Can recent developments in Chinese financial statecraft capabilities have implications for Norway’s national security interests?

FFI-Report 2025
Gina Gerhardsen Marie Nordlie
In recent years, the intersection of economic instruments and national security has gained increased prominence in both academic debates and policy debates. The escalation of the U.S.–China trade conflict and Washington’s growing reliance on trade restrictions as tools of coercion have renewed interest in economic statecraft – the strategic use of economic resources to advance foreign policy objectives. Closely related is the emerging, though less explored, concept of financial statecraft, which involves the deployment of financial instruments and infrastructures for similar strategic purposes.
China’s role in the global financial system has evolved considerably in recent years, particularly through the development of new financial technologies. This report examines whether these developments enhance China’s capacity to exercise financial statecraft in ways that could carry security implications for Norway. Our analysis is informed by the theory of Weaponized Interdependence, which highlights how network structures create power asymmetries: states that occupy central positions, or ‘hubs’, can leverage their position through exclusion (exploiting chokepoints) and information control (exploiting so-called panopticon effects). We assess whether China’s growing presence as a financial hub enables it to wield coercive power against Norway by evaluating four key financial technologies: CIPS, e-CNY, Alipay, and Chinese-backed stablecoins.
We find no evidence that these instruments currently generate chokepoint or panopticon effects that could be directly weaponized against Norway. Our main conclusion, therefore, is that China’s recent advances in financial statecraft, with respect to these four instruments, do not pose immediate security risks for Norway. However, indirect risks warrant close attention. These technologies may strengthen China’s resilience against Western sanctions, reduce the costs of potential disruptions to Western financial infrastructure, and gradually shift the strategic balance of power in ways that could, over time, introduce new security challenges for Norway.

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