interview some of Boko Haram’s leaders. Several recordings of sermons by the founder Mohammed Yusuf are available on DVDs circulated in Nigeria, as well as on YouTube. These primary sources are important for identifying some of Boko Haram’s most central ideas and objectives (see Section 4.4). However, the statements and videos published by Boko Haram have a particular political purpose and should be met with sound skepticism. For instance, publicly overemphasizing its regional connections could be a strategy employed to enhance the group’s credentials among radicals and facilitate recruitment and financial support.

Likewise, the use of secondary sources, and especially news reports, raises questions of reliability. First, the journalists and researchers writing on Boko Haram do not always reveal their sources of information. This is often to protect informants, but it makes it difficult to assess reliability and verify information. Secondly, news reports are written by journalists under time pressure, and often contain factual errors, bias and exaggeration. Furthermore, the Nigerian press is mostly southern based and may lack information about or misunderstand developments in the north – the area where Boko Haram operates. In addition, threats and intimidation from Boko

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Haram make journalists and researchers increasingly unwilling, or unable, to report stories about the security situation in Nigeria.10

Finally, the information provided by the Nigerian authorities must be treated with some caution. According to Amnesty International, “The Nigerian authorities are reluctant to give information about incidents and are believed to regularly underreport the number of casualties”.11 There are often wide discrepancies between official statements and the eyewitness accounts of local people.

Given these uncertainties, this report assesses all information critically, and uses multiple sources to crosscheck facts and information. The research undertaken in Nigeria by the author was important in this regard. The author interviewed diplomats, researchers, religious leaders, civil society representatives and Nigerian security officials, all of whom have extensive knowledge about Boko Haram and the security situation in Nigeria. The interviews were very useful in order to confirm or invalidate the information previously obtained on Boko Haram from various secondary sources. The field trip thus helped validate the contents of this report. Nevertheless, the informal and illegal character of violent extremist groups like Boko Haram means that much of the material is still difficult to verify and remains uncertain even after consulting multiple sources.

3 Islamism in Nigeria

Islam was introduced to northern Nigeria as early as the 11th century and became well established in the major urban centers of the North by the 16th century, gradually spreading into the countryside and toward the “middle belt” of Nigeria. In 2013, about half of Nigeria’s population is Muslim, about half is Christian and a small minority holds various indigenous beliefs. Muslims in Nigeria are predominantly Sunni, but there is also a significant Shia minority. The main Islamic influence is concentrated in the northern states, 12 of which have been operating under an institutionalized Sharia legal code since 2000.12

Northern Nigeria has a long tradition of Islamic fundamentalism, but it has generally been relatively non-political, focusing on withdrawal from society to study the Quran and leading a pure, religious life.13 However, there have also been instances of violent Islamist uprisings against the state, such as the jihad of Dan Fodio in the 19th century, and the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1970s and 1980s.

11 Ibid. p. 16.
In the beginning of the 19th century, the religious scholar Usman Dan Fodio led a group of Muslims of the Fulani tribe in a revolt against the two dominant Muslim civilizations in the region: the Hausa cities of northern Nigeria and the sultanate of Borno (roughly the region of the Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe, together with parts of Chad). Arguing that the rulers were oppressive, did not observe Sharia and allowed the practice of Islam to be mixed with traditional religion, Dan Fodio led his followers into exile in order to form a true Islamic state. He later called for jihad and launched an attack that established the Sokoto Caliphate (also called the Fulani Empire), stretching across northern Nigeria and into neighboring countries. The Sultan of Sokoto remains one of the main religious leaders of Nigerian Muslims, and according to David Cook, Dan Fodio’s legacy of both withdrawal and jihad is seen as normative by many northern Nigerian Muslims, including Boko Haram.

The Maitatsine movement was led by a Cameroonian preacher known as Marwa, who arrived in the northern Nigerian city of Kano around 1970 and took up many of Dan Fodio’s teachings. Marwa preached against Nigeria’s secular government, political corruption, and the moderate religious establishment. He quickly gained many followers, especially among the poor. During the 1970s, the Maitatsine gradually turned more violent, and relations between the group and the government deteriorated. Marwa was killed in 1980 during a confrontation with police. The movement dispersed, but reemerged as isolated pockets of extremism in the northern part of the country. Maitatsine teachings are said to be a source of ideological inspiration for Boko Haram.

Peter Chalk identifies three main streams of Islamic thinking in contemporary Nigeria: conservatism, modernism and fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is by far the most marginal of the three, and focuses on “so-called antisystem movements that articulate vehement opposition to the existing political (secular) status quo, the federal government, established (and perceived ineffectual) religious elites, modern-oriented Muslim identity, and foreign – mainly Western – influences.” The fundamentalists cite the dysfunctional conditions of the secular Nigerian state as a reason to challenge current moral and political order through religion. Their aim is a society guided by the rules and principles of Islam, and they are willing to suffer, struggle and actively embrace martyrdom to achieve this end. Some see Boko Haram as a product of an age-old tradition of such Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, fuelled by increasingly puritan views on

15 David Cook, “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, CTC Sentinel 4, no. 9 (2011). Usman dan Fodio’s jihad has also provided inspiration for a series of holy wars in other parts of the Sahel, leading to the foundation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. “An analogy has been drawn between Usman dan Fodio’s jihad and the French Revolution in terms of its widespread impact. Just as the French Revolution affected the course of European history in the nineteenth century, the Sokoto jihad affected the course of history throughout the savanna from Senegal to the Red Sea.” (Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Nigeria: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991)).
18 Ibid. p. 420.
19 Ibid. p. 421.
Islam, and increasingly intolerant views regarding the role and place of Islam in a modern secular state.20

Nigerian Islamism is not uniform, but manifests itself in a variety of forms. Besides Boko Haram, some of the major Islamist trends in Nigeria (not all violent) include:21

- **The Qadariyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods**: The dominant Sufi groups.22
- **Izala (Jama'at Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna)**: An anti-Sufi movement established to counter what the groups sees as religious innovation (bid’ah) practiced by the Sufi brotherhoods.23 The group was split into two factions for a period, but they reunited again in 2011.24
- **The Muslim Brothers-Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN)**: IMN is led by Sheikh Ibraheem El Zakzaky. Initially it was a Sunni organization, but close associations with Iran lead to Shiite doctrine becoming influential.25 Today, IMN is sometimes characterized as a Sunni organization strongly influenced by Iran, and sometimes as a predominantly Shiite organization.26 IMN is dedicated to promoting an Islamic revolution in Nigeria similar to that of Iran. The group was noted for its street-level violence in the 1990s, for example the beheading of Gideon Alakuta in 1994 for desecrating the Quran.27 The former leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, claimed to have been a member of IMN in the 1990s.28
- **The Movement for Islamic Revival (Ja'amutu Tajidmul Islamia, JTI)**: JTI was formed as a splinter group from IMN. It is led by Abubakar Mujahid.29 Mohammed Yusuf, the first leader of Boko Haram, is said to have been the leader of the Borno State section of JTI in the late 1990s.30
- **Yan Kala Kato**: Considered an offshoot of the Maitatsine movement. Yan Kalo Kato believes Islamic jurisprudence derives solely from the Quran. The group was responsible

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23 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
for the Kala Kato Riots of December 2009 in Bauchi, which led to the killing of 70 people. They share Boko Haram’s rejection of Western education.31

It is difficult to assess what support these movements have within the broader Muslim population in Nigeria. According to Chalk, current Islamic trends in Nigeria appear to be moving in the direction of heightened fundamentalism. He argues that poverty, political marginalization and unemployment have created an environment “ripe for antisystem religious tendencies”.32 A 2011 Gallup survey found that the majority of residents in the mainly Muslim Northeast and Northwest Nigeria said Sharia must be a source of legislation (79% and 64% respectively), but among these, a minority said it must be the only source.33 The survey also found that 34% of the residents in Boko Haram’s core operating area in the Northeast believe greater interaction with the West is more of a threat than a benefit (the national average was 35%). This is not a direct measure of the support for Boko Haram or other extremist religious groups, but it indicates that although their anti-Western rhetoric has some support, it is not shared by the majority of Nigerians.

Having briefly described the general trends of Islamism in Nigeria, the next chapters look at Boko Haram in more detail.

4 Background

4.1 Name

“Boko Haram” in the local Hausa language is often loosely translated as “Western education/civilization is forbidden”. The group was accorded this nickname due to its preaching against attending government schools and universities or having government jobs.34 The word “boko” is popularly used to denote the formal educational system in Nigeria, but its specific meaning is disputed. According to some, in classical Hausa language “boko” literally means “deception” or “deceit”. It is used to describe the formal educational system because in the colonial period this system was associated with Christian missionaries and seen as a disguise for evangelism and Western beliefs. Others consider the word “boko” as a corruption of the English word “book”, which is also associated with Western education and culture. The word “haram” is adopted from Arabic, and usually means sin/forbidden.35

In a 2009 interview with BBC, the movement’s first leader, Mohammed Yusuf, argued that Western education “spoils the belief in one God”. He said that “There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam,” and he also rejected the idea that the world is round, the theory of Darwinism, and that rain is part of the hydrological cycle. Many believe Yusuf banned all things Western, but Paul Lubeck has pointed out that Yusuf embraced technology in his personal life and merely believed Western education should be “mediated through Islamic scholarship”. In an August 2009 statement, Sanni Umaru, the man who proclaimed himself leader of Boko Haram after the death of Yusuf, explained the meaning of Boko Haram:

*Boko Haram does not in any way mean Western Education is a sin as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means Western Civilisation is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but is not determined by Western Education.*

In several statements since then, the group has rejected the name Boko Haram, calling itself *Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad*, Arabic for “Sunni Muslims for Preaching and Jihad”. For practical reasons, this report uses the name Boko Haram to denote the group.

### 4.2 Emergence

There is some disagreement among academics regarding when and how Boko Haram emerged. Part of the reason is that scholars differ on how to define the emergence of a group. Some trace the origins of the ideas held by the group, while others trace members, organizational structures or names. Radical Islamist groups also tend to be loosely organized and constantly change names. Thus, it is often difficult to determine whether or not they are in fact the same group of people operating under new names, various factions of the same group, or different groups. There are at least four different accounts of how Boko Haram emerged, some of them compatible and others less so.

According to one source, Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram after breaking away from the renowned Islamic cleric Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam and his followers.

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37 Ibid.
Though both movements were rooted in Salafi/Wahhabi ideology, their strategies were divergent: Sheik Ja'afar pushed towards an increased Islamization of the political institutions of Nigeria, while Yusuf “advocated the necessity of a radical withdrawal from anything related to the Nigerian state, including working for the police, participating in the government, working in the administration of Sharia within the framework of the state, and studying in formal educational institutions…”. Yusuf therefore broke away from his teacher and founded Boko Haram sometime during the beginning of the 2000s.

Another version of the story is that the group was known by Nigerian authorities to have existed since 1995 under the name of Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra. It has subsequently flourished under various names such as the Nigerian Taliban, the Yusufiyah Sect, and Boko Haram.

Yet another account traces the origins of Boko Haram back to the Maitatsine movement in the 1970/80s (see Section 3). The Maitatsine dispersed following violent confrontations with the police in the early 1980s, but some extremist cells retreated to remote areas in the North. Two decades later, in 2000, several of these factions united in a loosely organized movement known as the Nigerian Taliban or the Taliban groups. They “advocated for the imposition of Sharia law across the north and rallied against what it considered to be the malign influence of Western culture on domestic society”. The Nigerian Taliban was almost completely destroyed by Nigerian military forces in 2004, but Mohammed Yusuf took up the radical Islamic cause. He founded a fundamentalist Islamic school in 2002, attracting students from across northern Nigeria. Together with surviving members from the Nigerian Taliban, these students were among the original members of Boko Haram.

A forth account takes a more recent starting point. It traces the origins of Boko Haram specifically to the city of Maiduguri in northern Nigeria, but is otherwise relatively similar to the third. In 2002 a group of radical youths who had worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Nidimi Mosque in Maiduguri broke away from the mosque and declared that the Nigerian Islamic establishment was intolerably corrupt. They embarked on hijra (see Appendix C for glossary), and set up a separatist community based on strict Islamic principles in the village of Kanama, near the border with Niger. They preached an anti-state ideology and called for other Muslims to withdraw from society and return to a life under “true” Islamic law. Some see this as the beginning of Boko Haram, although that name was not yet in use. The group became known as “the Nigerian Taliban”, though there is no evidence that they had any links to the Taliban or other international

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
In December 2003 the group came into conflict with police, reportedly over a community dispute over fishing rights. Subsequent events are unclear; either the group attacked local police stations or the army besieged the group’s mosque. Either way, most of the group’s members were killed during the conflict, including the leader. In 2004 the survivors returned to Maiduguri and rejoined the youth group originating from the Alhaji Muhammadu Nidimi Mosque, now led by Mohammed Yusuf. They continued to work for the Islamist cause, and their group later became known as Boko Haram.

Variations over the fourth account of Boko Haram’s origins are most common, and they are also the most detailed. It therefore appears to be the most plausible explanation, but this report can neither confirm nor deny any of the accounts. However, there is a consensus that by mid-2004, Mohammed Yusuf was the leader of a group of radical Islamists based in Maiduguri, Borno State.

4.3 Evolution

The evolution of Boko Haram can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasts from the group’s formation until the death of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009, during which time the group was relatively peaceful. The second phase lasts from September 2010 until today (2013), and is characterized by radicalization and increasing violence.

Phase 1: 2003–2009

During the first phase, Boko Haram was mainly focused upon withdrawal from society. The leader, Mohammed Yusuf, preached against what he saw as the failure of the modern lifestyles of Nigerian Muslims to be truly Islamic. He argued that the 12 northern states that had adopted the Sharia legal code in 2000 were not implementing it strictly enough. He advocated a purer way of Islamic life away from society, and constructed a mosque for the group on land owned by his father-in-law. The mosque was named Ibn Tamiyyah Masjid after the medieval Islamic theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Tamiyyah (1263–1328). Gradually “a state within a state” was established, with a cabinet, its own religious police and a large farm. A calm period followed as the group focused on recruiting new members and shoring up resources. Occasional *al-amr bi-l-ma`ruf wa-l-nahy `an al-munkar* attacks (see footnote) and clashes with the police occurred, but these were short-lived and never evolved into an organized armed struggle against the state.

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51 Ibid.
55 Bøås, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the "Taleban" to Boko Haram II,” p. 3. *Al-amr bi-l-ma`ruf wa-l-nahy `an al-munkar* (‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’) is the duty of Muslims to actively prevent moral degradation and sinful acts by other Muslims. It entails moral policing based on
However, in 2009 Boko Haram came into conflict with the authorities in a way similar to the 2003 confrontations (see Section 4.2). Apparently, members of the group on their way to a funeral were stopped by the police because they were not wearing motorcycle helmets. They began arguing, and shots were fired. Several people were injured. The group then attacked police stations and other government buildings in Yobe and Bauchi, killing several policemen. They also attacked mosques and churches. The Nigerian military responded, and five days of fighting left more than 800 dead, mostly Boko Haram members. On the fourth day of the confrontations, July 30th 2009, Boko Haram’s leader Mohammed Yusuf was captured. He died in custody shortly after. The regional police assistant inspector-general, Moses Anegbode, told Nigerian television that “Mohammed Yusuf was killed by security forces in a shootout while trying to escape”. However, officials working for Human Rights Watch in Nigeria called for an immediate investigation into the killing, labeling it “extrajudicial” and “illegal”.

The death of Yusuf marked the end of the first, relatively calm period of Boko Haram’s evolution. The police continued to hunt for Boko Haram members and sympathizers, making arrests and confiscating their property if they had fled. A number of people who were suspected of being supporters of Boko Haram disappeared during this period (more than 100, according to a local journalist), but the police deny any involvement. Remaining Boko Haram members fled the area, and little is known of their whereabouts from September 2009 to September 2010. Security sources in Nigeria told Reuters in January 2012 that they had traced a number of Nigerians to insurgent training camps in Algeria during this time period. Other sources point to Mali, Somalia and Cameroon. At the time, Boko Haram was widely believed to be extinct.

**Phase 2: 2010–2013**

The second phase of Boko Haram’s evolution is characterized by violent radicalization. By mid-2010, Boko Haram reappeared in Nigeria under a new leader, believed to be Abubakar Mohammad Shekau, Yusuf’s former second-in-command (see Section 5.3). He announced his leadership of the group in a video released in April 2010. In September of the same year Boko Haram attacked a prison in Bauchi, freeing some 700 inmates, including roughly 100 followers of Boko Haram. This attack marked the start of a new and increasingly violent stage in Boko Haram’s evolution, in which the group’s armed operations have become more frequent and religious principles, and, in some sectarian conflicts, violence is used. For example, Boko Haram has attacked Muslims who were drinking alcohol and playing cards.

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57 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
advanced. From executing only a handful of attacks per year using small hand weapons and knives before 2009, in the second phase, Boko Haram began conducting attacks almost every week using explosives and, from 2011, suicide attacks. Among the most spectacular attacks attributed to Boko Haram are the 2010 and 2011 Christmas day bombings of churches and Christian worshippers, the 2011 suicide bombings of the police headquarters and the UN compound in Abuja, and the coordinated January 2012 bombings in Kano. (See Section 6 and Appendix D for a more detailed overview of attacks by Boko Haram).

4.4 Ideology

It is not entirely clear what Boko Haram wants to achieve through its attacks. As described in Chapter 2, the group appears not to have issued any major ideological declaration, but based on several shorter statements and media interviews, it is possible to identify some of Boko Haram’s central aims. However, the ideology expressed in official statements may not be shared by all members of the group. Some suggest that the movement is experiencing internal discord and fragmentation (see Section 5.2). According to this perspective one segment of the leadership is working towards a broader militant Islamist agenda and builds ties to international terrorist organizations, while most other elements of Boko Haram remain focused exclusively on local causes, antagonism against the government being the primary rallying point. According to The Economist, Boko Haram “comprises an ever-greater number of malcontents with a variety of aims. Some are criminals using the Boko Haram label to disguise the motives for attacks. (…) At the other end of the spectrum are dierch Islamists who fervently desire the demise of the secular state and want to bring Boko Haram under al-Qaeda’s umbrella…” It is thus important to keep in mind that while the group’s statements provide us with an overall impression of what the central organization aims to achieve, the motivations of individual Boko Haram members may vary greatly.

In June 2011, Boko Haram released a list of conditions to be met before the movement would consider a ceasefire and dialogue with the government. The list contains some of Boko Haram’s explicitly stated objectives:

- Unconditional release of all imprisoned members of Boko Haram.
- The immediate prosecution of all those involved in the killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf after he was taken into police custody in July 2009.
- An investigation into the alleged poisoning of Boko Haram suspects awaiting trial.
- Implementation of Sharia in the 12 northern states of Nigeria.

