Faryab Survey wave 8 – a year after the redeployment of Norwegian forces from Faryab

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English summary

Wave 8 of the Faryab Survey was conducted in October 2013. The questionnaire used in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in cooperation with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). It consists of 53 questions covering three main areas: Security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies. In total, 1441 people in Faryab between 18 and 80 years of age were interviewed.

The result in October 2013 shows that only 40% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 36% say the opposite. This is about the same situation as seen a year ago, just after the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan leadership. Unemployment is still clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, like it has been throughout all the waves.

The perception of the security situation is also about the same as a year ago, just after the transition, but has deteriorated compared to April 2013. In October 2013, 40% reply that they are satisfied with the situation. The Afghan National Police is considered an important security provider, and the impression of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is still good.

The overall perception of the government is still good. 61% express that the provincial government does a good job. This is significant lower than in April 2013, but somewhat higher than in October 2012. Nevertheless, the good impression is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem.

Looking at the Pashtuns, this ethnic group is more negative to the situation compared to the average in Faryab. Primarily, the negative differences are with regards to development and partly security. One reason for this might be that the Pashtun villages have much poorer living standard compared to Faryab overall, with 98% of the Pashtun respondents in this wave living with poor roads and poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

Despite the significant number of respondents in the survey, every poll suffers from limitations and biases. This is especially relevant in conflict areas, for instance because there might be limitations in the areas available for the pollers, or respondents may be afraid of expressing their real opinions.

Wave 8 of October 2013 is likely to be the final in the Faryab Survey series. Its future lies in in-depth analysis combined with other data sources, but the current results give the last insight into up-to-date perceptions of the population of Faryab based on our approach. On many topics the results are more negative than in April 2013, and approximately down to the levels of October 2012. As a result, it is reasonable to say that the results of April 2013 did not establish a new positive trend in Faryab.
Sammendrag

Faryab Survey wave 8 ble gjennomført i oktober 2013. Spørreskjemaet brukt i undersøkelsen er utviklet av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) i samarbeid med det norsk-ledede Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). Meningsmålingen består av 53 spørsmål som dekker de tre hovedområdene; sikkerhet, utvikling og styresett, i tråd med både den norske og den Nato-ledede International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) sin strategi. I alt ble 1441 personer i Faryab intervjuet. Disse var mellom 18 og 80 år.

Resultatet fra oktober 2013 viser at kun 40 % av respondentene mener ting går i riktig retning i Faryab i dag, mens 36 % sier det motsatte. Dette er omtrent den samme situasjonen som i oktober 2012 rett etter overføringen av sikkerhetsansvaret fra ISAF til afghanerne selv. Arbeidsledighet anses fortsatt som det største problemet i Faryab, og det har det vært gjennom alle åtte målingene.

Synet på sikkerhetssituasjonen er også som på samme nivå som for ett år siden, men har blitt noe verre sammenlignet med i april 2013. I oktober 2013, svarer 40 % at de er fornøyde med sikkerhetssituasjonen. Det afghanske politiet er ansett som en viktig sikkerhetsaktør, og inntrykket av de afghanske sikkerhetsstyrkene er fortsatt godt.

Det generelle inntrykket av styresmaktene er fortsatt godt. 61 % mener provinsmyndighetene gjør en god jobb. Dette er signifikant lavere enn i april 2013, men noe høyere enn i oktober 2012. Selv om befolkningen har et godt inntrykk av styresmaktene blir korrupsjon blant offisielle styresmakter sett på som et problem.

Pashtunere er mer negative til situasjonen sammenlignet med gjennomsnittet i Faryab. Først og fremst gjelder dette innen utviklingsrelaterede spørsmål i provinsen, samt sikkerhet. En årsak til dette kan være at de pashtunske landsbyene har dårligere levemuligheter. En årsak til dette kan være at de pashtunske landsbyene har dårligere levemuligheter. 98 % av de pashtunske respondentene som ble intervjuet i denne meningsmålingen, lever med dårlige veier og dårlig eller ingen tilgang til vann og elektrisitet (én dag i uken eller mindre).

Til tross for et betydelig antall respondenter som har blitt intervjuet, har alle meningsmålinger avgrensninger og usikkerhet knyttet til seg. Dette gjelder spesielt for målinger i konfliktområder, blant annet fordi enkelte områder kan være utilgjengelige og noen respondenter kan være redde for å uttrykke sine virkelige meninger.

Faryab Survey wave 8 fra oktober 2013 er sannsynligvis den siste i rekken av spørreundersøkelser fra Faryab. Fremtidige analyser vil bli utført basert på det eksisterende datamaterialet kombinert med andre datakilder. Denne rapporten gir derfor det siste oppdaterte innblikket i befolkningens oppfattelse av situasjonen i Faryab ut fra vårt undersøkelsesopplegg. Innenfor mange tema er resultatene mer negative enn i april 2013, og omtrent på nivå med oktober 2012. Som et resultat av dette er det rimelig å si at resultatene i april 2013 ikke etablerte en varig positiv trend i Faryab.
Preface

As part of the project “Analysis support to military operations” (ANTILOPE), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has deployed operational analysts with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan since December 2008. The PRT was terminated in September 2012 as part of the transition process.\(^1\)

PRT Maimanah has been one of 28 PRTs across Afghanistan and part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). One of the main tasks for the analysts was to carry out comprehensive progress assessments regularly. This included both civilian and military issues. In order to embrace the Afghan society in the assessment, FFI has in cooperation with PRT Maimanah developed a survey to be held in the Faryab province.

The current report documents the main findings of the eighth wave of the survey, completed in October 2013. We have focused on the trends over time rather than the single results from wave 8. However, it is important to keep in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones. This report follows the same pattern as previous reports of wave 1–7 [1–7].

Wave 8 is the second of the Faryab Survey series to be conducted after the withdrawal of PRT Maimanah and the ISAF mission from Faryab. We hope that the results of this survey will contribute to the assessment of effects of the Norwegian and international engagement in Faryab.

