Possible effects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq on the nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and Libya
About the publication
Report number
2013/02732
ISBN
978-82-464-2327-2
Format
PDF-document
Size
1.5 MB
Language
English
In 2003 the nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran and Libya all took a radical new turn; North
Korea left the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Iran halted parts of its
nuclear program and signed the Additional Protocol; while Libya decided to cancel its nuclear
program. It is interesting that all programs took this turn within the same year as Iraq was invaded
based on allegations of having programs for the development of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. The report concerns the possible effects which the invasion of Iraq
had on the three nuclear programs, and to what degree the outcome can be explained by the
invasion. In addition, this report discusses possible effects on the further development of Iran’s
and North Korea’s nuclear programs from 2003 to 2013.The conclusions of the report are
primarily based on realism as the most relevant international relations theory, which means that
the behavior of the states are analyzed through their actions rather than domestic factors.
Liberalism and social constructivism are used for support.
• Iran’s decision to suspend its uranium enrichment on 8 December 2003 and sign the
Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 was primarily due to the effect of the Iraq
invasion. The threat of sanctions, and the belief that the suspension of the enrichment
would only be temporary, also contributed. This is best explained by realism. The
decision to continue the enrichment, and thereby the nuclear program, was affected by the
election of a new president in 2005, and the realization that the other negotiators wanted a
permanent halt. This period can be explained through social constructivism.
• North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT was due to the pressure building up by
the Iraq invasion, but also the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the Bush
administration’s approach. North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons is based
on a strategy of using its nuclear weapons program as a leverage to initiate negotiations
and gain incentives. All actions by North Korea can be explained through realism.
• Libya’s decision to cancel its nuclear program was due to the effect of sanctions, the
disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network, the Lockerbie negotiations and the realization that
the regime could remain in power. Libya’s actions can be explained through realism.
As this report is issued, it is still uncertain whether Iran’s nuclear program is for nuclear weapons
or nuclear power, if the current negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 will result in a permanent
agreement, and if North Korea will conduct more nuclear tests or missile launches.