Drivers of nuclear weapons proliferation in Egypt and Saudi Arabia

English summary This report aims to investigate the drivers behind nuclear proliferation and apply an investigation of these to the states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It aims to do so by examining two key concepts; opportunity and willingness. Opportunity will be understood as the various factors that comprise necessary conditions for manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. These factors include technological facilities and expertise, economic capacity and resilience, and delivery systems. Willingness will be explained to be the various factors that trigger the decision to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. These are based on security threats, domestic politics, norms, and status. In regards to Egypt, the report finds an extensive and advanced nuclear infrastructure. The currently existing facilities in Egypt could potentially be used to produce plutonium at a rate of just over 8 kg annually. Egypt, despite on-going political turmoil, has a more resilient and stronger economy than both Pakistan and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, both states that managed to develop nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Egypt fields a variety of delivery systems, from ballistic missiles through cruise missiles, artillery and military aircraft. Saudi Arabia however currently lacks the infrastructure and expertise necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. This could however be developed, given their big and resilient economy, but makes a Saudi Arabian manufacture of nuclear weapons unlikely in the immediate future. Questions arise however from the Saudi Arabian possession of DF-3 inter-regional ballistic missiles. These missiles are highly inaccurate in pinpoint targeting and tactical use, and have been deployed as delivery systems for nuclear weapons by the People’s Liberation Army of China in the past. Speculations that Saudi Arabia has a nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that might allow them to directly purchase nuclear warheads or materials are hard to verify, but important not to discount in an investigation of the state’s proliferation risk. The report finds that Egypt is less likely to seek nuclear weapons as a response to changes in its security situation in the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia is more likely to do so. Domestic politics however are seen as a stronger incentive to acquire nuclear weapons in Egypt, yet plays a less significant role in Saudi Arabia. Both states are likely to be influenced by considerations of regional status and prestige in the event of a nuclear armed Iran, and similarly by a weakening of the normative global regime of non-proliferation. To conclude, the report finds that Egypt has a greater opportunity than Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons and that the willingness of both states is contingent on regional developments.