\(^{1}\) The transition process is the process where security responsibility is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership.
1 Introduction

Norway has been the lead nation of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Maimanah in the Faryab province from 2005 and until its termination late September 2012. The PRT has been part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and was a joint military-civilian unit. The mission statement was in line with the general ISAF mission statement:

*In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [GIRoA], ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, [...], and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.*

As part of this contribution, a strategy for the Norwegian civilian and military effort in Faryab was developed by the Norwegian Government [8]. The main goal in the strategy was to support the Afghan government in its effort to ensure stability, security and development. The strategy also emphasized *afghanisation,* meaning that the Norwegian effort, both in terms of security, development and good governance, should be based on Afghan values.

The current survey reflects how observable the international efforts have been to the population of Faryab, in line with the ISAF mission statement above, one year after the withdrawal of international forces in the region.

1.1 Transition phase

Afghanistan is now well into transition – the process where security responsibility is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership [9]. The process was agreed upon between the Afghan Government and NATO at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and formally began in July 2011. The transition is planned to be completed by the end of 2014.

In order to start the transition phase in an area, four main criteria needed to be satisfied. The criteria are [9]:

- Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF.
- Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.
- ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

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2 Maimanah is the provincial capital of Faryab.
3 In June 2012, the PRT was replaced by the Transition Support Group Faryab (TSG-F), and 28 September the TSG-F withdrew from Faryab.
4 See: [http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html](http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html) for reference and further details.
The Faryab province started the transition phase in 2012, and PRT Maimanah was terminated late September 2012.

1.2 Assessments

Assessments of the current situation and the development in the Afghan society are necessary in order to analyse the value of the international effort in Afghanistan. This has been important during the transition phase in order to know if and when the four main transition-criteria are fulfilled. And it is equally important to assess the situation after the transition in order to see if the situation is sustainable.

In assessing the current situation and the development, and in line with the afghanisation approach, it is important to include the population and the view of their own situation. What does the population of Faryab think of the situation? What are the biggest challenges in the province?

The Faryab Survey is an extensive survey conducted in the province in order to better understand the population and their perception of the situation. It has been carried out twice a year since the first wave in April 2010 [1–7]. The latest wave, wave 8, was conducted in October 2013, a year after the termination of PRT Maimanah, in order to capture people’s perception of the situation in the province after the withdrawal of ISAF.

1.3 Outline of the report

This report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the Faryab Survey in general and the eight wave in particular. This includes the sampling method. Chapter 3 gives the demographics for wave 8. This covers the age, gender and ethnicity distribution, the living standard and literacy level. Chapter 4 presents the margin of error of wave 8 and the uncertainties of the survey. The main findings of wave 8, and comparisons of the results with previous waves, are presented in Chapter 5. Province level results are also compared to perceptions on the same matters in the districts of Ghormach and Kohistan, to the women’s perceptions and Pashtuns’ perceptions. The last chapter gives the conclusions.

2 Faryab Survey

The Faryab Survey has been conducted the past 3.5 years (Table 1.1) by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The agency utilises Afghan civilians to conduct interviews based on a questionnaire. The interviewers are approximately evenly divided male and female, with a mix of ethnicities to match the respondents. Quality controls are carried out by the central office in Kabul in order to assure that the standards are maintained.
Table 1.1  Field dates and sample sizes of the eight waves of Faryab Survey.

The questionnaire employed in the survey has been developed by FFI in cooperation with the now terminated PRT Maimanah. It is an extensive survey that consists of 53 questions, in addition to batteries of supplementary questions, covering three main areas: Security, development and governance. This is in keeping with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy. On average, an interview takes 31 minutes to complete. Only very minor modifications have been made to the questionnaire employed across the eight waves of surveying in order to be able to follow the trends over time.

The current report covers the main findings and trends, and does not go into detail on each question in the questionnaire.

2.1 Wave 8

Faryab Survey wave 8 was conducted in October 2013, a year after the withdrawal of international forces from Faryab. It has a sample size of 1441 respondents. It is divided into a main bulk of 1068 respondents, which is representative of the province, and four extra samples from areas of interest, which are called boosters (Section 2.2).

During and since the last wave in April 2013 (wave 7), a number of incidents have occurred that may affect the results of the current wave. A selection of these is:

- April 24: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continue large-scale coordinated operations in Qaisar and Ghormach, leading to 88 insurgent casualties [10].
- Media reports anti-girl education incidents have been increasing. For instance, on 21 May, a school in Shirin Tagab was attacked by gas, leaving 75 girls unconscious [11].
- August 15: At least 1500 families have fled their homes in Ghormach following threats of Taliban attack [12].
• 28 September: On this date, 1 year had passed since international forces withdrew from Faryab, and Camp Maimanah was handed over to the Afghan National Army (ANA).
• Media reports that violence against women has been increasing. For instance, on 4 October, a woman’s decapitated body was found in Maimanah [13].
• Over the past six months, the following districts have been seen as insecure areas by NGOs, who often did not operate in them during this time period: Ghormach, Almar, Qaisar, Pashtun Kot.

The factor that probably has the single largest influence on the results of wave 8 is still the withdrawal of international forces. This is the second survey in the Faryab Survey series that takes place after the withdrawal.

2.2 Interview sample

The respondents are selected using a multi-stage random stratification process that has four layers:

• Province – the interview sample is distributed based on the urban/rural characteristics in the province.
• District – the sample is distributed between the province districts based on the population estimates for each district.
• Settlement – a simple random selection of the known settlements in each district (neighbourhoods in the cities).\[^5\] In each settlement, a predefined number of interviews will take place – normally 10.
• Household – a random walk method is used to select the households in which the in-depth interviews will take place.

There were two constraints in the final selection of respondents:

• The respondents had to be 18 years or older, and
• The sample should have approximately 50% male and 50% female respondent participation.

In total, 1441 people from Faryab were interviewed in wave 8. The sample includes four boosters:

• Booster 1 (60 respondents) is a geographic area of interest. This area has been one of the focus areas for the former PRT Maimanah.
• Booster 2 (185 respondents) is based on an ethnic area of interest. It consists of Pashtun villages in five different districts in order to better cover the Pashtun perception.
• Booster 3 and 4 are intercept interviews of people from Kohistan district (70 respondents) and Ghormach district (58 respondents). These interviews had to be

\[^5\] There is no population data on settlement sizes, and therefore the sample cannot be distributed based on settlement sizes.
done in neighbouring districts due to security restrictions (Ghormach) and transportation restrictions (Kohistan).  