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The first three demands address the issue of imprisoned Boko Haram members and their treatment. This reflects how the movement distrusts Nigerian security forces (both the army and the police) and believes that imprisoned followers are maltreated when captured. The group often repeats these demands for the release of Boko Haram members and prosecution of Yusuf’s killers in its statements. The fourth demand relates to the implementation and practicing of Islamic Law in Nigeria. The 12 northern states mentioned in the statement adopted Sharia legal codes around year 2000, but their current application does not meet Boko Haram’s standards. While the June 2011 statement only called for Sharia in 12 northern states, other statements demand that Islamic Law should apply throughout the country. It is noteworthy that apart from demands for Sharia, which are shared by most Islamist trends, the group’s objectives appear to have little to do with the international Islamist agenda, and more to do with the local struggle between the movement on one hand, and the police and military on the other hand.

In addition to the mentioned demands, the question of governance figures prominently in Boko Haram statements. The movement explicitly states that it aims to overthrow the government; remove democracy and establish an Islamic state; ensure that Muslims rule Nigeria; and make President Goodluck Jonathan convert to Islam and step down. In fact, many of Shekau’s statements address President Goodluck Jonathan directly, saying “this is a message to President Jonathan”, or something to that effect. These statements often focus on the government’s inability to govern the country, with Boko Haram accusing the regime of corruption and apostasy.

Such political statements were less prominent before 2009, under former leader Mohammed Yusuf. He focused more on moral issues, and criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state. He preached withdrawal from society and advocated a purer way of Islamic life. Under Yusuf’s leadership, the group practiced religious vigilantism or moral policing, usually advocating against the consumption of alcohol and other non-Islamic practices. In August 2009, Sanni Umaru, who claimed to act as leader of Boko Haram for a short time period after Yusuf’s death in 2009, explained that Boko Haram believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture and oppose “Western ways of life”, including “the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexualism, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilization”. Nowadays, condemnation of immoral practices and lifestyles does not seem to be a main priority for the movement. Still, some of Boko Haram’s recent attacks...

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71 Onuoha, “The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure”.
72 Cook, “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”.
have targeted bars, card players and people who have offended Islam, indicating that moral policing remains part of the broader agenda.

Boko Haram’s statements and target selection also seem to indicate a strong sense of injustice and a desire for vengeance against people perceived to have treated the movement badly or unfairly. When Boko Haram claims an attack, it often refers to a previous wrongdoing against Muslims. For example, Shekau once justified Boko Haram’s attacks against Christians by saying that it was them “who slaughtered us and took our wives and humiliated us…” .74 Another time he claimed that Boko Haram only kills those “who have offended us, arrested our people and killed them.” 75 Boko Haram’s persistent targeting of security forces can also be seen as a quest for revenge, in particular for the killing of former leader Mohammed Yusuf in custody, and more generally for the authorities’ arrests and killings of other Boko Haram followers. 76 Since 2011, Boko Haram has increasingly threatened and targeted Christians. The movement has threatened to drive Christians out of northern Nigeria.77 In a January 2012 video statement, Shekau stated that:

You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of God. This religion of Christianity you are practicing is not a religion of God – it is paganism. God frowns at it. What you are practicing is not religion. Aside that, you Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like cannibals! You did all you wanted to us. We are trying to coerce you to embrace Islam, because that is what God instructed us to do. Even at that, without provocation, you slaughtered us and took our wives and humiliated us! (...) [T]o you Christians, repent! This path we're taking is God's path.78

Similar verbal attacks on Christians are repeated in several other statements, for instance in another January 2012 video clip of Shekau.79 Such statements have been paralleled by a steep rise in attacks on Christian targets, especially churches. Before 2011, such attacks were relatively uncommon, but since mid-2011 Boko Haram has been targeting Christians on a large scale.80 This strategy allows Boko Haram to tap into growing frustrations among Muslims in the North

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with the government of President Jonathan, who is a Christian from the South. By targeting Christian churches and communities, Boko Haram can portray itself as the protector of northern interests and the “Islamic alternative to the corrupt status quo”.  

In some of its statements Boko Haram also addresses social and economic grievances, and portrays itself as the champion of poor Muslims. For instance, in a 2012 Guardian interview, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa said that “Poor people are tired of the injustice, people are crying for saviors and they know the messiahs are Boko Haram.” 

Finally, Boko Haram statements indicate a willingness to associate with globally oriented militant Islamists, such as al-Qaeda (whether or not actual links exist between Boko Haram and global Islamist networks is discussed in more detail in Section 5.4). For instance, Sanni Umaru said in 2009 that Boko Haram respect and support al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, whose commands they would carry out in Nigeria. In a 2012 interview, spokesman Abu Qaqa said that it would be no problem for Boko Haram to gain support from al-Qaeda, as they were fighting for the same goal, an Islamic state. In another statement, Shekau declared sympathy with al-Qaeda and their fight against America. Anti-American rhetoric has figured in several of Shekau’s statements. For instance, in 2010 he warned the United States: “do not think jihad is over. Rather, jihad has just begun… Oh, America, die with your fury”. In a video from November 29, 2012, Shekau expressed his group’s solidarity with al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, Somalia and Yemen, and called for fellow fighters to continue their jihad on all battlefronts, including in Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen. Boko Haram has also adopted operational methods usually associated with internationally oriented terrorist groups, using suicide attacks and publishing a martyrdom video – tactics not used in Nigeria before 2011. On the other hand, only one among the several hundred attacks Boko Haram has conducted over the last three years was against an international target; the UN suicide bombing in 2011. If the group’s ideology had...
been dominantly anti-Western, it would have been entirely within the group’s capabilities to find and attack Western targets such as embassies and employees of international companies. In addition, most of Boko Haram’s statements address the Nigerian authorities and concern local grievances. Statements are mostly made in the local Hausa language, which, although spoken by some 43 million people, is hardly a global language. This can be seen as an indication that Boko Haram does not primarily seek an international audience. However, some of Shekau’s most recent video statements differed from previous ones by being partially in Arabic and by being posted on international jihadist forums.

4.5 Explanations

Alternative explanations have been proposed for the emergence and radicalization of Boko Haram. They include Nigerian poverty and inequality, the political marginalization of the North, support from discontented politicians, misguided military responses to the rise of Boko Haram, and traditions of religious fundamentalism. This section takes a critical look at these explanatory models.

The literature on Boko Haram often presents socioeconomic factors such as poverty and inequality as the main causes for the rise and growth of the movement. In fact, Nigerian journalist Dibussi Tande has labeled this “The Classic Narrative” of Boko Haram’s emergence. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, and has the continent’s second largest economy. In 2011, Citigroup predicted that Nigeria would have the highest average GDP growth in the world between 2010 and 2050. However, Nigeria also struggles with widespread poverty and is ranked by the United Nations as one of the most unequal countries in the world. There is a stark contrast between the standard of living in the northern and southern parts of the country, with the North having higher levels of poverty and lower scores on most socioeconomic indicators.

95 Boäs, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the “Taleban” to Boko Haram II”.
Many in the North thus feel the region is not getting its fair share of the oil revenues. The tensions created by such inequalities are further exacerbated by the fact that the economic divide roughly parallels ethnic and religious divides. According to Morten Bøås, one of the factors explaining how Boko Haram evolved into such a deadly and violent terrorist organization is “…the inequality between the north and the south of Nigeria and how this may have alienated some of the inhabitants of the north”.98

Most of those who emphasize socioeconomic variables also cite political marginalization of northern Muslims as a driving force behind Boko Haram.99 The economic, social and religious imbalance between the North and the South has made political power sharing a sensitive issue in Nigeria. Northern and southern Nigeria were governed separately under British colonial rule until 1914, when the protectorates were joined together under one single administration. Nigeria gained independence from British rule in 1960, and was ruled by authoritarian military leaders until 1999, when the country underwent a peaceful transition to democracy.100 Since then, control of the state has generally been organized through various forms of power sharing.101 An informal agreement, often referred to as “zoning”, was intended to ensure the rotation of the presidency between the North and the South. When the president is a southern Christian, the vice president is supposed to be a northern Muslim, and vice versa.102 From 1999 to 2007, the Christian southerner Olusegun Obasanjo was President. It was supposed to be the North’s “turn” at presidency from 2007 to 2015, but following northern president Yar'Adua’s death in office, his southern vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, took office.103 He remains President, but many Nigerians, especially Muslims in the North, see his government as illegitimate. They argue that Jonathan should have stepped down before the 2010 election since no northern Muslim president had been allowed to rule for the two periods prescribed by the informal agreement.104 Boko Haram taps into feelings of injustice and discontent with Jonathan’s presidency by emphasizing that he is corrupt, a liar, an infidel and responsible for the killing of innocent Muslims.105


102 Ibid. Lebanon has formalized a similar arrangement of rotating presidency.


There are also speculations that powerful Nigerian politicians have been supporting and protecting Boko Haram. In fact, President Jonathan himself has said that he believes there are Boko Haram supporters within his government and the security forces. While there is little hard evidence of this, there are several indications that such connections exist. Among the strongest is the case of Sanda Umar Konduga, who was arrested by the State Security Service (SSS) on November 3, 2011. Konduga said he was a member of Boko Haram, and claimed that the movement had formed a pragmatic alliance with members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) after the 2011 elections. He said that Ndume, a PDP senator representing South Borno in the parliament, had provided him with the telephone numbers of politicians and officials he wanted Boko Haram to threaten. The SSS claimed that Konduga’s confessions were supported by telephone records, but Boko Haram denied having connections with PDP or any other Nigerian political party. According to one SSS officer, Ndume later admitted having had phone interactions with Konduga. Similarly, some Nigerian politicians are rumored to have funded Boko Haram activities (see Section 5.5). It is difficult to determine whether such accusations are genuine or part of a political power game. However, it seems plausible that some political elites see their interests furthered by the Boko Haram uprising and, while the speculations about their active support may be exaggerated, do little to oppose Boko Haram.

Another factor contributing to the persistence and radicalization of Boko Haram may be the security forces’ violent responses to its uprising. Ever since the 2009 crackdowns that led to the death of about 800 people, including Mohammed Yusuf, the security forces have used brute force to curtail Boko Haram’s activities. There have been reports of security forces shooting civilians and people hiding in their homes fearing reprisals from the military. Rather than hurting Boko Haram, such violent crackdowns may have contributed to increasing resentment towards the authorities and sympathy for Boko Haram’s anti-state ideology. According to David Cook, Boko Haram tries to convey that “the security forces are tools of the Christian-dominated government in Abuja, and are actively preventing the formation of a Shari’a state using brutal methods and attacking innocent, pious Muslims”. Thus, when security forces use violence in a manner perceived by many as random and unjustified, they play straight into Boko Haram’s propaganda narratives. A February 2012 report from a BBC journalist based in Kano concluded that: “There is a growing fear that security forces do not appear to be differentiating between devout Muslims and those who choose to use violent means to further their political goals.”


107 Bodø, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the “Taleban” to Boko Haram II.”


Without addressing those concerns, the government could find its tactics backfire in its quest to rid itself of Boko Haram”.

Yet another contributing factor to the rise and growth of Boko Haram may be the strong position of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. According to Dibussi Tande, “Boko Haram is a product of an age-old tradition of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, fuelled by increasingly puritan views about Islam, and increasingly intolerant views about the role and place of Islam in a modern secular state”. Tande contends that even without Boko Haram, Nigeria would still be an outpost of Islamic fundamentalism. From such a perspective, Boko Haram is not a unique phenomenon in Nigeria, and one must consider causes for the growth of religious extremism in general rather than for Boko Haram in particular. That economic and political factors such as those addressed above contribute to the rise of Islamist fundamentalism in Nigeria seems probable, but there are also other factors that facilitate the entrenchment of religious extremism in the country, such as the Almajiri system and the role of universities and Muslim student societies in spreading radical views.

All of the above factors are likely to have played a role in enabling and strengthening Boko Haram. Economic and political marginalization of the North, direct or indirect support from discontented politicians, a misguided military response, and traditions of religious fundamentalism have almost certainly contributed to make some people in the North more susceptible to Boko Haram’s anti-state rhetoric and provided the group with some willing recruits. At the same time, such structural factors cannot adequately explain why only some and not all poor and discontented people of the North have become supporters of Boko Haram. These explanations must therefore be supplemented with explanatory variables at the individual level, such as inter-personal relationships, individuals’ religious convictions, financial motives, charismatic leadership, and so forth. Leading figures and authorities presented in section 5.3 seem to have played important roles in movement formation and radicalization. Moreover, it is important to take into account how organizational and group dynamics have contributed to recruitment, radicalization and the group’s sustainability and growth. Intra-movement conflict and competition, the development of comradeship and other organizational dynamics provide an important framework for the activities and ideological evolution of the group. This leads us to the next chapter, which discusses the organization of Boko Haram.


114 Almajiri schools form the primary level in traditional Islamic education in Nigeria, and focus on Arabic literacy and memorizing the Qur’an. Students support themselves by begging for alms. There are about 7-10 million Almajiris in northern Nigeria, many of whom are easy prey for the Islamist groups that often control the schools. Source: [Ibid.](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16860954)
5 Organization

This chapter addresses the organization of Boko Haram. The first section briefly discusses the movement’s size, membership and recruitment. The second section looks at its organizational structure, and introduces two groups that announced their formation in 2012 and is often described as splinter groups from Boko Haram. The third section provides biographies of some of the movement’s main leaders. The fourth section gives an overview of possible connections between the Boko Haram movement and terrorist networks in other countries. The fifth section discusses possible sources of funding for the group.

5.1 Size, Membership and Recruitment

It is difficult to determine the exact number of Boko Haram members, and estimates vary greatly. According to anonymous U.S. government sources, the core group of Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also draws support from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily from the Northeast.115 David Cook argues that the frequency and scale of attacks implemented by Boko Haram indicates that the group consists of several thousand hard-core members and sympathizers, while estimates from Nigerian security forces place the number of members at a few hundred.116 Freedom C. Onuoha cites an estimate of 280,000 members from a newspaper article which is no longer available online.117 While variations in estimates may reflect different definitions of what constitutes membership, the diverging numbers also illustrate the elusive character of Boko Haram, and how little is actually known for certain about the organization.

Boko Haram is said to recruit its members mainly among dissatisfied youths, especially young men who have received some education, but cannot find a job.118 Reportedly, recruitment is also taking place among Almajiris (students in traditional Islamic schools, who live at the school compound and beg for alms to finance their teaching), who migrated from rural areas to urban centers in search of better means of livelihood, or to study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities such as Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, and Maiduguri.119 In the beginning, Boko Haram is reported to have attracted new members by offering food, shelter and welfare handouts.120 There are also rumors that some wealthy and influential people are members and supporters of Boko Haram. For instance, the former commissioner of Borno State, Alhaji Buji Fai, is suspected of being a financial supporter of the group until he was killed in the 2009 riots.121 Currently, the aforementioned PDP Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume is on trial for providing financial and logistical support to Boko Haram.122 And, as mentioned above, the Nigerian president Goodluck

115 Lauren Ploch, “Threat from Boko Haram.”
118 Boás, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the “Taleban” to Boko Haram II”, p. 3.
Jonathan himself has warned of the presence of Boko Haram members and supporters in the government and security forces.\(^{123}\)

Boko Haram is also believed to recruit some of its members from Nigeria’s neighboring countries. Occasionally, people from these countries have been among those killed or arrested in Boko Haram clashes with Nigerian police forces. For instance, in 2009, 33 people were arrested on suspicions of participation in a Boko Haram attack on a police station in Kano. According to media reports, some of those arrested were Chadians who spoke neither Hausa nor English.\(^{124}\) Boko Haram is not known to have recruited members from the West. It has no known fighters from the Nigerian diaspora, and there have been few reports about people from outside West Africa joining the group.\(^{125}\)

### 5.2 Structure

As noted, Mohammed Yusuf led Boko Haram until his death in July 2009. Current leadership is attributed to Yusuf’s former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau.\(^{126}\) He announced his leadership in a 2010 video interview, and is referred to as Boko Haram’s leader in several statements released by the group. Ahmad Salkida, a Nigerian journalist who used to pray at Yusuf’s mosque and has contact with several Boko Haram members, confirms that Shekau is the leader. He told other journalists that Shekau does not communicate directly with the group’s members in the way Yusuf used to do, but instead exerts his power through a few select cell leaders. Even with them, there is little communication and, according to Salkida, “A lot of those calling themselves leaders in the group do not even have contact with him.”\(^{127}\)

Various “anonymous security sources” cited in newspaper articles refer to the Shura Council as Boko Haram’s highest decision-making body.\(^{128}\) This has also been confirmed by Salkida, who said that the ruling council consists of 30 members and has remained largely unchanged since 2010, apart from two members being arrested by the police.\(^{129}\) In November 2012, Nigerian authorities released a list of 19 wanted Boko Haram members, five of whom were identified as members of the Shura council.\(^{130}\) That such a council exists therefore appears credible, but

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\(^{123}\) Bøås, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the “Taleban” to Boko Haram II”.


\(^{126}\) Lauren Ploch, “Threat from Boko Haram.”

\(^{127}\) Xan Rice, “Changing face of Nigeria’s Boko Haram”,

\(^{128}\) Various “anonymous security sources” cited in newspaper articles refer to the Shura Council as Boko Haram’s highest decision-making body. This has also been confirmed by Salkida, who said that the ruling council consists of 30 members and has remained largely unchanged since 2010, apart from two members being arrested by the police. In November 2012, Nigerian authorities released a list of 19 wanted Boko Haram members, five of whom were identified as members of the Shura council. That such a council exists therefore appears credible, but
considering reports from several seemingly trust-worthy sources concerning factionalization, splinter groups, and the decentralized cell structure of Boko Haram (see below), it seems unlikely that the council exerts complete control over the group.

