Counterinsurgency - when theory meets reality - seminar report

This report is the end-product of a one-day seminar on counterinsurgency (COIN) arranged by the Norwegian MNE-6 Working Group. Hence, the majority of arguments presented in the report are primarily based on viewpoints expressed by the seminar participants. Due to a plethora of different uses and meanings, COIN has become a somewhat elusive concept, hard to handle with analytical rigor. In COIN, military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions are all combined to effectively defeat an insurgency. Therefore COIN is first and foremost a political endeavour. Accordingly, COIN can be defined as a comprehensive strategy to restore or establish political legitimacy, protect political infrastructure, and achieve local political dominance. The American COIN doctrine, FM 3-24, constitutes the most recent and significant publication on COIN. However, FM 3-24 does not contain any particularly new or groundbreaking thoughts on COIN. Rather it is based on a series of classical COIN publications as well as a long chain of American field manuals addressing challenges met in irregular warfare. In this context, it is not the essence of COIN that has changed, but the strategic context within which current COIN operations are being run. In order to address this new strategic context of COIN operations the British are currently working on a new UK COIN doctrine. The main difference from previous sets of British COIN principles is an added focus on the population in terms of understanding their culture and providing lasting security as a means of gaining and securing their support. There seems now to be a general acceptance among troop contributing countries in Iraq and Afghanistan that COIN is the most appropriate strategy for managing these conflicts. As a result, elements of COIN are currently being applied consciously by the majority of contingents. Nevertheless, a comprehensive COIN strategy employed consistently across all contingents has yet to materialize. Different contributing countries tend to operate along the same lines of operations, however often with different labels. There are also discrepancies in the concepts of operation of each nation, which obviously reflect the available manpower and resources. Norwegian experiences from Afghanistan expose a number of challenges that the Norwegian Armed Forces are facing to successfully contribute to larger COIN campaigns. In terms of force contributions, there is a certain degree of ambiguity between the political discourse and its corresponding decision making. In addition, there are problems of civil-military cooperation, interagency planning and lack of doctrinal guidance tools. To substantiate Norwegian strategic thinking about its contribution to Afghanistan, A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan was recently published. This document has several points of intersection with current COIN doctrinal thinking. Yet this short document does not point out how its stated objectives can be operationalised into ground activities. Hence, there is still no Norwegian COIN doctrine. Given her military and political caveats, Norway would benefit from having a strategy document, or a set of doctrinal guidelines, addressing COIN operations within the current strategic context, but from a Norwegian perspective.