2.3 Analysis

The main analysis in Chapter 5 of this report uses data from the **main bulk** of interviews (i.e. it excludes the boosters). The data is weighted according to the size of the different districts, in order to get a representative result. The boosters are not included as this will change the distribution and the ethnical profile, and will not give comparable results for the eight waves. The Pashtun booster is used to compare the results for the Pashtuns with the overall results for Faryab (Section 5.7).

The interviewer conducting the survey assesses each respondent’s comprehension of the survey. This assessment has four categories, where the lowest category covers those who have difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from the interviewer. The respondents having difficulty understanding the questions even with help, have been removed from the analysis in order to minimise the margin of error caused by misunderstandings and the like. However, in wave 8, as with the three previous waves, no respondents needed to be removed due to poor comprehension of the questions.

3 Demographics

This chapter summarises the demographics for wave 8.

3.1 Age distribution

The respondents in the main bulk of the survey ranged between 18 and 80 years of age (Figure 3.1). The average age is 37, meaning that the respondents are generally quite mature by Afghan standards. This average has been almost identical for all waves of surveying, ranging from 34 to 37.

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6 Unlike standard intercept interviews done on the street where you contact, for instance, each fifth passer-by, the single selection criterion has been respondents from Kohistan/Ghormach willing to be interviewed. The actual interviews were usually done in nearby Samawars (tea-houses, restaurants) or at some secluded place in the open.

7 In earlier analyses of the results from waves 1 through 4 [3, 4, 5, 6], the data for Kohistan and booster 1 were included. The current report calculates all results from waves 1 through 7 in the same way in order to provide consistency. This implies that some minor deviations may be found in some numbers when comparing the results with past reports.

8 As part of the quality control, ACSOR removed a total of 79 cases from the data due to 95+% similarities in answers of pairs of interviews.
3.2 Gender

The main bulk of the survey had 55% male and 45% female participation. This is identical to wave 6 and 7. ACSOR utilises female interviewers exclusively to interview female respondents.

3.3 Ethnicity

The ethnicity distribution of the main bulk of wave 8 is:

- 60% Uzbek
- 8% Tajik
- 19% Pashtun\(^9\)
- 9% Turkmen
- 4% Other ethnicities

Figure 3.2 shows the ethnicity distributions of the eight waves. The ethnicities in wave 8, like in wave 6, have a greater proportion of Pashtuns compared to the other waves.

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\(^9\) Only men were interviewed in Almar. For the last three waves only men have been interviewed in Almar due to safety concerns for the female interviewers.

\(^{10}\) This is exclusive the booster in Pashtun villages. When this booster is included, there are 25% Pashtuns.
A population census has not been conducted in Afghanistan since 1979. Since then, millions of people have been displaced. The ethnicity profile in Afghanistan therefore relies on estimates. The ethnicity distribution of wave 8 is slightly different than the estimated ethnicity profile of Faryab [14]. For instance, it is stated in the Faryab provincial profile that 13% of the population speak Pashto, while 19% in the survey consider themselves to be Pashtun. Assuming that the provincial profile gives the right distribution, this would indicate a slightly overrepresented Pashtun proportion in wave 8. It is known that there is a majority of Pashtuns in some of the more insecure areas. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the higher proportion of Pashtuns in the survey might influence the overall result, especially when it comes to security issues, in a negative direction.

### 3.4 Literacy and education

When it comes to literacy, 23% replied that they can read and write. This is in keeping with the average level throughout the Faryab Survey series. The average literacy rate in Afghanistan is 28% [15]. The illiteracy among the respondents in Faryab is about as high as the education level (Figure 3.3): 77% say they are illiterate, and 78% reply that they have no schooling.
3.5 Survey coverage

The interviews took place in 13 of Faryab’s 14 districts. The Kohistan district, due to transportation issues, was nonetheless covered through intercept interviews in a neighbouring district (Section 2.2). Due to safety concerns for the female interviewers only men were interviewed in Almar. Figure 3.4 shows the survey coverage.

It is also of interest to conduct interviews within the Ghormach district of Badghis province. This district was transferred to the PRT Maimanah’s area of responsibility in 2009. Unfortunately, due to security issues, this has not yet been possible. As described in Section 2.2, Ghormach was nonetheless covered through intercept interviews in a neighbouring district.
3.6 Living standard

The interviewers made an assessment of the living standard for each respondent. The standard is divided into five categories:

1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day per week
5. Poor or no road, non or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 3.5 shows that 79% of the respondents fell into the two poorest categories. These respondents live in areas with no or poor roads, and with access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week. Only 7% of the respondents fell into the top two categories with good roads, and access to water and electricity 4 to 7 days per week. With this, the sample of wave 8 has the highest proportion of the two poorest categories and lowest proportion of the top two categories throughout the Faryab Survey.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, this wave covers a bigger part of the less developed areas of the province than the other waves.\textsuperscript{12}

![Assessed living standards](image)

\textit{Figure 3.5 Assessed living standards. The standard of roads, water and electricity accessibility is categorised into 5 categories (1 being the best; 5, the worst).}

The higher proportion of less developed areas in wave 8 (and wave 5 and 6) should be considered in the analysis of the survey, especially when comparing the waves. With a higher proportion of respondents living in areas with no or poor roads, and little access to water and electricity, one can expect a higher proportion to be less satisfied when it comes to these issues.

In addition, the survey shows that these areas have a higher proportion of respondents with less education than the more developed areas. For instance, 82% of the respondents living in areas assessed as category 5 have no formal schooling; while in areas assessed as category 1 only 55%

\textsuperscript{11} The average, throughout the Faryab Survey, is 71% and 12%, respectively.

\textsuperscript{12} Wave 5 and 6 do also cover a bigger part of the less developed areas than the average throughout the survey.
has no formal schooling. With this, one can expect a higher proportion to be less satisfied when it comes to education in wave 8 (and wave 5 and 6) compared to the others.