According to a report by Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN), Boko Haram is a highly decentralized organization, with several local leaders and departments. The group has one single leader, but “Each State where they exist has its own Amir (Commander/Leader), and each Local Government Area also has an Amir. Below the Local Government Amirs are the remaining followers. They also organized themselves according to various roles, such as Soldiers and Police, etc.”131 The report does not cite sources, but was written at a meeting attended by nearly 40 members of different Islamic organizations in Nigeria. According to DCCN, “some of those in attendance were very well acquainted with the ‘Boko Haram’ movement, and knew the Late Muhammad Yusuf and some of his key followers personally. Others had been involved in dialogues and debates with ‘Boko Haram’ members for some years, and were well acquainted with the history, ideology, activities and evolution of the group”.132 The report thus seems to be a reliable source, and, even though it was written in 2009 and the organizational structure of the group may very well have changed since, it is collaborated by other, more recent, sources. For example a “senior security official in Abuja” told the online reporting community Sahara-Reporters in July 2012 that Boko Haram has developed a complex and decentralized organizational structure “that includes several departments headed by highly trained personnel and charged with specific assignments”.133

There have been some reports questioning whether Boko Haram is in fact a single organization.134 Variations in the tactics and bomb-making styles of recent attacks indicate that attacks attributed to Boko Haram could be the work of other groups, according to unnamed observers cited by Lauren Ploch.135 There have also been several reports about factions and splinter groups. For example, in July 2011, the Nigerian newspaper The Saturday Sun reported that “top security chiefs in the state” had disclosed that Boko Haram split into three units shortly after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009; one section led by Abubakar Shekau, one by Mohammad Nur and a third with unknown leadership.136 According to the security chief, the factions disagreed over whom should lead the group, with Shekau being more popular among the younger members of the movement while some of the older members allegedly considered him too extreme. The faction led by Mohammad Nur was less radical and more interested in dialogue with the government, another anonymous “senior government official” told the newspaper. 137

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132 Ibid.
134 See for instance Lauren Ploch, “Threat from Boko Haram.”
135 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
Another incident causing speculations about internal divisions in the group was the assassination of Babakura Fugu, Mohammed Yusuf’s brother-in-law, in September 2011. Fugu was assassinated only three days after he had met with the authorities in an attempt to establish a dialogue between the government and Boko Haram. Following the assassination, the BBC’s Hausa language radio service reported that Boko Haram had claimed the attack in a text message. However, a few hours later, the spokesperson Abu Qaqa denied responsibility and warned media houses of reprisals if they continued to misrepresent the group.138 Jacob Zenn takes this to mean that one faction, probably Shekau’s, accepted the negotiations and was not involved in the assassination of Fugu, while another, more radical faction tried to obstruct the reconciliation process by assassinating him and claiming responsibility for the attack.139

Reportedly, there are also ethnic divisions within Boko Haram. For instance, following his arrest, the spokesperson Abu Qaqa is said to have revealed growing tensions between various ethnic groups in the movement, as Hausa-Fulani members observe that Kanuri members are more rarely arrested and are not ordered on suicide missions.140

There are also two groups which have been characterized in the literature as splinter groups of Boko Haram: the Yusufiya Islamic Movement (YIM) and Jama`at Ansar al- Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (Supporters of Islam in the Land of Black Africa, simply known as Ansaru). On July 20, 2011, YIM announced its formation in flyers distributed in Maiduguri. In the flyers, the movement communicated that it was

(...) concerned that some people with evil motives have infiltrated our genuine struggle with a false Holy War that is outright un-Islamic. (...) We therefore distance our group from all the bombings targeted at civilians and other establishments and equally condemn them and pray that Allah exposes those who perpetrated them and attributed them to us. (...) This is necessary in the light of genuine concern by individuals and groups to the mass suffering of innocent citizens caught in the crossfire between our members and the Nigerian troops.141

Although the flyers did not name the target of the criticisms, they probably refer to Boko Haram.142 YIM has remained silent since the release of the flyers in July 2011, and the authenticity of the flyers or even the group’s existence cannot be independently confirmed.143 Boko Haram has denied that intra-movement ruptures exist. A message addressing the YIM flyers was posted on a blog believed to be Boko Haram’s on July 23, 2011. The blog post, entitled “A Call to Service”, stated that: “the brotherhood remains one indivisible entity. There is no split and there is no splinter group. Stories of [a] split are tissues of lies by the state security service to discredit us…”144

The group known as Ansaru announced its formation in a statement dated January 2012. According to Terrorism Monitor, the group probably broke away from Boko Haram because of internal disagreements over the killing of Muslims.145 In the statement released in January, Ansaru characterized Boko Haram as “inhuman to the Muslim Ummah”.146 In June 2012, the group also released a video explicitly distinguishing itself from Boko Haram by emphasizing the differences between the two and characterizing Boko Haram’s assassinations of Muslims as “inexcusable”.147 It then posted an Arabic message on an online jihadist forum (muslm.net) in July 2012, saying that one of its goals was to “protect the lives and properties of Muslims” because no other “Islamic armed forces took any military actions” against the “infidel armed groups.”148 Despite this disassociation from Boko Haram, Ansaru has also said it would complement its “brothers” in Boko Haram, and maintains that Ansaru and Boko Haram are fighting the same struggle, but with different leaders. According to Ansaru’s statements, the group is led by Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, who appears with a veil covering his face in videos, and its spokesman is Abu Jafa’ar (both names are believed to be pseudonyms).149

Ansaru is suspected to have been involved in six major incidents: four kidnappings of foreigners, a November 2012 attack on the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) detention facility, and a January 2013 attack on Nigerian soldiers heading for Mali.150 Although six incidents are too few to draw any firm conclusions from, Ansaru appears more anti-Western and internationally oriented in its targeting practice and ideology than Shekau’s Boko Haram. For instance, Ansaru claimed responsibility for the December 2012 kidnapping of a French engineer from his residence in Katsina state, warning that it would continue to attack the French government and its citizens.

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142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
146 Cited in “Abu Usmatul Al-Ansari Announce Breakaway Faction”, Brief, Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 6 (2012).
147 Ibid.
150 Only four of these can be confidentially attributed to Ansaru. For more detailed descriptions of these attacks, see Jacob Zenn, “Ansaru: A Profile of Nigeria’s Newest Jihadist Movement”, Terrorism Monitor 11, no. 1 (2013) and Jacob Zenn, “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention”, CTC Sentinel 6, no. 3 (2013), pp. 1–8.
until France ends its ban on the Islamic veil and its “major role” in the planned intervention in northern Mali. In January 2013, Ansaru attacked a convoy of troops in Kogi State en route to deployment with West African forces in Mali, killing at least two soldiers and wounding eight others. Claiming responsibility, Ansaru said that the attack was part of a mission to stop Nigerian troops joining Western powers in their “aim to demolish the Islamic empire of Mali.” It is also possible that Ansaru has connections to AQIM, although the exact nature and extent of collaboration remains unclear.

Due to the elusive nature of Boko Haram, it is difficult to determine the extent and nature of internal factionalization, and how Ansaru relates to the “core” movement led by Shekau. Still, the differences in modus operandi between various attacks attributed to Boko Haram, the disagreements over who killed Fugu, and the ethnic tensions described by Qaqa, suggest a significant level of fragmentation. In addition, the very formation of Ansaru can be seen as an indication that a split is emerging between nationally and more internationally oriented militant Islamists in Nigeria.

5.3 Leaders and Key Members

The following section presents biographies of some of Boko Haram’s most important leaders and members. The biographies are arranged according to the individual’s position within the movement, beginning with the former and current leader, followed by regional commanders and cell leaders, spokesmen, suicide bombers and other known and suspected members.


Mohammed Yusuf was born in January 1970 in Girgir village in the Jalasko local government area of Yobe State. He dropped out of the local secondary school, and accounts of his further education vary. According to one source he “received a Quranic education in the Chad and Niger republics, where he imbibed his radical ideology”. Another source simply claims that he “was a trained salafist” and strongly influenced by the fourteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. The BBC cites the Nigerian academic Hussain Zakaria saying that Yusuf “is graduate educated and very proficient in English… he is very well-educated in a Western context.” Yusuf is reported to have had four wives and nine or twelve children.

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154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Johnson, “Backgrounder: Boko Haram”.
According to the Nigerian scholar Abimbola Adesoji, Yusuf himself claimed to have been part of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) under the leadership of Sheikh Ibraheem El Zakzaky in the 1990s, and later the amir (leader) of the splinter group Jama‘atul Tajdidul Islam (JTI) in Borno State.\textsuperscript{160} Adesoji apparently believes that Yusuf used the membership in these other fundamentalist groups to prepare for his leadership role in Boko Haram, but he does not specify in what way.\textsuperscript{161}

Apparently, Yusuf assumed leadership of Boko Haram sometime between 2002 and 2004 (see also Section 4.2).\textsuperscript{162} By mid-2004, Yusuf had gathered a radical Islamist following in Maiduguri, Borno State.\textsuperscript{163} He established a mosque for the group called Ibn Tamiyyah Masjid and built up a small society with its own religious police and a large farm. Neighbors dubbed the group Boko Haram, but Yusuf never used this name.\textsuperscript{164}

According to members of the Borno religious establishment, Yusuf went on Hajj on two occasions during this period and in Saudi Arabia he made contacts with Salafists who provided the group with funding.\textsuperscript{165}

In a 2009 interview with the BBC, Yusuf rejected that the world is round, that rain is part of the hydrological cycle, and the theory of Darwinism, on the grounds that these phenomena ran contrary to Islam and the teachings of Allah.\textsuperscript{166}

In 2009, Boko Haram came into violent conflict with the Nigerian police (see Section 4.3). On the fourth day of the fighting, July 30, 2009, Yusuf was captured by police and killed. Human Rights Watch has labeled the killing “extrajudicial” and “illegal”.\textsuperscript{167}

**Abubakar Muhammad Shekau**: Believed to be the current leader of Boko Haram. Shekau is believed to have been born in a village in the northeastern State of Yobe. He is said to be between 35 and 50 years old.\textsuperscript{168} Shekau moved to the nearby city of Maiduguri around 2000.


\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid.} p. 99.


\textsuperscript{163} Walker, “Special Report: What is Boko Haram?”

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Ibid.}


He studied theology under local clerics in the Mafoni area of Maiduguri, and enrolled in a
government-run school for Islamic studies. Shekau is fluent in his native Kanuri, Hausa and
Arabic, but he does not speak English.

He is believed to have been second-in-command to Yusuf. It is possible that Shekau and Yusuf
first met in Maiduguri through Muhammad Nur (see below), who was a common friend. As
second-in-command, Shekau was seen as the most influential and dreaded Boko Haram member.
He considered Yusuf too liberal, and was known for his uncompromising stance on interpreting
the Quran and the Traditions of the Prophet (hadith). According to a Nigerian journalist who
claims to have known Shekau prior to 2009, “Shekau was always studying and writing, and was
more devoted and modest than anyone else. He would only wear cheap clothes and did not accept
even to drive a car, preferring a motorbike. Even when Boko Haram was peaceful, he was some-
how more feared than Yusuf.”

Shekau was most popular among the youngest Boko Haram members, while many of the older
saw him as being too extreme. It may have been Shekau, and not Yusuf, who ordered the attacks
on Nigerian security forces in July 2009, which resulted in the death of Yusuf and several
hundred other Boko Haram members.

The police claimed that Shekau was shot dead in the clashes between Boko Haram and the
authorities in July 2009. But less than a year later, a 25-minute video clip filmed on April 19,
2010, showed Shekau answering questions from a Nigerian journalist at his hideout, believed to
be in Maiduguri. People who knew Shekau identified him as the man in the video clip. In the
video, Shekau said he had been shot in the thigh and not lethally wounded in 2009. He further
proclaimed his leadership of Boko Haram, saying that he “being the deputy [to Yusuf], stepped in
and assumed leadership to continue in the pursuit of religious knowledge.”

Radical Ideologue: An In-Depth Look At Northern Nigeria’s Abu Shekau”, Militant Leadership Monitor 2,

“Shekau: Shadowy leader of Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, AFP, June 21, 2012. URL:

“Profile of Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau”, BBC News, May 24, 2012. URL:

Ibid.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d2ab750-9ac1-11e1-9c98-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xfUsgfF (Accessed June
13, 2012).

“Shekau: Shadowy leader of Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, AFP, June 21, 2012. URL:

“How Nur, Shekau run Boko Haram”, Vanguard, September 3, 2011. URL:
Shekau has not been seen in public since the 2009 clashes, but he has appeared in several video and audio clips issued by Boko Haram’s “public enlightenment department”. In one such audio recording, a voice said to be Shekau’s claimed responsibility for the bombings and shootings in Kano in January 2012, which left at least 150 people dead. He stated that: “I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill the way I enjoy killing chickens and ram”.

Shekau appears not to communicate directly with Boko Haram foot soldiers. He is said to control the group through a few select cell leaders, with whom he has only limited contact.

In March 2011, the police raided a home in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State where Boko Haram members were believed to be hiding, but three suspects, possibly including Shekau, detonated explosives and escaped. According to Terrorism Monitor, unidentified “Nigerian reports” suggest that the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies are assisting in the hunt for Shekau. It was alleged that he was hiding in a village in Cameroon after having abandoned an earlier refuge in a village in Niger. More recently, there have been speculations that he has traveled to Mali.

**Sanni Umaru:** Alleged leader of Boko Haram for a short time period in 2009.

After Yusuf’s death, Sanni Umaru addressed himself as the new leader of Boko Haram in an e-mail statement sent to Nigerian news agencies on August 9, 2009. The statement also warned of a renewed Boko Haram bombing campaign targeting cities throughout Nigeria. Umaru has not issued any other statements and no information regarding his whereabouts since 2009 seems to be available online.

**Mamman Nur:** Third-in-command under Yusuf.

Mamman Nur is said to be from Chad. He studied at a state-run theological school in Borno State, where Maiduguri is the capital, but dropped out and joined Boko Haram. Nur is thought to be around 35 years old.

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He is believed to have been the third-in-command during Yusuf’s leadership. Reportedly, after the crackdowns against Boko Haram in 2009, he fled to Chad to escape Nigerian security agents, before moving on to Somalia.  

Sources claiming to have been Boko Haram members and familiar with the group’s organizational structure told the Nigerian newspaper the Vanguard that Nur took over temporarily as leader while Shekau recovered from gunshot wounds he suffered during the 2009 uprising.

On August 30, 2011, Nigerian authorities declared that Mamman Nur was wanted for the attack on the UN offices in Abuja. According to the Department of State Security Services (SSS) in Nigeria, Nur has “al-Qaeda links” and returned to Nigeria from Somalia in the spring/summer of 2011. The SSS’ claim that Nur had returned from Somalia corroborates a July 2011 statement by Boko Haram that some of its members had gone for training in Somalia.

Nigerian and international media speculate that there is a power struggle between Nur and Shekau. Nur’s faction is said to be the most radical and sees Nur as more competent to lead the group given his exposure to Somali training and al-Qaeda contacts. Jacob Zenn suggests that it may have been Nur’s faction who assassinated Mohammed Yusuf’s brother-in-law, Babakura Fugu, after Fugu had met with authorities in an attempt to establish a dialogue between the government and Boko Haram in September 2011.

Suleiman Mohammed: Former Boko Haram commander in Kano.

Suleiman Mohammed is described by Nigerian authorities as Boko Haram’s head of operations in Kano. Mohammed was arrested with his wife and five children during a police raid in Kano on May 11, 2012. He claimed to be a Yoruba from Oyo in Southwestern Nigeria, but his origins could not be confirmed. No information about him has been made public since the arrest.

Mohammed Zangina (aka Mallam Abdullahi and Alhaji Musa): Former Boko Haram commander of North-Central Nigeria.

Zangina was declared wanted by the Joint Task Force (JTF) on November 23, 2012. According to the JTF, he is a member of Boko Haram’s highest decision making body, the Shura council.
and Boko Haram’s head of operations for North-Central Nigeria. Zangina was arrested in January 2013.193

**Sheik Asheku:** Possible Boko Haram commander of Borno State.
An anonymous security official told the Nigerian newspaper the Sunday Trust that Sheikh Asheku participated in secret talks between Boko Haram and the state government of Borno in May 2012. The source described Asheku as “a leader of the Boko Haram, who is believed to be a field commander. I don’t know if he is in charge of Borno.”194

**Abu Qaqa (aka Abu Darda, Mohammed Shuaibu, Mohammed Bello, Abu Tiamiya and Abdulrahman Abdullahi):** Purported Spokesman for Boko Haram.
A man calling himself Abu Qaqa has issued many of the threats and claims of responsibility on behalf of Boko Haram.195 “Abu Qaqa” is an alias, and the man is also known as Abu Darda, Mohammed Shuaibu, Mohammed Bello, Abu Tiamiya and Abdulrahman Abdullahi.196

Nigerian authorities reported that Qaqa was arrested on February 1, 2012.197 The arrested man was said to be 42 years old and a member of the Ebira tribe of Kogi State.198 However, according to a Boko Haram statement, the man arrested was not Abu Qaqa, but Abul Darda, head of the group’s department of public enlightenment.199 The State Security Services (SSS) have maintained that the captured man is Abu Qaqa and that “Abu Darda” is one of his many aliases.200 After the arrest, audio and e-mail statements have continued to be made by a “Abu Qaqa” on behalf of Boko Haram, but this may be other individuals taking up the alias (see below).

**Mohammed Anwal Kontagora (Abu Qaqa II):** Purported Spokesman for Boko Haram.
Mohammed Anwal Kontagora was thought to have succeeded Abu Qaqa I (see above) as spokesman for Boko Haram.201 His name indicates that he was from Kontagora in Niger State. He was killed on April 14, 2012.202 He is reported to have been killed on orders from Shekau, supposedly because he attempted to exit from the movement. He was said to have tried to

198 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
denounce Boko Haram after being followed intensively by security agents, forcing him to change locations several times.\(^{203}\) Since Kontagora’s death, e-mail statements attributed to Boko Haram have continued to bear the signature “Abu Qaqa”.

**Abu Zaid**: Spokesman for Boko Haram.

Abu Zaid is an alias sometimes used by Boko Haram to make statements.\(^{204}\) The real identity of the man/men behind the alias remains unknown.

**Abu Zinnira**: Spokesman for Boko Haram

In a March 2013 statement, Shekau declared that Abu Zinnira is the group’s new spokesman.\(^{205}\)

**Habib Bama (aka Habib Bammah, Shuaibu Bama and Habib Mamman)**: Accused of planning several of Boko Haram’s most deadly attacks.

According to the SSS, Bama is a Kanuri from Borno State, and has served in the Nigerian Army.\(^{206}\) The SSS declared him wanted on February 15, 2012. He is accused of having planned the bombings against Mogadishu Barracks and Police Headquarters in Abuja in 2011, the United Nations Building in Abuja in 2011, and several sites in Jos.\(^{207}\) An unnamed “security source” also told the Nigerian newspaper the Daily Trust that Habibu Bama is the prime suspect in the Christmas Day 2011 Madalla church bombing, contradicting an earlier claim by the police that Kabiru Sokoto planned the church bombing.\(^{208}\)

Bama was arrested on June 21, 2012, in Yobe State.\(^{209}\) The circumstances of the arrest are uncertain, but it is clear that Bama was wounded by gunshots.\(^{210}\) He died in custody shortly after his arrest.\(^{211}\) There has been some speculation that his death was caused by a deliberate decision to deny him medical care.\(^{212}\)

\(^{203}\) Ibid.


\(^{211}\) Ibid.

\(^{212}\) Ibid.

Police initially thought Kabir Sokoto to be the mastermind of the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of Saint Theresa Catholic Church Madalla. However, a “security source” later told the Nigerian newspaper the Daily Trust that Habibu Bama has replaced Kabir Sokoto as the prime suspect in the Madalla attack.

