Et uunyttet gevinstpotensial? - insentiver for forbedring og effektivisering på tvers av etatene i forsvarssektoren

FFI-Report 2019

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19/00102

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978-82-464-3237-3

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1.1 MB

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Brage Lien Torbjørn Hanson Petter Y. Lindgren Helene Berg
In the current long term plan for the Norwegian defence sector (2017–2020) the efficiency requirements amount to 1.8 billion NOK, distributed on the sector’s five agencies. These gains from efficiency come from a combination of a number of central and local initiatives, mainly from improvement of the agencies’ own processes. However, increasing numbers of tasks are outsourced, and unmitigated in their own agencies. These tasks are typically not within the core activities of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The latest example is the establishment of the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA) in 2016, where the two processes management and investment in materiel were to be unmitigated and professionalized. This gives the opportunity to improve and increase efficiency in the value chain across agencies. The improvement and efficiency of processes involving several agencies has not been studied previously, so this area has potential for gains from increased efficiency. In this report we identify and map the existing formal incentives for across agencies in the defence sector. Then we will present measures to improve the incentive structure. To study the incentives we have developed three research questions: 1. What are the formal incentives to improve and increase efficiency across agencies in the Norwegian defence sector? 2. How do the agencies themselves work to improve and increase efficiency in the value chain across agencies? 3. What initiatives can be taken to develop the incentive structure in order to improve and increase efficiency across the agencies? From our study of incentive structures we find the following main result per agency: • The Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NSD) has incentives to increase efficiency through governance indicators, but these are neither sufficiently specified nor operationalized. This leads to a weakening of the incentives within investment and management of new facilities. Revising the rent model could create further incentives. • The governance indicators of NDMA in general have good incentives for improving and increasing efficiency in the processes of materiel management and investment. However, the lack of financial incentives causes a weakening of the incentive structure. • The Norwegian Defence Reseach Establishment (FFI) in general has sweak incentives to improve and increase efficiency. However, most of the gaps in the incentive structure are covered though the financing terms of the agency. • To study the incentives within the Norwegian Armed Forces, we looked at which of the other agencies’ governance indicators that were mirrored in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ incentive structure. We found a substantial potential to improve incentives, especially within the processes of investment and management of new materiel and new facilities.

About publication

Report number

19/00102

ISBN

978-82-464-3237-3

Format

PDF-document

Size

1.1 MB

Download publication

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