4 Biases and margin of error

One of the key aspects of the Faryab Survey is the large number of respondents. The size of the sample reduces the margin of error to an acceptable level, also when looking at subsets of the total sample, below province level. On the province level, the stated sampling error is 2.6% at a 95% confidence level. There are, nevertheless, challenges specific to polls in conflict zones that increase the margin of error [16, 17].

4.1 Random sampling

The randomness of the sampling is a key challenge. This is a challenge for surveys in general, but in particular for surveys in Afghanistan due to the poorly documented demography, bad infrastructure and security risks. A truly random sample is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan because there does not exist an exhaustive list of residents or households. The respondents are therefore selected using the stratification process described in Section 2.2. A number of villages per district are randomly selected proportional to the estimated population size of the districts, with some adjustments in order to have a minimum number of respondents per district. In each village, a number of respondents are selected – usually 10. Since the sample is not totally proportional to the population size in each district, relative weights are assigned to the respondents. Data from the Central Statistical Office was used to compute these weights.14

4.2 Accessibility

Some of the villages may be replaced due to inaccessibility. This might be due to poor security or poor roads. In other words, some of the most unsafe areas and underdeveloped villages (at least relative to infrastructure) will not be included in the survey (see Section 3.5). This will, to some extent, affect the questions about development and security. On the other hand, the fact that a village is assessed to be impossible to reach, or too dangerous to travel through, is in itself an indication of the development or the security situation of the province.

None of the 158 randomly selected villages in wave 8 had to be replaced due to security or transportation issues. Still, two of the districts, Kohistan and Ghormach, had to be covered through intercept interviews in neighbouring districts due to security restrictions (Ghormach) and transportation restrictions (Kohistan) (Section 2.2), and one district had only male respondents due to safety concerns for the female interviewers (Almar).

13 2.6% is the stated sampling error by ACSOR. This is the maximum sampling error for a reported percentage of 50%. Still, the sampling error applies if the respondents are sampled randomly. The employed random stratification process (Section 2.2) will therefore increase the sampling error.

14 http://cso.gov.af
4.3 Misunderstandings and alike

Furthermore, there are biases inherent in the survey because people may misunderstand questions or answer what they think is expected by them. They may not remember correctly or have the knowledge to answer, or they may deliberately answer wrong, or refuse to answer. There are also cultural norms that could affect the answers. For instance, Afghans may feel bound to answer according to established dependencies, be it governmental or anti-governmental institutions. We have reduced the biases by using civil Afghans who understand the Afghan culture to do the in-depth interviews, and by removing respondents who do not understand the questions (Section 2.3). Where biases remain, their effects are assumed to be constant throughout all the waves of surveying. We therefore emphasise the trends over time rather than simply the status in Faryab in October 2013.

5 Main findings

The subsequent sections in this chapter summarise main findings from October 2013, wave 8 of the Faryab Survey. The findings are first presented on their own showing the population’s perception of the situation in Faryab a year after the withdrawal of ISAF from the province. They are then compared to the previous seven waves tracing the progress of the situation from the presence of international military forces through transition and finally the Faryab province on its own without international military presence.

The findings are categorised into the general situation (Section 5.1) and the three main areas of the survey – security, development and governance (Sections 5.2 through 5.4). The main findings for Faryab are also compared to people’s perceptions on the same matters in Ghormach and Kohistan (Section 5.5), to women’s perceptions (Section 5.6) and to the Pashtuns’ perceptions (Section 5.7).

5.1 General situation

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population’s perception of their own and Faryab’s situation in general. In the survey, the respondents are asked if they think things in Faryab, in general, are going in the right or wrong direction. The result in October 2013 shows that only 40% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today. And almost just as many, 36%, say things are going in the wrong direction, while 24% say that the province is going some in the right and some in the wrong direction.

Figure 5.1 shows the result on this question throughout the eight waves. The previous results have implied a negative trend where the number of respondents saying things are going in the right
direction has decreased and, at the same time, the number of respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction have increased. The result in April 2013, wave 7, did not follow this negative trend. However, six month later, the result has reverted back to a negative trend. But even though the proportion believing things are going in the right direction is the lowest throughout the survey, the increase in the proportion believing the opposite is not correspondingly large. There is about the same increase in the proportion believing that things are going both in the right and in the wrong direction.

![Graph showing direction trends](image)

**Figure 5.1** In which direction do you think things in Faryab today are going?

### 5.2 Security

The perception of security in Faryab is stated directly through a question on how satisfied the respondent is with the security situation. In October 2013, 40% reply that they are somewhat or very satisfied with the situation. When asking about how it is today compared to a year ago, 10% say the security situation has improved the last year, 53% say it is the same, while 37% express that it has become worse. This is a significant worsening since April 2013, but is about the same result as seen just after the transition phase a year ago. Figure 5.2 shows the result throughout the eight waves on this question.
There is a correlation between the areas where the respondents are living and how satisfied they are with the security situation. The respondents living in the more developed areas are generally more satisfied with the security situation compared to the less developed areas: 63% of the respondents living in areas assessed as category 1 and 2 (Section 3.6) are satisfied with the security situation, while only 37% of the respondents living in category 4 and 5 say the same.

The results in Figure 5.2 may indicate a seasonal variation. The respondents are relatively more positive to the security situation in April surveys (waves 1, 3, 5 and 7), while they are more negative in October surveys (waves 2, 4, 6 and 8). This seasonal variation might appear due to more insurgent activity during the summer, i.e. prior to the October surveys, compared to during the winter.

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (Figure 5.1) were asked to give the main reason for why they think so. 30% of these respondents justify this optimism by saying the security has improved or that the Taliban no longer exists in their area (Figure 5.3).
In the survey, respondents are also asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. 12% respond that lack of security is the biggest problem in October 2013 (Section 5.3 and Figure 5.10). This is about the same result as in October 2012 (14%).

5.2.1 Key security actors

During the transition phase, the military forces of the PRT Maimanah operated as a partner to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). I.e., it was primarily the ANSF that had the responsibility to plan and lead operations, while the PRT had a supporting role. The objective of this concept was to train and guide the Afghan security forces and at the same time help them to provide security in the Faryab province. Since October 2013 the ANSF has operated on its own. The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population’s perception of the key security actors in its local districts, especially when it comes to ANSF.