Sokoto was arrested by Nigerian police on January 17, 2012, but was freed by other Boko Haram members when they attacked the police team escorting Sokoto to his apartment in Abuja for further interrogations. He was recaptured on February 10, 2012.

Mohammed Abul Barra: The suicide bomber in the attack against the UN headquarters in Abuja, August 2011.

After the UN bombing, Boko Haram released two martyrdom videos of a man alleged to be the bomber. According to a spokesman claiming to be from Boko Haram, the person who appears in the videos is Mohammed Abdul Barra from Maiduguri. The videos show the alleged bomber asking his family to understand his decision to conduct the bombing, which he said was meant to send a message to the US president “and other infidels”. In the video, Barra also refers to the UN as a “forum for all global evil” and praises Osama bin Laden.

Muhammad Manga: The suicide bomber in the attack against the Federal Police Headquarters in Abuja, June 2012.

Following the attack on the Federal Police Headquarters in Abuja, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Zaid contacted the Nigerian magazine Blueprint, saying that the suicide bomber in the attack was Muhammad Manga. According to Zaid, Manga was from Adamawa State, but he was born and brought up in Maiduguri, where he embraced the teachings of Mohammed Yusuf. He was 35 years old, married and had five children.

Abubakar Adam Kambar: Designated a Global Terrorist by the US.

Kambar was labeled as one of the “Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224” by the US on June 21, 2012.


218 Ibid.

According to the US State Department press release, Kambar has “ties to Boko Haram” and “close links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). He is believed to be in his mid-30s and from Borno State.

Kambar’s exact position within Boko Haram was not known. According to an AFP source, Kambar was an active member of Boko Haram under Yusuf, and is believed to have taken part in the 2009 uprising. According to the same source, after the 2009 uprising Kambar went to Algeria, where he is thought to have linked up with Barnawi (see below).

Kambar was killed by Nigerian security forces in Kano in November 2012.

**Khalid al-Barnawi**: Designated a Global Terrorist by the US.

Khalid al-Barnawi was labeled as one of the “Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224” by the US on June 21, 2012. According to the US State Department press release, he has “ties to Boko Haram” and “close links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM).

Khalid Al Barnawi could well be a pseudonym. “Al Barnawi” is the Arabic adjective corresponding to Borno, the northeastern Nigerian State where Boko Haram is strongest (Borno was also the name of a pre-colonial empire in the region). Khalid is one of the region’s most common names.

Barnawi is thought to have been born in Maiduguri, and to be in his 30s.

A source said to be close to Boko Haram told the AFP that Barnawi is believed to have run a militant training camp in the Algerian desert. According to the same source, Barnawi was involved in the kidnapping of foreigners in Niger and in Nigeria, including the abductions of French nationals in Niger in 2011 and of a Briton and an Italian in Nigeria in 2012. The source said that Abu Mohammad, the alleged mastermind of the kidnap of the Briton and the Italian, trained at the Algerian camp under Barnawi. Abu Mohammed and Barnawi then made an agreement with the faction of Boko Haram led by Abubakar Shekau, saying that Mohammad and his followers would carry out abductions for ransom. Part of the ransoms would go to finance Boko

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Haram operations. Boko Haram would in return provide security and cover for Mohammad’s group. The source said Barnawi argued with an al-Qaeda “spiritual adviser” at the training camp, and that he planned the kidnappings without the consent of al-Qaeda.227

Barnawi’s involvement in the kidnappings appears not to have been confirmed by any other sources. In a statement, Boko Haram denied any involvement in the kidnappings.228

Sanda Umar Konduga (alias: Usman al-Zawahiri): Claims to be a member of Boko Haram receiving instructions from politicians of the ruling party.

Konduga was arrested by the State Security Service (SSS) on November 3, 2011.229 In a press conference held by the SSS on November 21, 2011, Konduga claimed he was a member of Boko Haram, working under the alias Usman al-Zawahiri.230 According to Konduga, Boko Haram had formed an alliance with members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) after the 2011 elections. Konduga said that he had been working for a PDP Senator, Mohammed Ali Ndume. Allegedly, Ndume provided Konduga with the telephone numbers of other politicians and officials he wanted Boko Haram to threaten. The SSS said Konduga’s confessions were supported by telephone records.231

While Konduga said he was a member of Boko Haram, he admitted he was not working with the group’s permission when using the alias of Usman al-Zawahiri. The Nigerian press began reporting the existence of a Boko Haram spokesman called Usman al-Zawahiri in 2011,232 but this was denounced by another Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Zaid, who swore that Boko Haram did not know him.233

On November 22, 2011, Konduga pleaded guilty of criminal intimidation and was sentenced to three years in prison.234 In a statement Boko Haram claimed Konduga was an impostor who had

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227 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
never been a member, and rejected any links to Nigeria’s political parties. Konduga’s father told the media that his son was mentally ill.

5.4 Links to Other Groups

There has long been speculation, particularly in Western media, over the extent of connections between Boko Haram and outside extremist groups, including al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the AQIM spin-off group Movement for Unity and Jihad (MOJUA), and Ansar Dine in Mali. The previous section showed that some of the key members of Boko Haram, such as Mamman Nur, are believed to have links to other extremist groups in the region. Below is a summary of some of the other main indications of connections between Boko Haram and other terrorist networks, listed in chronological order:

- The US Department of State’s *Country Report on Terrorism 2007* declared that there was no conclusive evidence that Boko Haram has links with AQIM in Mali or al-Qaeda affiliates elsewhere. But three years later, a November 2011 report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, concluded that “Boko Haram has the intent and may be developing the capability to coordinate on a rhetorical and operational level with al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabaab.”

- AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel publicly offered Boko Haram assistance in early 2010. In October 2010, AQIM’s media arm published a statement attributed to Boko Haram, which is cited by analysts as the first time AQIM ever disseminated an official message from another group.

- On October 21, 2010, suspected Boko Haram members set up posters on key road intersections in northern Nigeria warning against assisting the police in catching members of the group. The posters bore the signature of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).


238 *Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, p. 4.

239 Lauren Ploch, “Threat from Boko Haram.”


In June 2011, the BBC reported that anonymous Nigerian security sources had told the news agency that they believed Boko Haram to be receiving training and expertise from outside Nigeria, maybe in Somalia and Afghanistan.\footnote{242}

In November 2011, a man claiming to be Abu Qaqa, spokesman for Boko Haram, said that the group had links with al-Qaeda. In a phone conference with local journalists, he claimed: “any Muslim group that is struggling to establish an Islamic state can get support from al-Qaeda if they reach out to them... It is true that we have links with al-Qaeda. They support us and we support them”.\footnote{243} In an interview with the UK newspaper The Guardian in January 2012, Qaqa also said: “Al-Qaeda are our elder brothers. During the lesser Hajj [August 2011], our leader travelled to Saudi Arabia and met al-Qaeda there. We enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them we ask them.”\footnote{244}

In December 2011, members of the UN assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region were informed that Boko Haram was active in Niger and had established links with AQIM, and that some of its members had received training in AQIM camps in Mali during the summer of 2011.\footnote{245}

In April 2012, the media began reporting that Boko Haram members had joined the rebellion in Mali. A regional deputy in Gao told the AFP: “There are a good 100 Boko Haram fighters in Gao. They are Nigerians and from Niger. (…) They’re not hiding. Some are even able to speak in the local tongue, explaining that they are Boko Haram.”\footnote{246} Other Malian security officials reportedly said that Boko Haram fighters were in the majority in the attack on the Algerian consulate in Gao in April 2011.\footnote{247}

In June 2012, Niger’s president Mahamadou Issoufou said Niger had evidence that Boko Haram was running training camps in Gao, Mali.\footnote{248}

Also in June 2012, the Nigerian Air Chief Marshal, Oluseyi Petinrin, said that Boko Haram had ties to AQIM. “We have been able to link the activities of the Boko Haram sect to the support and training the sect received from AQIM”, he said at a meeting with


\footnote{247} Ibid.

security officials from ECOWAS. This was the first time a Nigerian top security official made such links in public.\footnote{Ola Awoniyi, “Nigeria defence chief says Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda”, \textit{AFP}, February 23, 2012. URL: \url{http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g1HSCZCkSQ8eU0k6BBd2pC4ZNylg?docId=CN G72ca66ee1a4af263528e0bb35442cae.5f1} (Accessed June 12, 2012).}


- In July 2012, General Carter Ham, head of the US military’s Africa Command, said there were signs that Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and AQIM were increasingly coordinating their activities. He added: “Most notably I would say that the linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram are probably the most worrisome in terms of the indications we have that they are likely sharing funds, training and explosive materials.”\footnote{David Smith, “Africa's Islamist militants 'co-ordinate efforts in threat to continent's security'”, \textit{The Guardian}, June 26, 2012. URL: \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/africa-islamist-militants-coordinating-threat} (Accessed June 27, 2012).}

- Also in July 2012, two Nigerians were charged with being members of Boko Haram and collecting money from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen to pay for the training of Nigerian militants.\footnote{“Two Nigerians charged with links to Yemen al Qaeda”, \textit{Reuters}, July 6 2012. URL: \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/us-nigeria-alqaeda-idUSBRE8650DA20120706} (Accessed July 16, 2012).}

In addition, some analysts regard the quickly evolving tactics and weapons used by Boko Haram as an indication that the group has ties to other terrorist groups.\footnote{Scott Stewart, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militants Remain a Regional Threat”, \textit{Security Weekly} (January 26, 2012), URL: \url{http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/nigerias-boko-haram-militants-remain-regional-threat} (Accessed June 4, 2012); \textit{Cook}, “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.”} According to Stratfor, “Bombmaking is an art that normally follows a significant learning curve absent outside instruction from a more experienced bombmaker. Boko Haram’s proficiency suggests the group’s bombmaker(s) indeed received training from experienced militants elsewhere.”\footnote{Ibid.} Similarly, a November 2011 report by the US. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security found that “Boko Haram’s evolution in targeting and tactics closely tracks that of other Al Qaeda affiliates that have targeted the U.S. Homeland…”\footnote{“Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland”, p. 4.} However, the fact that Boko Haram’s tactics and weapons are becoming more advanced does not necessarily mean that Boko Haram has trained in jihadist training camps and obtained support from Islamist groups outside Nigeria. There are experienced militants within the country who may have been paid to teach Boko Haram tactics and bomb-making skills. Moreover, numerous manuals and teaching videos are available online.

\footnote{“Nigeria defence chief says Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda”, \textit{AFP}, February 23, 2012. URL: \url{http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g1HSCZCkSQ8eU0k6BBd2pC4ZNylg?docId=CN G72ca66ee1a4af263528e0bb35442cae.5f1} (Accessed June 12, 2012).}
However, the contents and quality of the online material varies greatly, and practical experience and socialization in training camps are still considered important factors for success.256

Although there are many indications on some levels of affiliation between Boko Haram and regional or international terrorist groups, some of the information regarding outside links should be viewed with sound scepticism. For example, as mentioned in Section 2, both Boko Haram and security officials in the region could have an interest in exaggerating the extent of contact between various terrorist groups. The fact that Boko Haram’s own statements and propaganda focus mostly on national issues (see Section 4.4) indicates that the group has yet to become an integrated part of a global jihadist movement. In addition, Boko Haram has issued most of its statements via YouTube and local media, not through the media forums of al-Qaeda. The statements are mostly in Hausa, a language not used by the other groups in the region.

But as noted in Section 4.4, Shekau’s November 2012 video statement broke this pattern. Unlike his five other 2012 statements, it was in Arabic and was posted on online jihadist forums. Shekau paid homage to “martyred” al-Qaeda leaders such as bin Laden, and called the United States, the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Israel “crusaders” and warned them: “jihad has begun.”257 In February 2013 Boko Haram also kidnapped a family of seven Frenchmen in Cameroon, near the Nigerian border. This is the first and (so far) only attack conducted by the group outside of Nigeria. In the statement claiming responsibility for the attack, the group made reference to the French-led intervention in Mali: “Let the French president know that he has launched war against Islam and we are fighting him everywhere. Let him know that we are spread everywhere to save our brothers.”258 Although the timeline is too short to draw any firm conclusions, this could imply that the group is increasingly turning its attention towards the international level. Finally, as indicated by some of the reports above, Boko Haram appears to receive financial support from individuals and organizations outside Nigeria. This leads us to the next section, which discusses the group’s sources of funding in more detail.

5.5 Funding

Little is known about how Boko Haram funds its operations, but some of its finances are believed to come from abroad.259 In February 2012, the Nigerian Tribune reported that “recently arrested key figures” of Boko Haram had told security agents that while the organization initially relied on donations from members, its links with AQIM opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK. According to the newspaper the Nigerian Tribune, members of Boko Haram confirmed that the charity Al-Muntada Trust Fund, with a headquarters in the United Kingdom,

259 Onuoha, “The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure.”
had extended some financial assistance. The Al-Muntada Trust Fund denied this. Other sources of Boko Haram funding reportedly uncovered in police investigations are the Islamic World Society with a headquarters in Saudi Arabia, and some prominent local businessmen. The Nigerian newspaper the Premium Times reported in May 2012 that an intelligence report based on joint police and military investigations and raids carried out in Kano and Sokoto in December 2011 showed that Boko Haram had received 40 million naira (about 250,000 USD) from an unnamed Algerian organization.

Boko Haram is also reported to have various domestic avenues for raising money. One source of funding is thought to be daily levies (possibly 100 naira, which equals about $0.6 USD) paid by members. Boko Haram has also been blamed for a series of bank robberies. Andrew Walker refers to an unnamed source said to be close to Boko Haram, who believes that the group has made about 500 million naira (3 million USD) through bank robberies, although such claims cannot be verified. There are also rumors of donations from politicians, government officials and other wealthy Nigerians to Boko Haram. As mentioned above, the former commissioner of Borno State, Alhaji Buji Fai, and the PDP Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume, are said to have been supporters of the group. In a January 2012 Guardian interview, Boko Haram’s spokesman Abu Qaqa denied reports that some governors in northern Nigeria paid the group monthly allowances in exchange for immunity from attacks. Due to the informal and illicit nature of most financial transactions to terrorist groups, it is difficult to verify this information and to accurately assess Boko Haram’s financial situation.

In general, the economic wealth of a group affects its ability to conduct attacks, but the relationship is not linear. The capabilities of a terrorist group depend on a variety of factors in addition to funding. Many of these have been discussed in this chapter, including the number and composition of Boko Haram’s members, the organizational structure and the experiences and

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skills of the leadership. These organizational characteristics constitute an important framework for the group’s activities and operations. As leaders have changed and membership grown, so have Boko Haram’s tactics and targeting practice evolved. This is the topic of the next chapter, which focuses on the group’s armed operations and how these have changed over time.

6 Operations

This section assesses Boko Haram’s operations and how they have evolved over the last ten years, discussing the frequency and deadliness of attacks, the targets and modus operandi, and the geographical scope of attacks. The account is based on an overview of incidents compiled by this author from academic studies, newspapers, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (see Appendix D).270

6.1 Frequency and Causalities

Since Boko Haram’s formation in the early 2000s, the annual number of attacks conducted by the group has increased from an average of two attacks per year before 2009 to almost 120 attacks in 2012. Figure 1 below illustrates this development. The figure is based on this author’s compilation of incidents (see Appendix D), and covers attacks associated with Boko Haram from its formation in the early 2000s to March 31, 2013. Attacks conducted on the same date and in the same village/town against different targets, are classified as one single attack, because they are most often reported as such by the media. As mentioned in section 2, incidents are often underreported. The exact number of attacks is thus likely to be underestimated and should be interpreted with some caution. The trend is nevertheless clear: the frequency of Boko Haram attacks has been increasing.

270 Boko Haram has taken responsibility for less than 1/6 of the attacks registered in this overview. The remaining attacks are included because Nigerian authorities, analysts or journalists have attributed them to Boko Haram – often because they resemble previous attacks by the group. It is likely that some of the unclaimed attacks were conducted by other extremist groups, by local factions/cells of Boko Haram operating independently from the central leadership, or by criminal gangs. However, there does not appear to be any major differences between the attacks Boko Haram have claimed and the ones attributed to Boko Haram by others – both categories include examples of successful and unsuccessful attacks, and the same types of targets, methods and geographical areas.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the two phases in Boko Haram’s evolution as described in Section 4.3. Whereas Phase 1 (2003 to 2009) was relatively peaceful, Phase 2 (2010 until end of March 2013) is characterized by increasing levels of violence. Between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram allegedly conducted at least six attacks on local police and villagers near Maiduguri. Following the crackdown on Boko Haram in July 2009, more than a year passed without any attacks. But in September 2010, Boko Haram became active again, conducting 17 attacks by the end of the year. Among the major occurrences were the aforementioned attack on a prison in Bauchi State, freeing more than 700 inmates (100 of them Boko Haram members) and a series of Christmas holiday attacks on churches in Maiduguri and Jos, killing 86 people. In 2011, Boko Haram was accused of 57 attacks. Compared to previous years, this represents a dramatic increase in the number of attacks. However, the figure shows that there were significant variations between one quarter and the next, with Q4 having almost five times as many attacks as Q3. In 2012, Boko Haram was associated with 116 attacks, equaling an average of close to one attack every three days – more than in any previous year. In the first quarter of 2013, the group has been associated with 30 attacks.

The increasing frequency of Boko Haram attacks has been paralleled by an increasing number of people killed, as illustrated by Table 6.1. The table excludes attacks before 2010 due to very imprecise information about how many people were killed in those attacks. When reports about numbers of deaths vary, the lowest estimate has been used. The table only includes deaths from the attacks, not from subsequent violence such as retaliation attacks. Boko Haram members who died in the attacks are generally not included, and the vast majority of the deaths are security

271 It is possible that other radical groups operating in the area were responsible for some of the attacks in this period. As we saw in Section 3.2, ‘Emergence’, one or more radical Islamist groups known as ‘the Nigerian Taliban’ or ‘the Taliban groups’ operated in northern Nigeria around the millennium (Walker 2012: 3-4; Bøås 2012). Analysts disagree over whether the Nigerian Taliban and Boko Haram should be seen as the same or different groups, and incidents between 2002 and 2005 are therefore variously attributed to the Nigerian Taliban and Boko Haram.
personnel and civilians. Again, one should be careful to read too much into the exact numbers, but they nevertheless provide a sense of the development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Quarter</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>People killed</th>
<th>Average Death Toll</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year total</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.1 shows that while there are some fluctuations through the year, the overall trend is that the number of people killed in attacks attributed to Boko Haram has increased, from more than 100 in 2010 to almost 800 in 2012. Table 6.1 also illustrates that the “typical” Boko Haram attack has become deadlier, with the median number of people killed increasing from one death per attack in 2010 to three in 2012 and the first quarter of 2013. Yet the median has remained lower than the average, reflecting that most Boko Haram attacks are still quite small – typically drive-by shootings by gunmen riding on motorcycles.

