When lies are spread as truths – a case study on Russian propaganda
About the publication
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6.5 MB
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Norwegian
This report analyses the dissemination of a specific false news story published by the Russian media outlet RT (Russia Today) on 28 January 2025. The report was commissioned by Kongsberg Gruppen (KOG).
The story claims that a Russian hacker obtained highly sensitive documents from KOG through social engineering targeting a KOG employee. According to these documents, Norway supposedly entered into a secret agreement to deliver ten new NASAMS air defence systems to Ukraine. The story is constructed with technical details, visual elements, and a narrative structure designed to convey credibility and trigger engagement, despite the clear absence of sources, rebuttals, and verifiable information.
The analysis traces how the story first appeared on Mash.ru’s Telegram channel and was subsequently spread across a range of Russian state-controlled media outlets, proxy actors, and disinformation websites. In total, the fake news story was featured on 77 websites and in 211 social media posts, with at least 1.6 million views. It was published in multiple languages, primarily Russian and English, but also others. The report documents how the story was amplified through a broad network of actors within the Russian information manipulation ecosystem, including the Pravda network and Storm-1516, as well as commercial networks used by Russia to launder content and circumvent EU sanctions on state-controlled media. Additionally, the story was shared by the Chinese-linked Paperwall network.
Using EU DisinfoLab’s methodology for assessing disinformation incidents, we classify the story as ‘high risk’. This indicates that it had a wide reach, high exposure, and the potential to influence perceptions. While the direct impact of this single case is likely limited, it should be seen as a drop in a larger ocean of Russian propaganda stories. The case illustrates how false information can gain strategic relevance when embedded in a coordinated influence pattern.
For KOG, we assess the direct damage from this specific case as limited. However, the incident highlights a real risk to the company: more systematic and targeted dissemination of similar narratives over time could erode trust among customers, partners, authorities, and the public, increase KOG’s visibility as a target, and potentially influence support for Ukraine. This risk is particularly relevant if such claims persist over time, become embedded in search results or large language model outputs, and are repeated over time.