In October 2013, a year after the withdrawal of ISAF, 60% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be the most important security provider in their districts (Figure 5.4), whereas only 6% express the same about the Afghan National Army (ANA). A possible explanation for why the ANP is considered to be the most important is probably not due to a better impression of the police compared with the army (as stated later in this section), but due to their area of responsibility: the ANP is recruited locally and continuously operates in the province as a whole, while the ANA is focusing on the problem areas. Thus, the ANA has less visibility compared to the ANP, and the security is worse in the areas where the ANA operates.

Comparing the waves, the result shows that the proportion saying the ANP provides security is fairly steady and fluctuates around 60%. This is a positive finding, given that it is the police that should have the main responsibility for domestic security in Afghanistan. The proportion saying that the ANA provides the security has had an underlying negative trend, but with a slight increase in October 2012 and April 2013. It is now at its lowest throughout the survey.
33% respond that the people themselves provide security in their area, and 18% respond that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area (Figure 5.4). This may be a result of cultural aspects, but it may also indicate that the national security actors are not present in these areas or that they are not seen as doing a good enough job. The latter may be supported by the fact that about 40% of the respondents believe that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained (Figure 5.7, third graph).

Figure 5.4  Who provides security in your district? (Note: This is a multi-answer question, i.e. the respondent is free to answer more than one actor as the security provider.)

The Afghan National Police

All in all, the respondents have a positive view of the Afghan police. 74% believe that the police are leaving a good impression on the people (Figure 5.5). This is a decrease since April 2013 (80%), but it is still higher than in October 2012 (70%) and does not follow the negative trend as seen in the previous waves in 2010–2012 (waves 2–6). In addition, 86% agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the population, which is consistent with the results from the past three waves (Figure 5.7, first graph).
The confidence in the ANP is confirmed through another question: 71% say they will report crimes to the police. Still, this is a marked decrease compared to the other waves where the result has been 80–90%. One reason for this might be that the ANP is not present in their area. There is especially a drop after the transition where about 45% see the ANP once a week or more, while half a year prior to the withdrawal of the international military forces, in April 2012, 63% saw the ANP once a week or more (Figure 5.6). On the positive side, more people say they see them a few times a month or more in October 2013 compared to the last year.

47% of the respondents disagree that the ANP has sufficient forces in their area, and 52% of the respondents believe that they cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces. Still, on the other hand, 72% agree that the ANP helps to improve the security (Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7 Responses on four statements related to ANP.

Even though the respondents seem to believe that the police help to improve the security and that they are honest and fair, they also believe the ANP are corrupt: 67% respond that corruption is a problem amongst police officers in their area. This discrepancy might be due to several reasons, especially cultural factors: the expectations of the ANP might be low, the population might be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, corruption is part of how the society functions and may not be considered a problem, and so on.

Corruption
The question regarding corruption in the survey is based on a Western definition of corruption referring to payment for services the recipient is not entitled to by law. In a society like Afghanistan without a functioning tax system, collection of money by the representatives of the local authorities falls into the definition of corruption. Therefore, corruption by the Western definition may be accepted and it also may be considered as a good thing, by indicating that the local authorities are eager in doing their job.

The Afghan National Army
All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan army (Figure 5.8). 74% believe that the army is making a good impression in the province. As for the result for the ANP, this is a decrease since April 2013 (78%), but still higher than in October 2012 (70%) and does not follow
the negative trend as seen in the previous waves in 2010–2012 (waves 1–6). In addition, 87% agree that the ANA is honest and fair to its citizenry, which is consistent with the results the last year (Figure 5.9).  

47% agree that the ANA has sufficient forces in their area. 70% believe the army helps improve the security, but at the same time, 50% believe that the ANA cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces.

17 Corruption amongst the ANA was not included in the questionnaire.
5.3 Development

In the survey, the respondents are asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. This is an open-ended, single-answer question, meaning the respondent is free to reply whatever he or she feels like. As illustrated in Figure 5.10, the biggest problem in the province is by far unemployment (23%). Poverty and lack of security come up as shared second with 12% saying these are the biggest problems.\(^\text{18}\)

![Figure 5.10 The biggest problem in the local area.](image)

Table 5.1 below shows the top five biggest problems in the respondents’ local area throughout all eight waves of surveying. Unemployment has consistently been number one throughout the waves and has always had a much higher proportion (Figure 5.10). The subsequent problems do not distinguish themselves as much. Together with unemployment, poverty has also recurred within the top five biggest problems throughout the waves.

Interestingly, lack of security appears in the top five list of biggest problems only in the waves conducted in October (wave 4, 6 and 8). This supports the theory of a seasonal variation when it comes to the security situation (Section 5.2).

\(^{18}\) The difference between the two was only 0.3%.
5.3.1 Basic infrastructure and public services

The respondents’ basic infrastructure and access to public services are assessed by both the interviewers and the respondents themselves. The interviewers specifically assess the area where each respondent live with respect to road conditions and access to water and electricity (Section 3.6). The respondents assess how satisfied they are with the basic infrastructure and public services (Figure 5.11). The respondents are also asked if they believe the situation, with regard to these issues, have improved or not, and what they think will happen with these services in the year ahead.

It is no surprise that respondents living in areas with no or poor roads, and with access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week (category 4 and 5, Section 3.6) are more dissatisfied when it comes to these issues compared to respondents living in more developed areas. The largest difference is seen when it comes to how satisfied people are with the supply of electricity: 35% of the respondents living in the less developed areas (category 4 and 5) are satisfied with the supply of electricity, while 85% of the respondents in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2) say the same.

There is also a significant difference between the opinion in the less and in the more developed areas when it comes to how satisfied people are with the availability of education for children: 51% of the respondents in the less developed areas (category 4 and 5) are satisfied, while 76% say the same in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2).

In general, road conditions and the availability of jobs are the two issues the respondents are most dissatisfied with. The latter one is in line with the previously stated results in Section 5.3. In October 2013, 74% are dissatisfied with the road conditions and 73% are dissatisfied with job opportunities. In addition, only 4% and 10%, respectively, express that these conditions have improved the last year.