There are large variations in the average death toll from one quarter to the next. On a yearly basis, the average number of people killed per attack decreased from 2010 to 2011, but increased again from 2011 to 2012. The high average death toll in 2012 is especially due to the January (Q1) attacks in the northern city of Kano, killing between 150 and 200 people. These attacks illustrate that Boko Haram has the capacity to carry out large and coordinated offensives. However, the average death toll has subsequently decreased each quarter, from 13 deaths per attack in the first
quarter of 2012, to 4.5 in the first quarter of 2013. This is in line with Cook’s analysis of the 29 operations claimed by Boko Haram between June 2012 and April 2013, which concludes that the group’s attacks have become smaller and less complex during this time period.\(^{272}\) However, May 2013 has seen a renewed increase in Boko Haram violence, leading President Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa.\(^{273}\)

### 6.2 Targets

Before 2011 the majority of Boko Haram’s attacks were directed at official figures and symbols, especially police and security forces, or part of a purification agenda directed at Muslims.\(^{274}\) According to David Cook, Boko Haram’s major operations between September 2010 and September 2011 can be divided into seven target categories: 1) military, 2) police, 3) teachers and universities, 4) banks and markets, 5) purification attacks on beer drinkers, card players, etc., 6) Christian targets and 7) targeted assassinations.\(^{275}\) Among these, attacks towards police targets were by far the most common, with at least 16 incidents, while attacks against teachers/universities, purification attacks and targeted assassinations were the second most common, with at least five incidents within each category. In contrast to many other fundamentalist Islamist groups, Boko Haram rarely attacked Christians in this period.\(^{276}\) However, starting with the major attacks in Damaturu in Yobe State on November 4, 2011 and the Christmas Day operations in 2011, Boko Haram begun targeting Christians more frequently.\(^{277}\)

Boko Haram’s targets have all been national targets, with two exceptions: the bombing of the UN headquarters in the capital Abuja in August 2011, and the kidnapping of a French family in Cameroon in February 2013. These attacks have raised concerns that the group has contacts with other terrorist networks, and that Boko Haram is on its way to becoming a transnational terrorist threat.\(^{278}\) However, the exact nature and extent of such connections is uncertain, as discussed in section 5.4.

### 6.3 Geographic Scope

As mentioned, Boko Haram was established in Maiduguri, a town in the northeast of Nigeria. It was there and in nearby villages that Boko Haram conducted its first attacks. Until the beginning of 2011, most of Boko Haram’s operations were carried out in the northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Kano. Boko Haram still operates in the northern half of Nigeria, but in 2011 the group expanded its geographical range towards the West and South. In 2011, it attacked as far

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\(^{275}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{276}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{277}\) Cook, “Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria.”

west as Sokoto State, and as far south as the cities of Yola and the capital Abuja. However, in the first three months of 2013, the group’s operations have been confined to Borno and Yobe States (northeastern Nigeria), with occasional operations in Kano (north central Nigeria). The group has not conducted any attacks in the southern part of Nigeria. There have been occasional reports that the security services are searching for or arresting suspected Boko Haram militants in the Niger Delta and Lagos. But as of May 2013, the group is not known to have carried out any operations in the South. In February 2013, Boko Haram kidnapped a French family of seven in Cameroon, in the area between Lake Chad and Waza national park. The location is near the border with Nigeria and adjacent to the movement’s core territory in northeastern Nigeria.

6.4 Modus Operandi

In its first phase, Boko Haram mainly conducted simple attacks using clubs, machetes and small arms. However, by late 2010 it had also begun using Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The IEDs are mostly either improvised hand grenades made by filling empty soft drink cans with explosives – which are often thrown from motorcycles – or slightly larger devices left at the target. According to Stratfor, Boko Haram appears to have access to commercial explosives of an unspecified kind, in addition to the IEDs they themselves construct.

Though Boko Haram continues to employ its preferred tactic of carrying out ambushes and drive-by-shootings, it has also demonstrated a capacity to coordinate large-scale attacks, such as the January 2012 attacks in Kano. With the exception of the aforementioned February 2013 kidnap of seven Frenchmen in Cameroon, Boko Haram’s tactics are not known to have included kidnapnings. The group conducted its first suicide attack in Abuja on June 16, 2011, using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) to attack the police General Headquarters. This was the first known suicide attack carried out in Nigeria. Two months later, the group launched another VBIED suicide attack: the attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011. Since then, the group has conducted more than twenty suicide bombings (see Appendix D). As noted, many observers see the transition to VBIEDs and suicide attacks as a dramatic leap in

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280 Cook, “Boko Haram: Reversals and Retrenchment”.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
Boko Haram’s capability, indicating that the group has received help and training from other terrorist networks, such as AQIM or al-Shabaab.289

7 Concluding Remarks

Boko Haram is a militant Islamist group that has been operating in the north of Nigeria since the late 1990s or beginning of the 2000s. After an initial peaceful period under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the group has become increasingly radicalized and violent. The frequency and death toll of Boko Haram attacks have increased sharply between 2010 and 2013. The trigger causes for this shift appear to have been the killing of Yusuf and most of Boko Haram’s members by Nigerian security forces in July 2009, and the emergence of a new, more radical leadership. In addition, social and political marginalization of the North, direct or indirect support from discontented politicians, misguided military responses, and traditions of religious fundamentalism may all have contributed towards the radicalization and strengthening of Boko Haram.

The majority of Boko Haram’s attacks target official figures and symbols, especially the police and security forces. Since mid-2011 there has also been an increase in attacks on Christian targets. Boko Haram’s favored method of attack is drive-by shootings from motorcycles. Since late 2010 the group has also used explosives and, since mid-2011 it has conducted more than twenty suicide attacks.

We know relatively little about the size, membership and organizational structure of Boko Haram. The movement is believed to recruit most of its members among poor youths in northeastern Nigeria. It is currently thought to be led by Abubakar Shekau, but leadership appears decentralized, with local cells operating relatively independently of each other and the central leadership. There have been reports of internal disagreements, and an alleged breakaway faction calling itself Ansaru announced its formation in January 2012.

Boko Haram’s stated objectives can be classified in three main categories. First, Boko Haram demands the introduction and strict implementation of Sharia in Nigeria, or at least in the northern parts of the country. Secondly, Boko Haram is preoccupied with broader issues of governance, including removing democracy, overthrowing the government, and ensuring that President Jonathan steps down. Thirdly, Boko Haram wants vengeance, particularly against the security forces for the killing of its former leader Mohammed Yusuf, but also more generally against Christians and the Nigerian authorities, whom Boko Haram accuses of corruption and violence. In addition, the group has voiced some more specific claims, including that their mosque be rebuilt and that imprisoned Boko Haram members and their families be released.

There have been speculations that Boko Haram has established links to other extremist groups, such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for

Unity and Jihad (MOJUA), and Ansar Dine in Mali. Some analysts see the evolution of Boko Haram’s tactics and methods as an indication that the group may cooperate with foreign terrorist groups. Statements from security officials in the region and Boko Haram itself also suggest that such links exist.

On the other hand, Boko Haram appears to focus mainly on Nigeria, both in its rhetoric and its operations. Its statements mostly concern the Nigerian state and society, its preferred targets are national institutions such as the police and military, and the group has conducted only one attack outside the northern parts of Nigeria. This national focus makes it seem relatively unlikely that Boko Haram has close operational connections to international terrorist groups, or that it will emerge as a major international terrorist threat in the near future. So far, Ansaru – which is often described as a Boko Haram splinter group – has appeared more anti-Western and globally oriented in its rhetoric and targeting practice than the “core” movement led by Shekau. Still, the possibility of Boko Haram becoming more internationally oriented and conducting further attacks outside of Nigeria cannot be ruled out. For instance, Boko Haram’s February 2013 kidnapping of seven Frenchmen in Cameroon could indicate that the group is turning its attention more towards the international level.

Bibliography

Since the attacks on World Trade Center in 2001, the academic literature on terrorism and violent Islamism has grown extensively. However, most of this literature focuses on the Arab world and the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In comparison, relatively little has been written about Nigeria and Boko Haram. John Paden has written several books and articles about Islam in Nigeria, but these do not concern Boko Haram specifically. Freedom C. Onuoha, Jacob Zenn and David Cook are among the scholars who have written most extensively on Boko Haram.

The following bibliography provides an overview of literature on (radical) Islam in Nigeria in general, and Boko Haram in particular. It has been compiled based on searches for ‘Boko Haram’, ‘terrorism + Nigeria’ and ‘Islamism + Nigeria’ in several academic search engines, as well as by studying the lists of references in articles about Boko Haram and Islam in Nigeria. The list contains the academic work referred to in this report, but does not include news reports.

290 The following websites have been used:
- http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search/selectdb?sid=e4863d35-9955-4fcd-9680-6c496e9e0e29%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=106
- http://scholar.google.no/
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
- http://ask.bibsys.no/ask/action/smpsearch?lang=nb
(Radical) Islam in Nigeria


**Boko Haram**


### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANPP</td>
<td>All Nigeria People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIBWIS</td>
<td>Jama't Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna (Izala) (Society for Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (JTF was set up by the Federal Government of Nigeria in June 2011 in response to Boko Haram violence. It consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Department of State Security and the Nigerian Police Force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTI</td>
<td>Jama'atul Tajdidul Islam (The Movement for Islamic Revival)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOJUA</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>State Security Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIM</td>
<td>Yusufiya Islamic Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A  Map of Nigeria

Appendix B  Glossary of Key Terms

*Hajj*: The annual pilgrimage to Mecca and its associated rituals. It takes place on the eighth to twelfth days of the last month in the Muslim lunar calendar and is one of the five main pillars of Islam. All Muslims who are physically and financially able to make the pilgrimage have a religious duty to do so at least once in their lifetime.\(^{292}\)

*Hijra*: The migration of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622. In the Sufi tradition, Hijra is interpreted as the soul’s journey towards God. It also refers to a journey taken to avoid persecution because of religious beliefs. In the 1900s, hijra has become a central political-religious concept and is interpreted as a necessary retreat from society and godless ideologies (capitalism, secularism, socialism) to build an Islamic alternative; a state where Islamic law is followed.\(^{293}\)

*Islamist*: The term refers to those who believe that “Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life”, and who seek to establish norms of Muslim conduct in political and social affairs.\(^{294}\) The term is increasingly used to refer to Muslim groups seeking to enforce an ideological view of Islam in affairs of society through violent means.\(^{295}\)

*Jihad*: An Arabic word meaning struggle. It can refer to non-violent effort to follow the straight path of Islamic practice, but it is mostly used about Holy War in the Way of God, meaning armed struggle against the enemies of Islam.\(^{296}\)

*Salafism*: A Sunni movement named by its reference to the Salaf (the ancestors, the earliest Muslims) as role models for Islamic practice. Salafism “emphasizes the ‘normativeness’ of the original traditions”, and has become associated with literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islam.\(^{297}\) It is often associated with Wahhabism and jihadism.

*Sufism*: “A mystical movement in Islam that encompasses a set of rituals, such as euphoric worship, as well as certain beliefs, such as the existence of saints and the possibility of gaining direct knowledge of God. Today, Sufism is organized into orders, or tariqas, each grouped around a spiritual leader or shaykh.”\(^{298}\)


\(^{296}\) Ibid., p. 90-91.

\(^{297}\) Ibid., p. 159.

*Wahhabism*: The form and interpretation of Islam that is the basis for the official Sunni doctrine in Saudi Arabia. It “denounces innovations that have developed since the first generation of Muslims”, and advocates “the use of compulsion to enforce the practices of the faith”. 299

Appendix C  

Timeline of Incidents

Below is a chronological overview of incidents related to Boko Haram, including attacks planned or conducted by Boko Haram, arrests and killings of Boko Haram members by security forces, and statements by the group.

Analysts disagree over when Boko Haram first emerged (see Section 4.2). It is therefore difficult to determine the exact starting point for a timeline of key incidents related to Boko Haram. However, by most accounts, Boko Haram conducted its first attacks in December 2003, although the group was not known under that name until years later. The timeline thus covers the period from 2003 to March 31, 2013.

The timeline has been compiled based on incidents mentioned in academic articles and newspapers, timelines of incidents compiled by other analysts, and incidents registered in the Global Terrorism Database. The list seeks to be comprehensive, but it is possible that some incidents have been left out. The timeline is arranged chronologically according to the two main phases in Boko Haram’s evolution, as described in Section 4.3.

Phase 1: 2003–2009

December 23–31, 2003: Attacks. A group of about 200 gunmen from Boko Haram attacked police stations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam, Yobe State. An unknown number of policemen were killed. Boko Haram seized police weapons and vehicles. Military troops were sent to contain the insurrection. Boko Haram members were killed, and a number arrested.

January 7, 2004: Arrests, killings. Seven Boko Haram members were killed and three arrested by a team of “local vigilantes” outside the town of Damboa, Borno State. Bags containing AK-47 rifles were recovered from the Boko Haram members.

June 2004: Failed attack. Four members of Boko Haram were killed by prison guards in a failed jail-break in Damaturu, Yobe State.

September 23, 2004: Attacks. Boko Haram attacked police stations in the towns of Gwoza and Bama in Borno State. Four policemen and two civilians were killed. The attackers escaped to the Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Soldiers were sent to the mountains,

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301 Ibid.

302 Ibid.

303 Ibid.
and 27 Boko Haram members were killed. Five Boko Haram members who crossed into Cameroon were later arrested and handed over to Nigerian authorities.  

**October 10, 2004: Attack.** Ambush by suspected Boko Haram gunmen on a convoy of 60 policemen near the town of Kala-Balge on the border with Chad. 12 policemen were taken hostage. Police authorities assume they were killed because all attempts to trace them failed.  

**April 17, 2007: Attack.** Unknown militants, possibly Boko Haram, attacked a police station outside the city of Kano, killing 12 police officers and one civilian. Subsequent counter-terrorist operations resulted in the deaths of at least 25 militants.  

**November 12, 2007: Arrests.** Nigerian authorities declared they had detained at least ten suspected militants, possibly from Boko Haram and allegedly linked to AQIM, during operations in Kano, Kaduna and Yobe States. Five were later charged with conspiracy and planning to commit a terrorist acts, and two were also charged with attempted murder.  

**July 26–30, 2009: Attacks.** Boko Haram fought violently with police, allegedly over Boko Haram members’ refusal to wear motorcycle helmets in a funeral procession. Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf threatened reprisals in a video statement. Violent uprisings led by Boko Haram began in Bauchi state, and subsequently spread to three other states in the north of Nigeria. Among the targets attacked by Boko Haram were the State Police headquarters in Borno, several police stations, government buildings, mosques and churches. The military response left more than 800 dead, mostly Boko Haram members.  

**July 30, 2009: Arrest.** Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was captured and died in custody. According to police he was killed when trying to flee. Human rights organizations labeled the killing “extrajudicial” and “illegal”.  

**August 9, 2009: Statement.** Sanni Umaru released an e-mail statement describing himself as the new leader of Boko Haram. The statement also warned of a renewed Boko Haram campaign targeting cities throughout Nigeria.
Phase 2: 2010 ➔

April 19, 2010: Statement. Abubakar Muhammad Shekau declared himself leader of Boko Haram in a video interview.313

September 5, 2010:
- Attack. Gunmen on a motorcycle fired upon the district head of the Kalari area in Maiduguri, Lawan Zanna Mohammed Kagu. Kagu and another person were wounded. One man was killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.314
- Attack. Gunmen riding a motorcycle injured two people near the prison in Maiduguri, Borno. No group claimed responsibility, but Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.315
- Attack. Gunmen on a motorcycle shot and killed a retired police officer in Bama, Borno. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.316

September 7, 2010: Attack. Boko Haram gunmen attacked a prison in Bauchi. They freed over 700 inmates, including around 100 Boko Haram members. Four people, including a soldier, one policeman and two residents were killed in the raid.317

September 21, 2010: Attack. Gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed a local chief and a trader in Maiduguri. A man claiming to be a chieftain of the “Nigerian Taliban”, which might have been used as another name for Boko Haram, claimed responsibility.318

October 6, 2010:
- Assassination. Militants shot and killed the national vice-chairman of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), Awana Ali Ngala, in his house in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.319
- Attack. Gunmen riding motorcycles fired upon the house of Ali Modu, the speaker of the Borno State House of Assembly, killing one policeman. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.320

315 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.313
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
October 9, 2010:  
- **Assassination** of Sheikh Bashir Mustapha, an Islamic scholar, and one other person in his home. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.  
- **Assassination** of Bashir Kashara, a well-known Wahhabi figure. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

October 19, 2010: **Assassination** of Inspector Kashim Bukar. He was shot by three men in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

October 21, 2010: **Statement**. Boko Haram hung posters on key road intersections in northern Nigeria warning against assisting police in catching members of the group. The posters bore the signature of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and warned: “any Muslim that goes against the establishment of Sharia law will be attacked and killed.”

October 22, 2012: **Assassination**. Militants attacked and killed a local village head, Mohammed Tukur, in the village of Kandahar near Gauwa, Bauchi. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

October 23, 2011: **Failed attack**. An attempt to set a police station in Yobe on fire was overpowered by the police. One attacker was killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

November 19, 2010: **Attack**. Two gunmen on motorcycles killed three people, including one child, and injured another child in front of the Gomari Jumat Wahabi mosque in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

November 29, 2010: **Failed attack**. A man armed with a gun, two swords, and a knife attempted to kill a village chief in Borno, but did not succeed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

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December 28, 2010: Attack. Militants fired at a teaching hospital and killed one policeman and two civilians. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.330

December 29, 2010: Attack. Eight people were shot dead in Maiduguri. Among the dead was the governorship candidate of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.331

January 1, 2011: Attack on a church in Maiduguri, Borno State. No one was hurt, but part of the building was destroyed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.332

January 4, 2011: Attack at a prison in Yola, Adamawa State. 14 prisoners were freed. Members of Boko Haram had just been transferred to the prison. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.333

January 28, 2011: Assassination of Modu Fannami Godio, secular opposition figure and gubernatorial candidate from the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.334

February 2011: Assassinations. The police chief of Borno State and an undercover policeman were assassinated in their homes during the week of February 20. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassinations.335

March 28, 2011: Assassination. The chairman of the ANPP, Alhaji Modu Gana Makanike, was shot dead by two gunmen. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.336

March 29, 2011:
- Planned attack. Nigerian police uncovered a Boko Haram plot to bomb an ANPP election rally in Maiduguri.337

328 Ibid.
333 Ibid., p. 103.
335 Zenn, “Boko Haram Exploits Sectarian Divisions to Incite Civil War in Nigeria.”;
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
March 31, 2011: Assassination of Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi, Islamic scholar and preacher. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.

