Økende, komplekst og uoversiktlig – kartlegging av utenlandsk påvirkning i forbindelse med stortingsvalget 2025

The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (KDD) commissioned the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) to examine whether foreign actors have attempted to influence Norwegian citizens on social media in connection with the 2025 parliamentary election. We examined this in cooperation with Analyse & Tall and Common Consultancy. The dataset consists of more than 22 million posts and comments collected from Facebook, X, TikTok, and Telegram between 1 September 2024 and 14 September 2025.

Russian actors mention Norway in 48 posts per day on average, up from 31 the previous year – an increase of about 55 percent. They seek to weaken support for Ukraine and amplify conflict and distrust within and between Western countries, including Norway. They distort events to portray Norway as “russophobic”, they accuse Norwegian media of spreading fake news, and they use Glenn Diesen and Steigan.no to legitimize pro-Russian narratives.

For the first time, we have found an influence attempt explicitly linked to the election: A proRussian hacker group ran a campaign (#OpNorway) on Telegram and X, combined with claimed denial-of-service attacks against Norwegian websites, including that of the Conservative Party (Høyre). Our assessment is that this had no impact on the election.

Chinese actors mention Norway in 4 posts per day on average, up from 3 the previous year – an increase of about 33 percent. Chinese Norwegian-language content grew significantly from 6 to 831 posts, and CGTN is seeking Norwegian-speaking journalists, indicating that Norwegians are now a more important target audience. Chinese actors aim to position China in line with the doctrine “Tell the China story well”, using Norwegian politicians, business leaders, and celebrities to promote China as an attractive destination and partner. Increasingly professionally produced content is spread through state-controlled media and influencers, sometimes amplified by paid advertising for global reach. There is no indication of direct Chinese election interference.

We identified one case of coordinated inauthentic activity targeting the election: A network of seven anonymous TikTok profiles sought to undermine three center-left parties through satirical comments about Islam and immigration, gaining significant exposure. We also found several profiles using political party logos and names without disclosing account ownership. It is possible that the actors behind both the network and the political profiles are Norwegian.

Our results show that Russia and China attempt to influence and shape Norwegian perceptions in line with their strategic goals and deliberately use Norway in narratives for international audiences. Apart from #OpNorway, we found no evidence of foreign influence directly targeting the election itself.

Our analyses reveal a more complex information environment. Social media’s lack of transparency makes attribution difficult and sometimes impossible, complicating efforts to distinguish authentic from inauthentic activity, genuine from fabricated content, and foreign from domestic actors.