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19 Lack of water is the sum of those who lack clean water and water for irrigation.
The topic the respondents are most satisfied with is the availability of clean water (69%), despite the fact that 79% of the respondents live in areas with no or poor roads, and with access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week. However, the respondents in the more developed areas are much more satisfied when it comes to the availability: 92% of the respondents living in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2, Section 3.6) are satisfied with the availability of clean water, while 69% of the respondents living in the less developed areas (category 4 and 5) state the same.

Overall, the proportion of dissatisfaction is still substantial. This is a concern as insurgents can exploit the situation for increased recruitment and support. This is particularly a concern in relation to the great dissatisfaction of job opportunities.

Thinking about the year ahead, the respondents are less optimistic now than in April 2013: More respondents now believe the situation a year ahead will be the same or worse. For instance, 46% believe the availability of drinking water will improve in the year ahead and as many, 46%, believe it will stay the same. Six months ago, in April 2013, 65% believed the availability of drinking water would get better, while 31% believed it would stay the same. And when it comes to the availability of jobs, 34% believe it will get better a year ahead, while 23% believe it will get worse. The corresponding proportions in April 2013 were 41% and only 14%. The result in October 2013 is about the same as seen just after the transition phase in October 2012 on these questions.
It is possible that the optimism seen in April 2013 could be explained by a relief that things did not progressively deteriorate after the withdrawal of international forces as was expected, e.g. because of good initiative by the local government. However, things did not progressively improve either, and the less optimistic thoughts six months later might reflect that people are still concerned about the same things as before the transition of security responsibility. An alternative explanation is that optimism is subject to seasonal variation, as the equivalent result in October 2012 was about the same as in October 2013.20

5.3.2 Reconstruction

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (green line in Figure 5.1) were asked to give their reasons as to why they thought so. With the exception of April 2013, the largest proportion of these respondents has since April 2011 replied that this was due to reconstruction (development of the province). In October 2013, 27% believe that things are going in the right direction due to reconstruction (Figure 5.3).21

On another question, 23% say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is, together with the result from October 2012 (24%), a clear low-point with regards to perceived presence of aid projects. The corresponding value in April 2013 was 35%. There is a considerable way to go to reach the levels of 2010–11 (waves 1 to 3) where about half the respondents said aid projects had been implemented in the last year (high-point of 63% in wave 3, April 2011).

One factor that is likely to contribute to this low-point is the larger proportion of respondents living in the less developed areas (category 4 and 5, Section 3.6) of the province. 21% say that aid projects have been implemented in their area in the last year, while 34% say the same in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2). This indicates that a larger part of the aid projects in Faryab is implemented in the more developed areas of the province.

The respondents who knew of aid projects were asked to mention what kind of projects these were, and they were allowed to mention two projects. In total, 45% say that these projects are vocational projects (tailoring), while corresponding numbers for construction of wells, bridges, roads, and schools are 43%, 40%, 27% and 15%, respectively. These are the same kind of aid projects that are replied in all the previous waves as well, although not always in the same order.

5.4 Governance

When asked who has the most influence in their local area – the government, opposing government elements (mukhalafeen-e dawlat) or neither – 81% reply that it is the government, and only 12% that it is opposing government elements. Figure 5.12 compares the results from all eight waves on this question.

20 The question was not included before April 2012 (wave 5), and so there is not enough data to conclude on whether there is a seasonal variation or not.
21 In average, during the eight waves, 26% believe that things are going in the right direction due to reconstruction.
The survey shows that a higher proportion of the less developed areas are under influence of opposing government elements than the more developed areas. For instance, 17% of people living in category 5 areas (Section 3.6) state that opposing government elements have most influence, while only 2% state the same in the more developed areas (category 1).

5.4.1 Local government

The overall perception of the government on different levels has been good throughout all eight waves. In October 2013, when asked to rate the performance of various levels of government, 61% expressed that the provincial government in Maimanah and that the district authorities did a somewhat or very good job.

However, the fairly good impression of the provincial government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that 74% state that corruption is a moderate to big problem amongst the provincial government officials. Thus, a lot of the respondents who believe the local government is doing a good job also believe corruption is a problem amongst the local government officials. This is the same situation as seen when looking at the Afghan police (Section 5.2.1). Again, the Afghan perception of corruption may differ from the Western definition.

Over time, there has been a negative trend when it comes to whether or not the respondents express that the provincial and district governors misuse their power. In April 2010, more than half the respondents stated that the provincial government officials never misused their power, whilst the corresponding number in October 2012 was only 22%. In October 2013, however, the corresponding number is only 12%. The respondents are slightly more negative when it comes to the district governor.

5.4.2 Rule of law

Regarding justice and the rule of law, 29% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 26% would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 38% would use both in the case of a dispute.
This is a shift from the previous waves: Fewer people state that they would go to an Afghan state court in October 2013, while more say they would use both the state court and the local Shura/Jirga in case of a dispute.

5.4.3 Presidential and Provincial Council elections 2014

The Presidential and Provincial Council elections are scheduled to be held in Afghanistan on 5 April 2014. The previous elections have been characterized by accusations of election fraud, lack of security and low voter turn-out, among others.

In October 2013, 83% of the respondents say they would participate in an election. This has been fairly steady throughout the survey, fluctuating round 80%. On the other hand, more and more of the respondents willing to participate in an election say they will do so with concerns about their safety (Figure 5.13). In October 2013, only 18% of the respondents willing to participate in an election, would do so with no concerns about their safety.

![Figure 5.13 Would you participate with no concerns, some concerns, or a lot of concerns about your safety?](image)

5.5 Ghormach and Kohistan

As mentioned in Section 2.2, booster 3 and 4 consist of respondents from Ghormach and Kohistan. However, due to security and transportation restrictions respectively, the interviews were not held in these districts, but rather in neighbouring districts. These respondents are therefore not a representative sample of the two districts. Still, in order to cover these districts the boosters have been analysed and compared to the main bulk of Faryab. In past waves, the results have differed from the main bulk with significantly more negative results concerning security in Ghormach, and development in Kohistan. This chapter looks at major discrepancies between the main bulk and the respondents from Ghormach and Kohistan.
5.5.1 Ghormach

The respondents from Ghormach are solely Pashtuns, but note that these respondents are not included in the sample of Pashtun respondents described in Section 5.7. Regarding what direction the general situation in Faryab is developing, the Ghormach respondents are considerably more negative than the overall population in Faryab. 70% of respondents say they believe things are moving in the wrong direction, compared to 36% in the overall population. This is more negative than results in past waves. The reasons are, however, the same as with the main bulk – predominantly poor security, and corruption.