April 8, 2011: Attack. A bomb exploded in Mahuta, Kaduna State. Only the bomber was killed in the explosion. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the bombing. A suspected accomplice was injured and arrested; police found over 100 strands of dynamite in his home.

April 9, 2011: Attack. Bombs exploded at two polling stations in Maiduguri. At least ten people were injured at the Unguwar Doki polling center, while there were six casualties at the Independent National Electoral Coalition polling center. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 16, 2011: Attack. Arrests. Two bombs exploded in Kaduna. Eight people were injured. The police arrested four foreigners (at least two of them from Niger) and a Nigerian accomplice. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 21, 2011: Attack. A bomb killed one person in Kaduna. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

April 22, 2011: Arrests. A bomb-making factory uncovered in Kaduna. Police said eight people were arrested, three of whom had been critically injured during the blast on April 21, 2011.

April 24, 2011: Four bombs were detonated in Maiduguri. Three people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

May 27, 2011: Attack. Simultaneous gun and bomb attacks by a group of around 70 gunmen on a police station, a police barracks and a bank in Damboa, Borno State. Eight people were killed, including four policemen. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

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338 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
341 Zenn, “Boko Haram Exploits Sectarian Divisions to Incite Civil War in Nigeria.”
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
May 4, 2011: Attack. Gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed three prison guards and a passerby in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.348

May 18, 2011: Attack on a police station in Maiduguri, Borno State. The attack led to a gunbattle with the police. About 10 people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.349

May 29, 2011: Attack. Three bombs exploded in a “beer garden” in a military barracks in Bauchi, Bauchi State. 13 people were killed and 33 wounded. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.350

May 31, 2011: Assassination of Abba Anas bin `Umar, the brother of Shehu of Borno (the sultan of Borno State). Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.351

June 6, 2011: Assassination of Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti, who was critical of Boko Haram. He was shot dead by two gunmen on motorcycles outside his house in Biu, 200 km from Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.352

June 7, 2011: Attacks. On a church and two police posts in Maiduguri. At least 14 people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.353

June 11, 2011: Failed attack. A bomb was found by the police at Gonin Gora market in Kaduna. It is not known who planted the bomb.354

June 12, 2011:
- Attack. Four people were killed in a Boko Haram attack on an unregistered drinking place in a suburb of Maiduguri.355
- Statement. Boko Haram released a list of conditions to be met before they would enter into a dialogue with the government.356

June 13, 2011: Failed attack. A bomb was found at the NNPC staff quarters at Narayi, Kaduna. It is not known who planted the bomb.357

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349 Ibid., p. 105.
353 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
June 14, 2011: Failed attack. A bomb was found on a rail track near a bridge and a school in the heart of Kaduna city. It is not known who planted the bomb. 358

June 16, 2011: Attack. Suicide attack on the police General Headquarters in Abuja. 359 Two people were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility. 360

June 19, 2011: Attack. Gunmen on motorcycles fired at a relaxation center in the Gomari district of Maiduguri, killing five people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 361

June 20, 2011:
- Attack. Gun and bomb attacks on a police station and a bank in Kankara, Katsina State. Seven people were killed, five of them policemen. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 362
- Arrest. Police raided Boko Haram’s headquarters in Maiduguri, where people were allegedly celebrating the bomb attack on police headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011. 58 people were arrested, among them several foreign nationals (Somalis, Sudanese and Nigeriens). 363

June 27, 2011: Attack. Gun and bomb attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri. At least 25 people were killed, and dozens injured. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 364

July 3, 2011: Attacks. Around 20 people were killed in the northeast of Nigeria in violence blamed on Boko Haram. 365

August 25, 2011: Attack. Gun and bomb attacks on two police stations and two banks in Gombe, Adamawa State. At least 16 people were killed, including seven policemen. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 366


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358 Ibid.


September 1, 2011:
- **Shootout** between Boko Haram gunmen and soldiers in Song, Adamawa State. One Boko Haram member was killed, another injured and captured.\(^{368}\)
- **Statement**. Boko Haram released a suicide video of the August UN bomber, Abul Barra.\(^{369}\)

**September 4, 2011: Assassination.** Two suspected Boko Haram members shot and killed Muslim cleric Malam Dala outside his home in the Zinnari area of Maiduguri.\(^{370}\)

**September 12, 2011: Attacks.** Bomb and shooting on a police station and a bank in Misau, Bauchi State. Seven people were killed, including four policemen. The bank was robbed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attacks.\(^{371}\)

**September 13, 2011: Attack.** Boko Haram members in Maiduguri shot and wounded four soldiers in an ambush. The attacks followed the arrest of 15 Boko Haram members in various military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in the city.\(^{372}\)

**September 17, 2011: Assassination.** Babakura Fugu (brother-in-law of former Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf) was shot dead outside his house in Maiduguri by two suspected members of Boko Haram. Two days earlier, Fugu had attended a peace meeting with Nigeria’s ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo.\(^{373}\)

**October 1, 2011:**
- **Assassination** of a butcher and his assistant by suspected Boko Haram gunmen at Baga market in Maiduguri.
- **Attack.** Bombing and shooting of a military patrol vehicle delivering food to soldiers at a checkpoint in Maiduguri. Three civilians were killed in the subsequent shootout. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\(^{374}\)

**October 3, 2011: Attack.** Three people were killed in attack on Baga market in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\(^{375}\)

**October 16, 2011: Assassination** of Bintwe Dalawa, a lawmaker representing Konduga in the Borno State House of Assembly, in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.\(^{376}\)

\(^{371}\) Ibid.
\(^{372}\) Ibid.
\(^{373}\) Ibid.
\(^{374}\) Ibid.
\(^{375}\) Ibid.
\(^{376}\) Ibid.
October 22, 2011: **Assassination** of a state television cameraman. Boko Haram claimed responsibility. In a statement, Boko Haram said it had evidence that the cameraman was an informant for the security services, and warned it would kill anyone else that “steps on our toes”.  

October 23, 2011:
- **Attack.** Bombing and shooting of a police station and two banks in Saminaka, Kaduna State. Unknown number of causalities. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.  
- **Attack.** Shooting at a market in Katari, Kaduna State. Unknown number of causalities. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.  

October 25, 2011: **Assassination** of a policeman. He was shot in his home in Damaturu, Yobe State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.  

October 29, 2011: **Assassination** of Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana’a, outside his house in Maiduguri, Borno State. Jana’a was reported to have provided information on Boko Haram to the security forces.  

November 3, 2011: **Arrest.** Sanda Umar Konduga (alias: Usman al-Zawahiri) was arrested by the State Security Service (SSS). Konduga admitted to being a member of Boko Haram and claimed he was working for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) politicians in the State of Borno. Boko Haram rejected any links to Nigeria’s political parties.  

November 4, 2011:
- **Attack.** Bomb and gun attacks in Damaturu, Yobe State. Targets included churches and mosques. At least 63 people were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.  
- **Attack.** Suicide bombers attacked a military base in Maiduguri, Borno State. The number of casualties is not known. Authorities suspected that Boko Haram carried out the attack.  

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379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
November 6, 2011: Assassination. A police inspector was killed in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.385

November 9, 2011: Attack. Bombing of a police station and the office of Nigeria’s road safety agency in Maina, Borno State. No one was hurt. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.386

November 13, 2011: Statement. Algeria’s deputy foreign minister said that intelligence reports showed coordination between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram.387

November 15, 2012: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram members threw explosives at the convoy of Borno State governor Shettima in Maiduguri. No one was hurt.388

November 24, 2011: Statement. A spokesman for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, claimed Boko Haram had links with al-Qaeda.389

November 26-27, 2011: Attack. Bomb attacks in Geidam, Yobe, following the arrest of Boko Haram members. Four policemen were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.390

December 3, 2011: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed two people in Maiduguri, Borno State. Three bombs also exploded, but no one was killed.391

December 4, 2011: - Attack. Bombing of two police buildings and two banks in Bauchi State. Three people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.392

388 Ibid.
- Attack on a wedding in Maiduguri, Borno. Two people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.393

December 6, 2011: Attack. A bomb explosion in Kaduna metropolis, Kaduna State, brought down a block of shops and apartments, killing eight people.394 Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.395

December 13, 2011: Attack. Bomb attack targeting soldiers. The soldiers retaliated with shooting and ten people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.396


December 19, 2012: Shootout between Boko Haram and police in Kano leave three Boko Haram members and three policemen dead. Police seized bomb-making equipment and made arrests.398

December 23, 2011: Attacks. Explosions and gunfire in Maiduguri, Damaturu and Potiskum. According to military sources in Maiduguri, Boko Haram attacked JTF operatives in at least six places within a span of one hour.399 The clashes in Damaturu continued for four days, and resulted in at least 10,000 internally displaced people, and an unknown number of deaths.400

December 24–25, 2011: Planned attack. A plot by Boko Haram to bomb the military barracks, the Bougainvillea Hotel and a Shell oil facility in Port Harcourt was thwarted when security agencies arrested several suspects on the night of 24–25 December, according to an army commander.401

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393 Ibid.
399 “Nigeria: Christmas Bombings.”
400 Ibid.
**December 25, 2011: Attacks.** Multiple bomb attacks against churches and Christian worshippers throughout Nigeria, including:  
- Bombing of a Catholic Church in Madalla, outside the capital city. At least 40 people were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.  
- Four people were killed when a suicide bomber drove into the headquarters of the State Security Service (SSS) in Damaturu.  
- A bombing in the province of Jos. One policeman was killed.

**December 28, 2011: Attack.**Bombing and shooting at a beer parlor in Mubi, Adamawa State. No one was killed, but 15 people were wounded. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

**December 30, 2011: Attack** at a military checkpoint in Maiduguri. Four passers-by were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

**December 31, 2011: Statement.** President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau States and ordered the closing of the borders to Chad and Niger near areas affected by recent attacks. He directed top security officials to set up a special counter-terrorism unit to fight the growing threat posed by Boko Haram.

**January 1, 2012: Threat.** In a phone call to local media, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa warned Christians in the North to leave within three days stating that Boko Haram would confront government troops in the areas where a state of emergency was declared on December 31, 2011.

**January 3, 2012: Attack** on a police station in Birniwa, Jigawa State. One civilian and one policeman were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

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402 Boås, “Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the “Taleban” to Boko Haram II”.


405 Ibid.


407 Ibid.

408 Ibid.


January 4, 2012: Attack. Two gunmen, suspected to be Boko Haram members, entered a home and shot a teacher and his son in Dalla, Maiduguri. The JTF killed the two attackers during an arrest attempt. 412

January 5, 2012: Attack. Gunmen attacked a church in Gombe State. Reports of the number killed vary between three and six. 413 Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 414

January 6, 2012:
- Attack. Shooting at a church in Yola. Eight people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 415
- Attack. Shooting in Mubi, Adamawa. 17 Christians were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 416

January 10, 2012: Attack on a beer garden in Damaturu, Yobe State. Eight people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 417

January 13, 2012:
Attacks on a pub in Yola, Adamawa State and on a pub in Gombe, Gombe State. The attacks killed four and injured two. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attacks. 418

January 17, 2012:
- Attack on a military checkpoint in Maiduguri. Two soldiers and four attackers were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 419
- Arrest: Six members of Boko Haram were arrested in a military raid on a hideout in Maiduguri. 420

January 18, 2012:
- Arrest of Kabir Sokoto, alleged mastermind of the Christmas Day bombing of the Catholic Church in Madalla. Sokoto was freed shortly afterwards by other Boko Haram members who

413 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
attacked the police team escorting Sokoto to his apartment in Abaji, Abuja. He was recaptured on February 10, 2012.  

- **Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked an army outpost in Borno State, killing two people.  

**January 20, 2012: Attacks** on eight government security buildings in Kano, including the regional police headquarters, two local police stations, the local headquarters of the State Security Service, the home of a police official and the state police command headquarters. There were up to five suicide bombers, at least 20 explosions and sustained gunfire. According to officials, over 100 people were killed. (As many as 300 were killed according to other sources). Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.  

**January 22, 2012: Failed attack.** Attempted bank robbery in Tafawa Balewa; repelled by security forces.  

**January 24, 2012: Arrests.** The JFT arrested 158 suspected Boko Haram members following the Kano attacks. Police reported seizing ten cars laden with explosives and about 300 improvised explosive devices hidden in soft drink cans and bottles at a number of locations in Kano.  

**January 28, 2012: JTF operation.** The JTF killed 11 members of Boko Haram in Maiduguri.  

**January 29(?) , 2012. Statement.** In a phone call to local journalists, Abu Qaqa threatened that Boko Haram would attack Sokoto if members of the group were not freed from prison.  

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422 Cook, “Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria.”  
February 1, 2012:
- **Attack.** Seven people were killed in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram took responsibility for the attack in a statement, saying they had killed 7 out of 30 persons earmarked to be executed because they revealed the identities of the 11 Boko Haram members who were killed by the JTF on January 28, 2012.430

- **Arrest** of (purported) spokesman for Boko Haram, Abu Qaqa. According to Boko Haram, the man who was arrested is not Abu Qaqa, but the SSS are certain that the captured man is Abu Qaqa.431

February 7, 2012:
- **Failed attack.** A bomb was diffused by the police anti-bomb squad in Kaduna. The bomb was found in the house of Hon. Auwalu Ali Tafoki, a former Chairman of the Kaduna South Local Area.432

- **Attack.** Suicide bombers attacked two military formations and a bridge in Kaduna. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks against the military formations. A military spokesman said the only death in the attack was the bomber, but another military source told the BBC that at least five soldiers were killed.434

February 15, 2012: **Attack.** Jailbreak in Koton-Karfe, Kogi State. About 20 gunmen attacked the prison with explosives and guns, freeing 119 inmates. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, saying they staged the operation to rescue seven Boko Haram members.435

February 20, 2012: **Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram bomb and gun attack at a market in Maiduguri. According to hospital staff, 30 civilians were killed.436 The army killed eight of the attackers and deactivated bombs.437

February 23, 2012: **Statement.** Nigeria’s minister of defense, Oluseyi Petinrin, stated that Boko Haram had ties to al-Qaeda.438

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437 Ola Awoniyi, “Nigeria defence chief says Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda,” *AFP*, February 23 2012. URL:
February 25, 2012: Attack. Gunmen suspected of being from Boko Haram launched simultaneous gun and bomb attacks on a prison and a police station in Gombe. 14 people were killed.439


March 7: Attack on a police station in Ashaka, Gombe State. Seven people were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.441

March 8, 2012: Kidnap, killings. An Italian and a British engineer, who were kidnapped in the northern town of Birnin Kebbi in May 2011, were killed when allied Nigerian-British forces tried to free them. Nigerian authorities blamed Boko Haram for the kidnapping and killings, but Boko Haram issued a statement denying any involvement.442

March 9, 2012: Assassination. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed a traditional ruler as he left a mosque after Friday prayers in the northeastern Gombe State.443

March 10, 2012:
- Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked and burned down a police station in Bulabilin Ngaura village, Borno State, killing one policeman.444
- Failed attack. Boko Haram tried to attack a mobile police base in Maiduguri, but, according to local police, was repelled. One suspected Boko Haram member was killed and 11 were arrested.445

March 11, 2012: Attack. A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed three civilians in a bombing outside a church in Jos.446 Christian youths killed at least ten people in reprisal attacks.447

444 Ibid.
445 Ibid.
March 12, 2012: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked a military patrol, killing five people. 448

March 21, 2012:
- Attack. Boko Haram suspects used explosives to destroy the Divisional Police Office’s (DPO) house in the Tudun Wada local government area, 100 kilometers from Abuja. 449
- Failed attack. The JTF killed nine suspected Boko Haram members and arrested two when they attempted to rob a bank. 450

March 30, 2012: Attack. A government official reported that suspected members of Boko Haram killed four people when they robbed a bank and stormed a police station in Maiduguri, Borno State. 451

March 31, 2012: JTF operation. A raid of a bomb factory in Kogi led to a shootout between the JTF and suspected Boko Haram members. Ten people killed. 452

April 4, 2012: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen killed seven people in a market in Maiduguri. 453

April 8, 2012 (Easter Day): Attack. A suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives near a church in Kaduna killing at least 38 people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 454

April 12, 2012: Statement. Boko Haram released a video threatening to overthrow President Jonathan within three months. 455

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450 Ibid.
453 Philip Mudd, “Are Jihadist Groups Shifting Their Focus from the Far Enemy?”, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 5 (2012).
454 Ibid.
April 18, 2012: **Statement.** The US government warned US citizens residing in Nigeria that Boko Haram is plotting attacks in the capital, Abuja, among others against hotels regularly visited by Westerners. 456

April 25, 2012:
- **Arrest.** The JTF raided a suspected Boko Haram “bomb factory” in a home in Kano State and arrested an unknown number of suspects. Items recovered from the house included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assorted containers, liquid substances, charcoal and a film about Osama bin Laden. No one was killed. 457
- **Planned attack.** According to Nigerian military sources, an attack on Biu town was avoided when the Nigerian military shot and killed three suspected Boko Haram members heading towards Biu. 458

April 26, 2012:
- **Attack.** A suicide attack on the offices of the Nigerian newspaper This Day in Abuja killed four people killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. 459
- **Attack.** A car bomb exploded outside a complex housing a number of newspaper offices, including This Day in Kaduna (Reported by AFP, April 26). Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. 460
- **Statement.** In a video statement, Boko Haram took responsibility for both April 26 attacks. The statement said that the media, and especially This Day, had offended the prophet Mohammed and told lies about Boko Haram, and threatened to attack other media houses. 461

April 29, 2012:
- **Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked a church in Keno, killing at least 15 people. 462
- **Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked a church in Maiduguri. Four people were killed. 463

April 30, 2012: **Attack.** A suicide bomber targeted a senior police official’s convoy in Taraba State, killing 11 people. The official was not injured. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 464
May 4, 2012: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen stormed a prison in Borno State, killing two guards and freeing an unknown number of prisoners.465

May 6, 2012: Shootout between security forces and Boko Haram in Kano. Four Boko Haram members were killed.466

May 11, 2012: Arrest. Suleiman Mohammed, described as Boko Haram’s head of operations in Kano, was arrested with his wife and five children during a police raid in Kano.467

May 12, 2012: Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen burned down a police station in Borno State. Two policemen were killed.468

May 13, 2012: Shootout between security forces and Boko Haram in Kano. Six security force officers were killed.469

May 19, 2012: JTF Operation. A suspected “Boko Haram enclave” was destroyed by the JTF in Jos.470

May 22, 2012: Planned attack. Separate attempts to bomb police headquarters and a radio station in Abuja were stopped by security personnel in the buildings. The affiliation of the suicide bombers is unknown.471

May 31, 2012: Kidnap, killing. A German national, kidnapped in January 2012, was killed in a military raid of a home in Kano, Kano State. At least five suspected kidnappers were also killed in the operation.472 It is not clear whether Boko Haram was involved: some sources say the raid targeted a Boko Haram meeting, others that it targeted a group affiliated with AQIM (who in

470 Ibid.
March 2012 had posted a video demanding that Germany freed a woman jailed on terror charges in return for the release of the kidnapped German. 473 Boko Haram has neither claimed nor denied responsibility.

