Position, navigation and time – and its impact for total defence

FFI-Report 2026
This publication is only available in Norwegian

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Report number

26/013

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3.3 MB

Language

Norwegian

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Lily Hübert Tor Atle Solend Anders Rødningsby Stig Rune Sellevåg
Commissioned by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has assessed the importance of satellite-based position, navigation, and time (PNT) for Norway’s total defense. Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) have increasingly been integrated into several parts of society as a source for highly accurate position and time. However, GNSS signals are very weak and highly vulnerable to electromagnetic disturbances, both natural and manmade. Norway has increasingly experienced such disturbances, and in their open threat assessment The Norwegian Intelligence Service assessed how outer space can be a future arena for warfighting.
The main focus of our report is to assess GNSS, although other parts of the space industry are also discussed. The study has mapped different uses of GNSS in society and described intentional actions and hazards that can lead to loss of GNSS services and other satellite services. We have assessed the importance of GNSS for Norway’s total defense capability based on a risk analysis of critical societal functions. Our study has also identified several cross-sectoral vulnerabilities that increase the risk for total defense, including an increased dependency on GNSS and several uncertainty elements related to the ability of societal functions to withstand GNSS disturbances.
We have concluded that satellite-based PNT strengthens Norway’s total defense and that loss of GNSS will reduce functional capabilities. The use of incorrect position or time data as a result of increasingly advanced spoofing attacks increases the risk for loss of functional capability in several societal functions. Loss of GNSS services increases the possibility for loss of life and health, especially relating to the emergency services’ need for PNT, and reduces situational awareness in the entire crisis spectrum. This may, for example, create dangerous situations for transport services and delays in supply deliveries. GNSS disturbances can cause problems for electricity supply and mobile networks.
We recommend six measures that will reduce risk and increase PNT resilience in Norway:
• enabling and conducting testing of equipment to identify and map vulnerabilities
• developing national frameworks and standards for PNT that include requirements for societal sectors
• developing ground-based alternatives to maintain and secure a stable time reference in Norway and Norway’s economic zone
• ensuring more resilient use of GNSS
• developing robust multi-sensor PNT systems
• continuing international collaboration to improve the security and availability of satellite based PNT and satellite service

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