Indeed, lack of security is reported as the biggest problem in Ghormach (22%), compared to unemployment being the biggest problem in the main bulk. Furthermore, 86% are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the security situation, compared to 68% in the overall population of Faryab. The Ghormach respondents also significantly differ from the main bulk in that 72% say the security at schools has decreased over the last year, compared to 26% in the main bulk. Perhaps as a result of this situation, only 23% and 19% believe the size of ANA and ANP forces, respectively, are sufficient.

In addition, 0% of Ghormach respondents report that aid projects have been implemented that benefited their community during the last year, compared to 23% overall in Faryab.

5.5.2 Kohistan

With regard to the direction in which the general situation in Faryab is developing, the Kohistan respondents are also notably more negative than the main bulk of Faryab. 49% of Kohistan respondents believe things are going in the wrong direction, again compared to 36% in the main bulk. Whilst Kohistan respondents agree with the main bulk that unemployment is the biggest problem, the second biggest problem is reported as lack of electricity at 17%, compared to 7% in the main bulk. Indeed, only 4% of Kohistan respondents are somewhat or very satisfied with the supply of electricity, compared to 40% in the main bulk of Faryab.

84% are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the condition of the roads, compared to 73% in the main bulk. 51% believe roads are most important for the needs of the community at present, compared to 25% believing the same of the overall population of Faryab. On the other hand, 87% are somewhat or very satisfied with the availability of clean water for drinking and cooking, compared to 69% in the main bulk. 82% are also somewhat or very satisfied with the availability of water for irrigation, compared to 50% in the main bulk.

The Kohistan respondents also notably differ from the main bulk with regards to security-related questions in a negative direction. This has not been the case in previous waves except for October 2012 (wave 6), and even then not as strongly as now in wave 8. Lack of security is reported by 17% to be the biggest problem, sharing first place with lack of electricity. Only 13% and 11% agree the size of ANA and ANP forces, respectively, are sufficient, compared to 47% and 53% agreeing in the main bulk.
Probably in connection, 64% of respondents in Kohistan reply that the people themselves provide security in the district (33% in main bulk), compared to 60% of main bulk respondents replying ANP (only 17% in Kohistan).

5.6 Women

Afghanistan is considered one of the most dangerous countries for women to live in [18]. This is due to violence, lacking healthcare and poverty, amongst others. The Norwegian government states that the absence of participation of women in the society is one of the main obstacles to achieve stability and development in Afghanistan. The gender perspective is therefore an integral part of the Norwegian aid to Afghanistan [19].

Comparing the female and male respondents, the survey shows that fewer women can read and write compared to men. Only 20% of the female respondents can read and write, while 26% of the male respondents can (Figure 5.14). This is also seen when it comes to the level of education: 81% of the women have no formal schooling, while the same applies for 75% of the men.

![Figure 5.14 Women and men answer: Can you read and write?](image)

Comparing girls and boys attending school there is a difference in participation. In wave 8, around 84% of boys are going to school, while only 69% of girls are doing the same (Figure 5.15). Throughout all waves, more boys than girls have attended school. 22 42% of the respondents answer They are not allowed and 23% Insecurity as the reason for why girls are not going to school. Corresponding numbers for boys are 3% and 7%. The main reason for why boys are not going to school is that They are working (80%).

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22 This question was first introduced in wave 3.
Figure 5.15 How many boys and girls are going to school?  

It is also seen in the survey that women use various media less than men. This might be a consequence of the fact that fewer women can read and write. Women in general read newspapers less often than men. They also listen to radio and use mobile phones less often than men do.

When it comes to women’s job and education opportunities, 64% are dissatisfied with women’s opportunities in Faryab. Both genders are dissatisfied with the situation. Previously there has been a positive trend on this subject (Figure 5.16), but the results in April 2013 did not follow this trend. The results in October 2013 are more positive than in April 2013. Looking a year ahead, about half of the respondents believe it will stay the same, while 29% and 23%, respectively, think the opportunities will become better and worse. Men are slightly more negative when looking a year ahead compared to women.

Figure 5.16 How satisfied are you with women’s job and education opportunities?

In general, the opinions of women and men in the survey are fairly similar with only minor differences. This similarity in opinions may be due to no significant difference of opinion between the genders. Or it could be due to the fact that none of the women were alone with the
interviewer during the interview. Other persons present could be family members, friends or neighbours.

One area where the opinions differ is the impression of the Afghan security forces. Women’s impression of the ANA and ANP is more positive.

In addition, women are more positive when looking a year ahead. This includes most of the social services. They are more positive than men when it comes to availability of water for irrigation, jobs, electricity, security, clinics, education for children and women, products at the market and road conditions.

### 5.7 Pashtuns

The major ethnic groups living in Faryab are Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen and Pashtuns [14]. The Uzbek group is the largest ethnic group, and this is reflected in our surveys. The Uzbeks hold the most powerful positions in the province government and authorities. Due to ethnic tensions between the Uzbeks and Pashtuns, this has led to an unfair distribution of goods to the Pashtuns. The Faryab Survey includes a booster of respondents from Pashtun villages in order to better cover the Pashtun perception of the situation. This chapter compares the result from these Pashtun villages to the overall average in Faryab.

As seen in all previous waves, the Pashtun minority is significantly worse off in relation to living standards than the average in Faryab. Figure 5.17 shows that for Pashtuns in wave 8, 98% live with poor roads and with poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less). The corresponding number for the overall population of Faryab is 79%.

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23 Women who speak their opinion may challenge the culture of what is acceptable in Afghanistan and may be afraid of speaking their mind freely.
As seen in previous surveys, the Pashtuns are generally more negative to the situation compared with the average in Faryab. However, this is not as clear in this wave as in previous waves. Primarily, the negative differences are with regards to development, and partly security. Many of the negative differences might derive from the differing living conditions for the various ethnicities.