**June 3, 2012: Attack.** A suicide bomber killed at least 12 people at a church in the northern town of Yelwa, Bauchi State. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. 474

**June 5, 2012: Assassination.** Two gunmen on a motorcycle killed former Nigerian deputy police chief Abubakar Saleh Ningi, his driver and a bodyguard in Kano. In an email statement to reporters on June 6, 2012, Boko Haram claimed responsibility and threatened to carry out more attacks: “By God’s grace very soon top government officials will have no peace as we will intensify attacks on them wherever they are”. 475

**June 5–6, 2012: JTF operation.** Nigerian security forces shot dead 16 suspected Boko Haram militants from Maiduguri. 476

**June 8, 2012: Attack.** In a suicide bombing a man drove a car with explosives into the entrance of the police headquarters of Borno State. Four people were killed, including a policeman, and seven were wounded. No one claimed responsibility for the attack. 477

**June 10, 2012:**
- **Attack.** A suicide car bomb exploded outside a church in Jos. According to police, no one was killed in the explosion, but 41 people were wounded, and two bystanders were killed in subsequent retaliations. 478 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. 479
- **Attack.** According to police, five gunmen attacked a church in the town of Biu, killing one and wounding three. 480 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. 481

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June 17, 2012:
- **Attack.** Coordinated suicide car bombings of three churches in the neighboring cities of Zaire and Kaduna in Kaduna State. At least 16 people were killed. As a result of the violence and reprisals that continued for several days, a police source told This Day that 52 people were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, saying the attacks were a response to the “atrocities Christians perpetrated against Muslims.”

- **Attacks** on two churches in Nassarawa and Barnawa in the south of Kaduna. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

June 18, 2012:
- **Attack.** Shooting and over a dozen bombings in Damaturu, capital of Yobe State. Targets included a police outpost and the governor's private residence. According to eye witnesses, a subsequent shootout between the JTF and suspected Boko Haram gunmen lasted for several hours. Sources told the Daily Trust that the attacks followed the arrest of a suspected Boko Haram member earlier in the day. Hospital sources told the Daily Trust that at least 40 people were killed. The Commissioner of Police (CP) in Yobe confirmed that at least 34 civilians, four policemen and two soldiers were killed. Boko Haram claimed responsibility in an e-mail on June 21, 2012, and threatened more attacks.

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485 Ibid.


490 Ibid.
June 21, 2012:
- **Statement.** The United States Department of State designated Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’.\(^{491}\)
- **Arrest attempt.** Habib Bama (aka Shuaibu Bama and Habib Mamman) was shot in an attempted arrest by the JTF in Yobe State.\(^{492}\) Bama was critically wounded, and later died in hospital. In a statement Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa said the group was happy about Habib Bama’s “martyrdom.”\(^{493}\)

June 22, 2012:
- **Arrest.** The JTF arrested four people trying to place bombs in a mosque in Kano.\(^{494}\) The identity of the suspects was not released, but they were thought to be members of Boko Haram. Two days later, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa denied the involvement of Boko Haram in the attempted bombing.\(^{495}\)
- **Attack.** A bomb exploded outside a nightclub frequented by Westerners in Abuja. No one was injured.\(^{496}\)

June 23, 2012: **JTF operation.**
Four suspected Boko Haram members were killed in shootout when the JTF raided a Boko Haram hideout in Kano. The JTF recovered weapons, ammunition and a Honda vehicle primed for a suicide mission.\(^{497}\)

June 24, 2012: **Attack.** Gunmen attacked a prison in Yobe, freeing 40 inmates. Two attackers were killed, and several policemen wounded. The police claimed that Boko Haram was responsible.\(^{498}\)

June 25, 2012: **Attack.** An IED exploded near a cluster of bars in the city of Bauchi. Nine people were injured, but no one was killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\(^{499}\)

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June 26, 2012: Attack. Three policemen were shot dead when gunmen attacked the regional police headquarters in the town of Wukari in Taraba State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 500

June 26–27, 2012: Attacks, all in Kano:
- 30 militants used explosives and guns to attack Kano’s Dala police division. According to the police, ten militants and one policeman were killed in the ensuing shootout.
- Five insurgents were killed in a separate gun battle at Jakara police barracks.
- Two insurgents were killed and three arrested after their group attacked a mobile police unit.
No one claimed the attacks, but police accused Boko Haram. 501

June 28, 2012: Attack. A bomb and gun attack against the police station in the town of Gulak in Adamawa State killed five policemen. 502 Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 503

June 30, 2012: JTF operation. The JTF launched a pre-emptive offensive against Boko Haram in Damaturu (Yobe), following intelligence that Boko Haram planned to attack the city. 504 Three suspected Boko Haram members were killed and one arrested. Arms and explosives were recovered from the scene. 505

July 2, 2012: Attack. Nine construction workers building a mosque were killed in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 506

July 4, 2012: Attack. An explosion outside a shopping mall in Abuja did not result in causalities. Journalists mentioned that the area had previously been targeted by Boko Haram, and that the

mall was frequented by diplomats, foreign professionals and Nigeria’s wealthy political elite, all of whom were potential targets for the group.507

July 6, 2012:

**Attack.** According to police, suspected Boko Haram members attacked an army patrol vehicle with explosives and gunfire in a residential area of Damaturu, Yobe. There were an unknown number of causalities.508

- **Assassination.** Suspected Boko Haram members killed two people in Maiduguri by slitting their throats.509

July 7, 2012: **Attack.** Hundreds of assailants attacked a dozen villages in Plateau State with guns and machetes. At least 58 people were killed in the attacks and 22 were killed during funerals the following day.510 Boko Haram claimed responsibility in an e-mail to journalists.511 However, the Nigerian President denied that Boko Haram was involved.512

July 13, 2012: **Attack.** A suicide bomber killed five people, including himself, at the central mosque in Maiduguri. The explosion narrowly missed the deputy governor of Borno State, Zanna Umar Mustapha, and Borno’s Shehu (regional religious leader), Abubakar Umar Garbai El-Kanemi.513 Anonymous security sources told the media that they believed Shehu was the target of the attack. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.514

July 15, 2012: **Failed attack.** A bomb exploded in a vehicle, failing to reach the alleged target of a church in Okene, Kogi State.515 No one was killed and the police arrested one man.516


July 16, 2012: Police operation. Police uncovered a “bomb factory” in Okaito, Kogi State, based on information from the man arrested on July 15, 2012. Weapons and explosives were recovered at the scene. According to local media, this was the fourth bomb-making facility uncovered in Kogi State since December 2011.517

July 17, 2012: Attack. A man fired a rocket-propelled grenade outside an Islamic school in Jos, killing one child. No particular group was suspected of carrying out the attack. 518

July 18, 2012: Statement. President Goodluck Jonathan lifted the state of emergency imposed on four states in the Northeast after the Christmas day bombings by Boko Haram in December 2011.519

July 19, 2012:
- Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked the largest market in Maiduguri, killing four and injuring two.520
- Shooting. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen clashed with security forces in Maiduguri, killing two people.521
- Attack. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen shot and killed two people at a major junction in Kano where people buy cigarettes and play cards.522

July 22, 2012: Attack. Two people killed were and a school set on fire in Yobe. The police suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.523

July 26, 2012:
- Attack. A shooting at a factory in Maiduguri killed two Indian employees and injured one. Money was also stolen. The police suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.524
- Attack. Three policemen were killed at during a shooting at a patrol post on Bauchi Gombe road, Bauchi State.525 In a statement on July 31, 2012, Boko Haram said: ‘We are responsible for the attacks in Bauchi…”, probably referring to this one.526

521 Ibid.
**July 27, 2012: Arrest.** The JTF said they had arrested 26 Boko Haram members and killed two in Maiduguri.527

**July 29, 2012:**
- **Failed Attack.** A suicide bomber and gunmen launched an attack at a mosque in Kano. The police engaged the attackers in a gun battle, killing four. The police suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.528
- **Attack.** Shooting at a National Air Force Vehicle in Kano killed two. The police suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.529
- **Attack.** Gunmen on a motorcycle shot and killed two civilians in Kano. The police suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.530
- **Attack:** Gunmen ambushed a JTF patrol in Damaturi. Killed one, injured three.531 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.532
- **Threat:** Hundreds of people fled Maiduguri after rumors that Boko Haram planned to attack the area. Reportedly, leaflets were distributed warning people to get out of the city.533

**July 30, 2012:**
- **Attacks.** Suicide bombers in cars attacked two police stations in Sokoto. The two bombers and one policeman were killed, and eight people were injured.534 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.535
- **Attack on Vice President Namadi Sambo’s residence in Zaria, Kaduna State.** Three gunmen on motorcycles killed one person and injured another.536 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.537

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529 Ibid.
530 Ibid.
- **JTF operation** in Borno State. The JTF retrieved weapons and explosives from Boko Haram, including eight rocket launchers. Two suspected Boko Haram members were shot.538

**August 3, 2012: Attack** in Potiskum, Yobe State. The Emir of Fika, Alhaji Mohammed Abali Ibn Muhammadu Idrissa, was targeted by a suicide bomber at the Potiskum mosque after Friday prayers, but survived. Six people were injured and the suicide bomber died. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.539

**August 4, 2012:**
- **Shootout** between the JTF and Boko Haram gunmen in Maiduguri, Borno, killing an unknown number of people. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.540
- **Shootout** between the JTF and Boko Haram in Gombe, killing six soldiers. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.541

**August 5, 2012:**
- **Attack** on a military vehicle, by a suicide bomber in a vehicle in Damaturu, Yobe, killing ten people. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.542
- **Statement.** A 30-minute YouTube video of Shekau was posted stating that Boko Haram would not negotiate with the government, and demanding that the President embraces Islam.543
- **Attack** on a police post in Shagari, Sokoto using guns and explosives. No one was killed.544

**August 6, 2012: Attack.** Gunmen attacked a church in Kogi, killing 16. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.545

**August 10, 2012: Arrests.** A JTF raid on a Boko Haram hideout in Maiduguri resulted in the arrests of two people. Weapons were recovered, including 9 rocket launchers.546

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541 Ibid.

542 Ibid.


545 Ibid.

August 11, 2012: Arrests. A raid on bomb-making factory in Kano resulted in the arrest of three Boko Haram members, and the recovery of weapons.547

August 11, 2012: Shootout. The JTF stated that they killed 20 Boko Haram members in a shootout in Maiduguri.548 Boko Haram later claimed that none of its members had been killed, only civilians.549

August 14, 2012: Statement. An alleged Boko Haram spokesman, Habu Mohammed, claiming to be a deputy to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, stated that Boko Haram had initiated dialogue with the government. This was confirmed by the Nigerian authorities, but later denied by Boko Haram in a statement from Abu Qaqa on August 23, 2012.550

August 15, 2012: Attack. A suicide car bomb attack on a military checkpoint at Shagari Housing Estate in Damaturu, Yobe State. Eight people were killed (six soldiers and two civilians). Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.551

August 20, 2012: Attack. A school, a police station, and a catholic church in Damagum, Yobe, were set on fire. No one was killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.552

August 21, 2012: Attacks by gunmen on two mosques in Biu, Borno State. Two people were killed, including an Islamic cleric. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.553

August 28, 2012: Attack. IEDs were used in Maiduguri, against an unknown target. Only the attacker was killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.554

**September 2, 2012: Attack** on a Divisional Police Headquarters, a church and the residence of the Unit Commandant of the Army in New Marte, Marte Local Government Area of Borno State. The attackers used guns and fire, killing a police sergeant and two civilians. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.555

**September 4–5, 2012: Attacks.** Gunmen riding on motorcycles attacked 20–25 base stations owned by mobile phone companies such as MTN, Airtel and Globacom in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Kano States. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks.556

**September 5, 2012: Arrests, killing.** The JTF killed seven suspected Boko Haram members and arrested 13 in Maiduguri. 557

**September 12, 2012: Arrest.** The JFT arrested 11 Boko Haram members and recovered arms, ammunition and homemade bombs in the Waka-Biu region of Borno State.558

**September 13, 2012: Attack** on two telecommunication masts in Zaria. The attackers used explosives. No one was hurt. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.559

**September 16, 2012:**

- **Attack** on people playing ludo by gunmen on a motorcycle in Bauchi. At least six people were killed and nine injured. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 560
- **Attack** by gunmen on motorcycles on a member of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps and three members of his family in Kano. All four were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.561

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September 17, 2012:
- **Shootout.** Three Boko Haram members were killed by the JTF near Kano. One of those killed may have been Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa. 562 36 IED’s were subsequently recovered at their hideout. 563
- **Assassination** of the attorney general of the northeastern State of Borno, Zanna Malam Gana, in his house in the town of Bama. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination. 564
- **Assassination** of Ibrahim Jarmam, the former head of the prison service in Bauchi State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. 565

September 19, 2012: **Shootout.** Two Boko Haram commanders were killed by the JTF along the Maiduguri-Kano road. According to a JTF spokesman, they were commanders in charge of Yobe and Adamawa States. 566

September 20(?) , 2012: **Arrest** of a Boko Haram “accountant” carrying 4.5 million Nigerian naira (about 28,500 USD) in cash on a bus between Kano and Zaria. 567

September 23, 2012:
- **Attack** on a catholic church in Bauchi by vehicle-based suicide bomber, killing himself, two others, and injuring 46 people. 568
- **Shootout** between the JTF and Boko Haram in Damaturu. According to the JTF 35 Boko Haram members and two soldiers were killed. 569

September 24, 2012: **Arrests.** The JTF raided a bomb factory in Mubi, Adamawa State, arresting 156 suspected Boko Haram members, including six women and five children. One of the suspects was killed during the operation. Among the items recovered were IEDs, chemicals, over 500 daggers, 9 AK–47 rifles, pistols, rocket launchers, other arms and ammunition. 570

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565 Ibid.
September 25, 2012: Arrest. Five suspected Boko Haram members were arrested in Niger, near the border with Nigeria.  

September 28, 2012: The JTF discovered an “arms factory” in Kano. They recovered “2 AK-47 rifle, 2 pistols, 2 bags of TNT, ready-made improvised explosive devices [IEDs], remote-controlled bombs, gas cylinders, a welding machine and one Tiger generating set”.

September 29, 2012: Arrests. The Nigerian military said it had arrested a number of security personnel for having links to Boko Haram. The arrests began with an immigration officer, Grema Mohammed. He reportedly confessed to having been trained alongside 15 other Boko Haram members in weapon handling, assassination and special operations in the Niger Republic. He also confessed to having participated in several attacks.

September 30, 2012:  
- Attack. A bomb exploded near an Islamic boarding school and mosque in Zaria, Kaduna state. Two suspected Boko Haram members were killed during the subsequent exchange of gunfire with security forces. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
- Statement. In a 9-minute YouTube video, Shekau warned that conspirators had nowhere to hide, stated that Abu Qaqa was not dead, and threatened to attack the wives of Nigerian security officials because the wives of Boko Haram had been captured.

October 1, 2012: Attack on student housing in Mubi, Adamawa, with guns and knives. 25 people were killed and 15 wounded. The press presented two alternative explanations: 1) the murders could be retaliation for the Nigerian military’s crackdown on Boko Haram in Mubi, arresting 156 suspected members; 2) The context for the killings may have been a contested student election that pitted southern Igbo candidates against northern candidates. Unnamed police sources in Abuja later disclosed to the Vanguard that 30 suspects had so far been arrested, among them 16 confirmed members of Boko Haram, including four students. However, a man

573 “Nigerian security officers arrested for Boko Haram links”, AFP, September 29, 2012. URL: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j8u4K8EJ1miSYbJoYmXX2_d7olA?docId=CNG.8f3911e9f1ecd80e7bb405b134a8bbe7.141 (Accessed October 2, 2012).
who claimed to be a senior member of Boko Haram told the Premium Times that his group had nothing to do with the killing of students in Mubi. 

October 4, 2012: Attack. Explosion outside a bar in Jalingo, Taraba State. One person was killed and 14 wounded. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

October 6, 2012: Attack. Explosion outside a TV station in Jalingo, Taraba State. One person was killed and five wounded. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

October 7, 2012: Shootout in Damaturu, Yobe State. According to a military spokesman, 30 suspected Boko Haram members were killed and a number arrested.

October 14, 2012:
- Assassination. Mala Kaka, a traditional ruler who had arranged a meeting the previous week to call for an end to Boko Haram attacks was shot dead in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.
- Bomb attack in Maiduguri. An IED exploded on a road, killing no one. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
- Attack on Dogon Dawa, a village in Kaduna State. Reports vary, but 12-24 people were killed. It is unclear who carried out the attack - Boko Haram or local robbers.

October 15, 2012:
- Bomb attacks in Maiduguri on various locations used by the JTF. Up to 15 separate explosions were reported. Officials claimed that one soldier was wounded and three Boko Haram members killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
- Attack. A traffic warden was shot dead by a gunman in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
- Shootout. The JTF claimed it killed 24 Boko Haram members in Maiduguri, and recovered weapons.

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580 Ibid.
581 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
586 Ibid.
October 17, 2012: Bomb attacks in Potiskum, Yobe State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack. Unconfirmed reports stated that at least five people were killed.

October 18, 2012: Arrest. Nigerian authorities said they had arrested “A high-profile Boko Haram commander, Shuaibu Mohammed Bama” at the house of an unnamed senator in Maiduguri, Borno State. Senator Ahmed Zanna (PDP) is the only current senator who lives in the designated area, but he claimed that although Bama was his nephew, he was arrested in the house of former governor of Borno, Modu Sheriff.

October 20, 2013. Attack. Seven people were killed in Potiskum, Yobe State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

October 23, 2012:
- Planned attack? The JTF in Borno State issued a release saying: “information available to the JTF indicates that the Boko Haram terrorists are planning massive attacks on military and civilian targets in Borno State before, during and after the forthcoming Eid-el-Kabir period. (...) The terrorist group has invited foreign mercenaries to assist them in launching the attacks.”
- Arrests of three suspected Boko Haram members in Maiduguri. The JTF also recovered 33 IEDs and ammunition. The arrests were possibly related to the planned attack described above.

