Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine

This report summarizes some of the most important lessons learned so far from the war in Ukraine. The study is based on work in the various departments at FFI, particularly technologically advanced aspects of warfighting such as cyber operations and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes. In addition, a broad spectrum of external, open sources has been used, both military and civilian.

The report begins with a chapter about empirical lessons at the political and strategic levels, with particular emphasis on the Russian decision to go to war, and the build-up period preceding the invasion. Following that, the report is organized with chapters for each of the six warfighting domains, in addition to domain-independent operations such as logistics, electronic warfare, etc. For each type of operation, lessons or hypotheses pertaining to tactics, equipment, organization, and training have been considered, insofar as the source material has contained sufficient evidence to support them in terms of causality. We have also examined to what extent the lessons learned are independent of the political, military, physical, and other contexts of the war in Ukraine – i.e., to what extent the lessons can be assumed to have general applicability.

Several of the inferred assumptions can be traced to new or emerging technologies and their use on the battlefield. This applies particularly to improved sensor technology, the use of unmanned or autonomous systems, and the growing importance of indirect fires from weapons combining long range with a high degree of precision. Where either of the two sides has managed to integrate two or more such technologies to establish comprehensive kill chains, this has had a disproportionate impact on tactics and operations, in terms of either their character, their outcome or both. A common denominator for today’s technologies with this kind of disruptive effect is that they all emanate from the digitization of military equipment and warfighting procedures in general.

As a consequence of the war’s duration, however, the two sides have managed to develop countermeasures against some of the weapons against which there seemed to be little protection initially. Successful countermeasures have then triggered adaptations of the original system, which has led to new countermeasures, etc. Such creative processes are ongoing, which means that some of the lessons learned must be considered temporary, since a new and final equilibrium between measures and countermeasures has yet to emerge.

Following the completion of the report, FFI became aware of the forthcoming publication of a Russian book on the development of modern war, based on the experiences from Ukraine and with a foreword by Colonel General (retd) Yuri Baluyevsky, former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. This is highly interesting, both because it gives a Russian view of the lessons learned from the ‘special military operation’, and because the conclusions are largely consistent with those of the report. Selected paragraphs from General Baluyevsky's foreword have therefore been included in an annex.