The Pashtuns’ satisfaction with the situation is shown in Figure 5.18 (the corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.11). The biggest differences in a negative direction, are in the areas of availability of clinics and hospitals, medicine, electricity, availability of education for children, and security. For the remainder of the surveyed areas, the Pashtuns are approximately as satisfied/dissatisfied as the average in Faryab. One positive finding is that the Pashtuns are significantly more satisfied than the average in Faryab with the availability of clean water for drinking (81% compared to 69%).

**Figure 5.17 Living standard comparisons between Pashtuns and Faryab (main sample).**
The Pashtuns share the opinion of the rest of Faryab that the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the people themselves are the most important security providers. Positively, in a reversal from the last survey (wave 7 in April 2013), the Pashtuns agree that the ANP is the main security provider. 57% replied that the ANP is an important security provider, compared with 32% replying that it is the people themselves. Local elders / Shuras are stated as a close third, with 25%. Regarding the ANP, this level is the highest since wave 5 in April 2012, and a break in the negative trend seen on this parameter since wave 4 in October 2011.

When it comes to the impression of the security forces, the Pashtuns are approximately on the same level as the average in Faryab. This applies for both the army and the police. 67% have a good impression of the police, compared to 74% overall in Faryab. However, 91% agree that the ANP is honest and fair with the people, compared with 87% overall in Faryab. Also, with regards to professionalism, 37% say the ANP is unprofessional, compared to 40% overall in Faryab.

65% Pashtuns have a good impression of the army, compared to 74% overall in Faryab. However, 97% believe the ANA is honest and fair with the people, compared to 87% overall in Faryab. Similarly, 32% reply that the ANA is unprofessional, compared to 37% overall in Faryab. All in all, the security forces have risen in status among the Pashtuns compared to previous waves.

The Pashtuns have also developed a considerably more positive impression of the local governance. Figure 5.19 shows how the Pashtuns rate the District authorities’ performance. 78%
say they believe the district authorities are doing a good job, compared to 61% overall in Faryab. This is remarkably higher than in wave 7 in April 2013, where only a marginal majority of Pashtuns at 52% believed the district authorities did a good job. The same pattern is seen in regards to the provincial authorities. These results might possibly be in response to the recruitment of a Pashtun Chief of Police (ANP).

![Figure 5.19 How do you rate the performance of the District Authorities?](image)

6 Conclusions

The Faryab Survey provides an insight into the population’s perception of its own situation. Wave 8 is the eight in line conducted in October 2013, a year after the withdrawal of the international military forces from the province. On many topics the results from October 2013 are not as positive as in April 2013, but have rather reverted to the same level as in October 2012.

The result in October 2013 shows that only 40% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 36% state the opposite. This is about the same situation as seen a year ago, just after the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan leadership.

The survey can be used to assess how the people in Faryab stand regarding the four transition criteria (Section 1.1):

- **Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF**

  The overall impression of the Afghan National Security Forces is still good. In October 2013, and a year after the withdrawal of ISAF, 60% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be the most important security provider in their districts. This is in line with the previous waves, where the result has fluctuated around 60%. This is a positive finding knowing the ANP, as the main security provider, is now operating on its own.
On the other hand, the proportion saying the Afghan National Army (ANA) provides security has had an underlying negative trend, and is now at its lowest throughout the survey.

33% respond that the people themselves provide security in their area. In addition, 18% respond that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area. This has not changed much since October 2012, but show that ANSF is still not capable of providing security to all of Faryab.

- **Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities**
  The perception of the security situation is about the same as a year ago, just after the transition, but is deteriorating compared to April 2013. In October 2013, 40% reply that they are satisfied with the situation, as compared with 58% in April 2013. A negative result in the autumn might be due to a seasonal variation.

  People living in more developed areas are generally more satisfied with the security situation compared to the less developed areas.

- **Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced**
  The overall perception of the government is still good. 61% express that the provincial government does a good job. This is significant lower than in April 2013, but somewhat higher than in October 2012. Still, 74% state that corruption is a problem amongst the provincial government officials.

  When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 29% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 26% would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 38% would use both in the case of a dispute. This is a shift from previous waves: Fewer people state that they would go to an Afghan state court in October 2013, while more say they would use both the state court and the local Shura/Jirga in case of a dispute.

  It is positive that 83% of the respondents say they would participate in an election. On the other hand, it is a concern that only 18% of the respondents willing to participate in an election, would do so with no concerns about their safety.

- **ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish**
  ISAF posture is not relevant after the transition.

  The transition criteria aside: Unemployment is still considered the single largest problem in Faryab, continuing the consistent trend for all waves of surveying. Equally, people are dissatisfied with the job opportunities in the province.
Two of the districts, Kohistan and Ghormach, had to be covered through intercept interviews in neighbouring districts due to security restrictions (Ghormach) and transportation restrictions (Kohistan). The respondents from the Ghormach and the Kohistan district are, for the most, more negative to the situation with regards to both security and development issues compared to the Faryab province.

Looking at the Pashtuns, this ethnic group is more negative to the situation compared to the average in Faryab. However, this is not as clear in this wave as in previous waves. Primarily, the negative differences are with regards to development and partly security. One reason for this might be that the Pashtun villages have much poorer living standards compared to Faryab overall, with 98% of the Pashtun respondents in this wave living with poor roads and poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

The results of October 2013 are likely to be the final in the Faryab Survey series. Its future lies in in-depth analysis combined with other data sources, but the current results give the last insight into up-to-date perceptions of the population of Faryab based on our approach. On many topics the results are more negative than in April 2013, and approximately down to the levels of October 2012. Some of these developments may be explained by a larger number of Pashtuns and people living in areas with poorer living standards compared to previous waves. However, it is reasonable to say that the results of April 2013 did not establish a new positive trend in Faryab.
References


## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSOR</td>
<td>Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTILOPE</td>
<td>Analysis support to military operations, FFI-project 1229</td>
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<td>FFI</td>
<td>Norwegian Defence Research Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>TSG-F</td>
<td>Transition Support Group – Faryab</td>
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