October 28, 2012: Suicide attack. Vehicle-based attack on a church in Maiduguri, killing seven people and injuring more than 100. At least three people were killed in reprisal attacks. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
November 1, 2012: Statement. Abu Muhammad Ibn Abdulazeez, who claimed to be a spokesman for Shekau, laid out conditions for a cease-fire and named acceptable mediators for peace talks. Talks were to take place in Saudi Arabia, Boko Haram members had to be freed, and those responsible for Yusuf’s death had to be prosecuted.\textsuperscript{596} It is unclear if Abdulazeez really represents Boko Haram’s leadership.\textsuperscript{597} On November 12, 2012, a spokesman for the President confirmed that they were in talks with Boko Haram, but through back-channels.\textsuperscript{598} On Nov 18, 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan denied that the government was negotiating with Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{599}

November 2, 2012: Assassination. A retired Nigerian general, Major General Mohammed Shuwa was shot dead in his home in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the assassination.\textsuperscript{600} Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez, an alleged spokesman for Boko Haram, said by phone to journalists that Boko Haram was not responsible.\textsuperscript{601}

November 4, 2012: Attack. Gunmen with explosives attacked a police station, a primary school and two telecom towers in Fika, near Damaturu, Yobe State. Two policemen and one civilian were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\textsuperscript{602}

November 6, 2012: Arrests, shooting. The Nigerian military reported that it raided a Boko Haram hideout in Gashua, Yobe State, killing four people and arresting four others suspected of the attack in Fika on November 4, 2012\textsuperscript{603}

November 7, 2012: Attack. An IED placed along a road in Maiduguri exploded when a JTF patrol vehicle passed. The JTF car was damaged, but no one was hurt. The JTF suspected that Boko Haram carried out the attack.\textsuperscript{604}


November 8, 2012: Possible escape. An alleged senior Boko Haram commander, Sani Mohammed (allegedly arrested with Kabir Sokoto in January 2012), was reported to have escaped from police custody in Abuja. A police statement denied anyone named Sani Mohammed had ever been detained.605

November 9: Attack on a police station at Bonny Yadi, near Damaturu, Yobe State, with guns, explosives, and fire. Three policemen were killed. The attackers also set 3 churches and a school on fire, but there were no causalities.606

November 10, 2012. Attack. The police reported that five residents of Gaidam, Yobe State, were killed in their home by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members.607

November 13, 2012. Threat. A letter by alleged Boko Haram members on the notice board of the College of Education, Gashua, threatened students and authorities by telling them to vacate the school for their safety.608

November 15, 2012. JTF operation. Security forces said they killed “a major commander of the Boko Haram sect, commanding the North-West and the North-East of Maiduguri”, Ibn Saleh Ibrahim, in a raid in Maiduguri. Ibrahim was the lead-suspect in the assassination of retired Nigerian general, Major General Mohammed Shuwa on November 2, 2012. Six of his “lieutenants” were also killed.609

November 23, 2012. Attack. Five people suspected to be helping security agencies track Boko Haram’s movements were killed by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members in Jere, outside of Maiduguri.610

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606 “Gunmen kill 3 police, burn churches in Nigeria's northeast”, AFP, November 10, 2012. URL: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hcUB6JXDDD-vrp0wAFXJzaKYhfAwHg?docId=CNG.b617c46264a9a1fa529c52ce964feb8c.131 (Accessed November 13, 2012).
November 24, 2012:
- **Rewards.** The JTF released a list of 19 Boko Haram members and offered 290 million naira ($1.8 million, £1.1 million) for information leading to their capture.611
- **Arrest** of a member of Boko Haram in Mubi local government area of Adamawa State. His capture also led to the location of a Boko Haram “bomb factory”.612

November 25, 2012. **Suicide attacks.** A Boko Haram suicide bomber rammed a bus packed with explosives into a church at the Jaji military barracks in Kaduna State, military officers told Reuters. Ten minutes later, as people were assisting the wounded, a suicide bomber in a Toyota Camry detonated in front of the church. 11 people were killed and over 30 injured in the blasts, according to the military.613

November 26, 2012:
- **Attack** on the headquarters of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad, SARS, in Abuja, by a “large number” of gunmen. Two policemen were killed and 30 prisoners escaped, although 25 were recaptured.614 Boko Haram was initially suspected, but the following day the attack was claimed by Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) in an e-mail sent to the Desert Herald.615
- **Statement.** Boko Haram requested talks with the government in a letter signed by Sheik Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazzez (same as in November 1, 2012 dialogue offer). The letter was written in Hausa and handed to the national head of the union of journalists, Aba Kakami.616 It stated that Boko Haram had appointed Sheikh Goni Gabchia, a cleric in Borno State, to replace retired General Muhammadu Buhari (who refused the November 1, 2012 offer) on its dialogue team.

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November 28, 2012:
- **Attack** on the police headquarters of Kala Balge Local Government Area of Borno State. The attackers used guns and IEDs, killing five policemen. The attackers also destroyed the masts belonging to major telecommunications firms, MTN, Glo and Airtel. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\(^{617}\)
- **Raid** against a Boko Haram stronghold in Maiduguri. According to authorities, one soldier was killed and one wounded, three suspected Boko Haram members killed and 31 arrested.\(^{618}\)

November 29, 2012:
- **JTF Raid** on Boko Haram “cells” in Abuja. Police reported that 20 Boko Haram members were arrested.\(^{619}\)
- **Attack** in Maiduguri, Borno State. Gunmen launched attacks on JTF patrol vehicles with IEDs and petrol bombs. Five people, among them soldiers, immigration personnel and civilians were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.\(^{620}\)
- **Arrest.** Nigerian troops recovered explosives and bomb-making items (“17 sensor mechanical timers (remote controls), 11 primed suicide bombers vest, 36 primed IEDs in cans and one military kitbag”) from a Boko Haram base in Zaria and arrested a suspect, the military said.\(^{621}\)
- **Statement.** Video of Shekau warning America, Britain, Nigeria and “other crusaders” that Boko Haram was with its Mujahedeen brothers for “Allah’s Cause” everywhere.\(^{622}\)

December 1, 2012:
- **Attack.** 50 gunmen attacked the border towns of Gamboru and Ngala (6 km apart), on the border with Cameroon. They burnt down three churches, attacked a customs post, an immigration office, and a police station, killing two policemen.\(^{623}\)
- **Shootout** in Maiduguri between the JTF and suspected Boko Haram members. Three civilians were killed.\(^{624}\)

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\(^{618}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{621}\) “Bomb equipment found at Boko Haram base in Nigeria”, AFP, November 20, 2012. URL: [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5igBYRg73EcNo-rryLZ-Iu2TDY19Q?docid=CNG.d660d6c1003e177489a31f519827a80d.491](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5igBYRg73EcNo-rryLZ-Iu2TDY19Q?docid=CNG.d660d6c1003e177489a31f519827a80d.491) (Accessed December 1, 2012).


December 2, 2012:
- **Attack.** Ten Christians were killed with guns and machetes, and their houses burnt down, in Chibok village, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.625
- **Military raid.** According to the military, a top Boko Haram commander, identified as Abdulkareem Ibrahim, and two sub-commanders were killed during a raid carried out in Maiduguri.626

December 6, 2012: **Failed attack** in Kano. Eight suspected Boko Haram members were arrested after they threw an improvised bomb at a police patrol vehicle, but missed.627

December 7, 2012: **Killings.** The JTF announced it had killed “four Boko Haram sub-commanders, including two experts in the manufacture of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and petrol-bombs” over a three day operation in Maiduguri, Borno State.628

December 10, 2012:
- **Arrests.** Nigerian security forces said they had arrested 28 suspected members of Boko Haram over the weekend, in a series of raids on their hideouts.629
- **Shootout** between the JTF and Boko Haram in Potiskum, Yobe State. According to the JTF, a divisional police officer and three others were killed. 13 Boko Haram members were also killed.630
- **Attack.** A district head of Jere Local Government Area of Borno State and his son were shot dead in Dalwa village, Konduga, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.631

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December 20, 2012: Attack, kidnapping. Around 30 gunmen attacked the residence of the renewable energy firm Vergnet in Katsina State. Two guards were killed and a French engineer kidnapped. Ansaru claimed responsibility for the attack and kidnapping.

December 23, 2012: Attack, Shootout. Attack on a police station and bank branch in Potiskum, followed by a shootout between security forces and members of Boko Haram. According to police, one local police chief and 14 Boko Haram members were killed.

December 24, 2012:
- Attack on the Church of Christ in Nations, in Peri village near Potiskum, Yobe State. According to the military, suspected Boko Haram militants killed at least six Christians and burned down a church.
- Attack on the First Baptist Church in Maiduguri, Borno State, killing six people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

December 28, 2012:
- JTF operation. Five suspected Boko Haram members were killed and a bomb-making factory in Kaduna destroyed.
- Attack using a mixture of gunfire and explosives, on a police station, a prison and government offices in Maiha, at the border with Cameroon in Adamawa State. Two people were killed, an unknown number of prisoners freed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.
- Attack. Five people were killed in their homes in Musari, a village near Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.

January 1, 2013: Shootout between the JTF and Boko Haram in Maiduguri. 13 Boko Haram members and one JTF soldier were reported to have been killed.
January 2, 2013: Attack. Gunmen attacked troops at Marte village, on the border with Cameroon. One soldier, one policeman and five Boko Haram members were killed in the gun battle. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.640

January 3, 2013: Attack on the Nigerian Prison Service (NPS) Farm Centre, Maiduguri. The attackers used guns, improvised explosive devices (IED) and petrol-bombs, and freed several inmates from detention. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.641

January 6, 2013: Failed arrest. An alleged Boko Haram member, Ali Jalingo, escaped arrest in Gboko town in Benue State when security operatives raided the area in search of him and exchanged fire with unknown gunmen.642

January 7, 2013: Attack. A female police officer was killed by gunmen in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.643

January 12, 2013: Arrest. Mohammed Zangina (aka Mallam Abdullahi and Alhaji Musa) was detained in Maiduguri. The military said Mr. Zangina was the leader of Boko Haram in the North Central part of Nigeria and “coordinator of most of the suicide attacks and bombings in Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, Jos and Potiskum”. He was also a key member of the group’s Shura council, and a reward of 25million naira (USD 159,000) had been offered for his capture.644

January 14, 2013: Attack. Gunmen suspected to be members of Boko Haram ambushed two patrol vehicles of the Joint Task Force (JTF) with IEDs, killing a soldier and injuring two others in Ngelzarma town, Yobe State.645

January 15, 2013: Arrest of Salisu Mohammed, who, according to police, was “a topshot of the Boko Haram in Gombe”.646

January 17, 2013: Attack. Two civilians were killed when a group of suspected Boko Haram gunmen opened fire on a military checkpoint on the outskirts of Kano. Two of the attackers were also killed.647

January 19, 2012:
- Attack. Two buses carrying Nigerian soldiers on their way to Mali were attacked near Okene, in Kogi State. The attackers used “high capacity remote controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs)” and handheld weapons. Two soldiers were killed and five wounded.648 A Nigeria army spokesman said that Boko Haram was responsible, but Ansaru claimed responsibility saying the attack was in retaliation for the French intervention in Mali.649
- Attack on the emir of Kano. He survived the assassination attempt, but it wounded two of his sons and killed four others.650
- Statement. The Nigerian newspaper the Vanguard reported that the Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau had been wounded in a gun battle and was receiving medical attention somewhere in Mali.651

January 21, 2013: Attack. Gunmen killed 18 hunters selling “bush meat” at a market near Maiduguri. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.652

January 22, 2013:
- Attack. Gunmen on motorcycles killed five men and injured two others playing a table game in Kano. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.653
- Attack. BBC, citing unnamed local sources, reported that “suspected militant Islamists” had beheaded five people in Maiduguri.654

January 28, 2013:
- Statement. Sheikh Abu Mohammad Abdulazeez Ibn Idris, who claimed to be a Boko Haram commander representing Shekau, claimed that Boko Haram had agreed to lay down its arms. Abdulazeez said that in return for this cease-fire, the Borno State government had agreed to release imprisoned Boko Haram members.655

650 Ibid.
651 Ibid.
652 Ibid.
653 Ibid.
654 Ibid.
- **Attack.** Eight people were killed in Gajiganna village, Borno State. According to eyewitnesses, some of them were shot, while others had their throats slit. Boko Haram was suspected to have carried out the attack, but Abdulazeez (see above) denied their involvement.656

**January 30, 2013:** **JTF operation.** The JTF raided two Boko Haram training camps in Borno State (Sambisa Game Reserve in the Bama Local Government Area and Farin-Ruwa forest in the South-West/East of the Demboa Local Government Area of Borno State). 17 Boko Haram members and one soldier were killed.657

**January 31, 2013:** **Attack** on banks, churches and a police station in Birin Gwari, Kaduna State, by 20–30 gunmen.658 Three policemen and one Boko Haram member were killed.659

**February 5, 2013:** **Attack** on staff camp of rangers in Sambisa Game Reserve in Borno State. The attack was suspected to be a revenge attack by Boko Haram for the January 30, 2012 raid on Boko Haram training camps (see above). Six rangers were killed, and an unknown number went missing.660

**February 6, 2013:** Media reported that a Boko Haram training camp had been found in Timbuktu, Mali, quoting a cook and neighbors saying there were several hundred Boko Haram members training there.661

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February 8, 2013:
- **Attack.** Gunmen on motorcycles attacked women administering polio vaccines. The attacks happened simultaneously in two separate locations in Kano State: the first in the Tarauni area where two women were killed, the second in the Nasarawa Local Government Area where seven women were killed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attacks.662

- **Arrest.** The SSS arrested two suspected Boko Haram members in Makurdi, Benue State. According to the prosecution, one of them admitted to being a Boko Haram member and said that they were paid to identify churches that could be targeted.663

**February 9, 2013. Arrest** of eight suspected Boko Haram members, including one woman. Those arrested were carrying weapons and IEDs in their car, in Kagoro, the Kaura Local Government Area of Kaduna State.664

**February 10, 2013. Attack.** Three South Korean doctors were killed, one of them being decapitated, in Potiskum, Yobe State. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.665

**February 11, 2013: Arrest.** Police in Kano paraded seven Boko Haram members suspected of involvement in the January 19, 2013 attack on the convoy of the emir of Kano, which killed five people. Eight other Boko Haram members were declared wanted.666

**February 15, 2013: Attack.** Two suicide bombers were killed in an attack targeting a military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri. At least one soldier was injured. Several homes, shops and vehicles were also damaged in the explosion.667

**February 17, 2013: Kidnapping.** Seven foreigners were kidnapped in Bauchi State, including one Italian, one Greek, one Briton, and four Lebanese. One security guard was also killed. Ansaru claimed responsibility, citing “the transgressions and atrocities done to the religion of Allah... by the European countries in many places such as Afghanistan and Mali”.668


667 Ibid.

February 19, 2013: Kidnapping of a French family of seven, including four children in northern Cameroon, near the border with Nigeria. Boko Haram claimed responsibility.

February 20, 2013:
- **Attack.** An improvised explosive device targeted a Joint Task Force patrol team in Maiduguri, Borno State. Three people, including the attacker, were killed, and two others wounded.
- **Statement.** Posters in Maiduguri denied that Shekau had ever delegated anybody to discuss a ceasefire.

February 21, 2013: **Attack.** A suicide blast targeted a military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri killing a civilian and injuring six soldiers. A section of a market and adjoining shops, as well as a petrol station were damaged.

February 22, 2013: **Attack.** Suspected Boko Haram members shot dead five people they found playing cards in Gombe, Gombe State. Several others were also seriously injured.

February 23, 2013: **Attack.** Six people were killed by gunmen in Ngaldla town in the Fika Local Government Area of Yobe State. The JTF suspected Boko Haram of carrying out the attack.

February 25, 2013: **Statement.** A video of the French hostages kidnapped in Cameroon was posted on YouTube. A male hostage read in French from a written statement, saying they had been taken by Boko Haram, who demanded the release of militants being held in Nigeria and Cameroon. One of the guards spoke in Arabic in the video, making reference to the “President of France” and his “war against Islam.”

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March 1, 2013: Attack. Gunmen killed eight people in an attack on a police station and a bank in Gwoza, close to the Cameroon border in Borno State.677

March 2, 2013: Arrest. Five suspected members of Boko Haram were arrested in Ibadan, Oyo State.678

March 2/3, 2013. Statement. In a video sent to local media Shekau denied having declared a ceasefire, and said that Abu Abdulazeez did not represent him. He warned Nigerians, especially in Yobe, Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna, Taraba and Adamawa, that the group would avenge its members.679

March 3, 2013: Attack. The Nigerian military said it had killed 20 fighters from Boko Haram as they tried to seize military barracks in the village of Monguno, Borno State.680 Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack, saying: “The truth of the matter is that we are the ones that triumphed during the encounter because we killed many soldiers and destroyed four armoured personnel carriers (APCs). What is obvious is that the JTF had only succeeded in killing innocent civilians, not our members as they claimed.”681

March 8, 2013: Shootout, arrests. A shootout in Maiduguri, Borno State, led to the deaths of 20 suspected militants and two soldiers. 25 Boko Haram members were arrested.682

March 9, 2013: Statement. Ansaru posted an online message on a jihadist forum saying it had killed the seven foreign hostages taken in February. The message was accompanied by a picture of unidentified men lying face down on the ground.683

March 10, 2013: Arrests, killings. Nigerian security forces said they had killed 52 Islamist militants and arrested 70 during ten days of fighting in Borno State.684

March 13, 2013: Attack. Two members of the People’s Democratic Party, PDP, Alhaji Ibrahim Usman Gula, the PDP zonal Vice Chairman for southern Borno, and Hajia Gambo, the PDP woman leader, Shehuri Ward in Maiduguri, were shot dead in their homes. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.685

March 14, 2013: Attack. A prison in Gwoza, Borno State, was attacked with missiles. One civilian was killed and an unknown number of prisoners freed. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.686

March 18, 2013:
- Statement. In a video, Shekau said the group would not release the seven French nationals in its custody unless the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon released imprisoned Boko Haram members.687
- Attack. Five explosions at a bus park in northern Nigeria’s main city of Kano killed at least 25 people. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.688
- Attack. According to the Nigerian military, Boko Haram attacked three public schools in Maiduguri, shooting dead four people and injuring three.689

March 19, 2013: Attack. Six soldiers were killed in bomb attacks on a JTF van in Maiduguri, Borno State.690

March 22, 2013: Attack. An attack on a prison in Ganye, Adamawa State, freed 124 prisoners. 12 were later re-arrested. Boko Haram was suspected of carrying out the attack.691

March 31, 2013: Arrest, killings. Nigerian troops claimed to have killed 14 suspected members of Boko Haram in a raid on a building in Kano. According to a military spokesman, a soldier was killed.692

also killed in the raid, and a potential suicide bomber was arrested in a car laden with explosives.\footnote{\textit{Nigerian troops ‘kill 14 Boko Haram militants’ in Kano}, \textit{BBC News}, March 31, 2013. URL: \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21989075} (Accessed April 4, 2013).}